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SUMMARY
Humans are experts at understanding what they see.  Similarity and analogy play 
a significant role in making sense of the visual world by forming analogies to similar 
images encountered previously.  Yet, while these acts of visual reasoning may be 
commonplace, the processes of visual analogy are not yet well understood. 
In this dissertation, I investigate the utility of representing visual information in a 
fractal manner for computing visual similarity and analogy.  In particular, I develop a 
computational technique of fractal reasoning for addressing problems of visual similarity 
and novelty. I illustrate the effectiveness of fractal reasoning on problems of visual 
similarity and analogy on the Raven’s Progressive Matrices and Miller’s Analogies tests 
of intelligence, problems of visual novelty and oddity on the Odd One Out test of 
intelligence, and problems of visual similarity and oddity on the Dehaene test of core 
geometric reasoning.  I show that the performance of my computational model on these 
various tests is comparable to human performance.  
Fractal reasoning provides a new method for computing answers to such 
problems.  Specifically, I show that the choice of the level of abstraction of problem 
representation determines the degree to which an answer may be regarded as confident, 
and that that choice of abstraction may be controlled automatically by the algorithm as a 
means of seeking that confident answer.  This emergence of ambiguity and its remedy via 
problem re-representation is afforded by the fractal representation.  I also show how 
reasoning over sparse data (at coarse levels of abstraction) or homogeneous data (at finest  
xxvii
levels of abstraction) could both drive the automatic exclusion of certain levels of 
abstraction, as well as provide a signal to shift the analogical reasoning from 
consideration of simple analogies (such as analogies between pairs of objects) to more 
complex analogies (such as analogies among triplets, or larger groups of objects).  
My dissertation also explores fractal reasoning in perception, including both 
biologically-inspired imprinting and bistable perception.  In particular, it provides a 
computational explanation of bistable perception in the famous Necker cube problem that 
is directly tied to the process of determining a confident interpretation via re-
representation. 
Thus, my research makes two primary contributions to AI theories of visual 
similarity and analogy.  The first contribution is the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) 
algorithm, the computational technique for visual reasoning that automatically adjusts 
fractal representations to an appropriate level of abstraction. The second contribution is 
the fractal representation itself, a knowledge representation that add the notion of self-




 We humans are expert at visual reasoning.  We constantly receive a complex 
visual world, and interpret it: faces and figures, diagrams and paintings, landscapes and 
abstracts, all yield to our superimposed understanding.  In the scenes we see, we 
recognize familiar objects, we notice novelty, and we are reminded of prior experiences.  
Yet, while the act of visual reasoning may be commonplace, how it is accomplished is 
unclear. 
 Though it is thoroughly influenced by prior research into human visual reasoning, 
the goal of my research and this dissertation is to develop a computational model of 
visual reasoning, and not a cognitive model per se.  The model I propose herein is based 
on representing the received world in a fractal manner. Using this new representational 
lens, I illustrate the power and expressivity of the model in addressing problems of visual 
similarity and novelty.
 In this introductory chapter, I begin with a few remarks concerning the inspiration 
I’ve taken from human visual reasoning, in particular familiarity, novelty, analogy, and 
abstraction. From there, I develop the problem statement, the research question, and what 
it is to construct a represented world.  I note the several challenges to undertaking this 
work, and discuss the way in which I limit the scope.  Next, I present the dissertation’s 
thesis, and three hypotheses that it addresses.  Finally, my work makes several significant 
contributions to science, and I conclude this introductory chapter with them, as a 
preamble for their further detailed discussion in the subsequent chapters. 
1
The Inspiration of Human Visual Reasoning
 My research has been significantly inspired by prior research into the way in 
which we reason about the visual world. In this section, I situate my research in the 
context of those sources of inspiration.  
Novelty and Abstraction
 Among the variety of processes, there are two aspects of human visual reasoning 
that seem especially powerful.  These are the ability to notice novelty, and the ability to 
shift to an appropriate level of abstraction.
Novelty and Familiarity
 Novelty and familiarity are related and intertwined (Sokolov, 1963): one might be 
very familiar with some visual object, yet may not consider it to be novel unless one 
encounters that object at time when least expected.  As may be seen in Figure 1.1, novelty  
implies a context in which the visual signal is to be appraised; familiarity does not 
necessarily suggest this.  Indeed, one may be entirely familiar, as an example, with what 
an apple looks like, but that apple would be unremarkable and lack novelty without some 
context.
2
 Figure 1.1.  Novelty in Context.
 In psychology, the phenomena of the orienting reflex (Sokolov, 1963) suggests 
that when stimuli are presented consistently, we (and all mammals) will turn or orient 
ourselves in the direction of a newly arriving distinct stimulus (Kishiyama & Yonelinas, 
2003).  Gradually, if the novel stimulus remains, we become habituated to it - it has 
become familiar.   This habituation to stimuli is in a sense an outcome of a consistent 
perceptual state (Barsalou, 1999).
Perception and Memory
 Perception and memory are connected via novelty as well.  Several studies 
indicate that we recall novel events more readily than non-novel events (Hunt, 1995; 
Wallace, 1965), a phenomena known as the von Restorff effect (Von Restorff, 1933, as 
cited in Hunt, 1995).  Hunt (1995) uses the term distinctiveness as a descriptive term to 
denote the perceptual saliency (or novelty) of events which violate the prevailing context, 
and argues that the novelty demands or attracts additional processing, perhaps through the 
3
mechanism of selective attention. This then causes further processing and elaboration, 
and the novel event is encoded into memory with the additional elaboration, which 
facilitates retrieval (Hunt, 1995).  
 Kishiyama and Yonelinas (2003) counter proposed, through their familiarity/
novelty hypothesis, that it is familiarity, and not recollection per se, that is sensitive to 
novelty.  Their studies suggested that novelty affects both recollection and familiarity, but  
that recollection only exhibited the von Restorff effect if the stimulus was intentionally 
encoded, whereas familiarity exhibited the von Restorff effect when the stimulus was 
encoded intentionally or incidentally.  Thus, Kishiyama and Yonelinas (2003) appeared to 
show that there may be two partially distinct responses to novelty, as measured by 
recollection.  The key in their distinction, however, lay in the nature of the encoding of 
the stimulus.
Analogy and Representation
 Our experiences provide a rich and ever changing context in which to situate, to 
compare, and to remember the in-falling visual world.   This visual input may be novel, 
or it may be the same as our just-prior experience (and we would be habituated to it).  
This textural lexicon is the structure unto which is lain the newly arriving world for 
judgment.  
 It is in this contextualization of novelty that I find the bridge to that which 
Hofstadter views as the central core of cognition, the ability to make analogies 
(Hofstadter, 2001).  Something regarded as familiar (or rather, similar, or analogous) 
must agree, in some sufficient number of aspects or ways or degrees, to that expectant 
tapestry of experience. For something to be novel, though, one need only note a single 
aspect or way or degree that doesn’t match.  
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 In either case, it is that the something can regarded as either familiar or novel only 
when it is compared against some expectation, and that expectation comes from our 
experiences. Holyoak and Hummel (2001), in their description of the consensus of 
component processes involved in analogical thinking, specifically mention the retrieval 
of a source analog from long-term memory, in addition to others: a process for mapping 
that source analog to a target in working memory, the generalization and evaluation of 
inferences, and the induction of relational schemas.  
 Essential to these processes of analogy making is the representation (are the 
representations) upon which each operates.  Most theories of analogy place particularly 
strong emphasis on structurally mapping relational presentations (Gentner, 1983; 
Holyoak & Hummel, 2001).  Yet, all begin with that retrieval of an analog from memory, 
something with which to compare the present experience. The target stimulus, the just 
arrived experience, triggers retrieval, but what affords the retrieval?
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Figure 1.2.  Successively zooming into detail.
Attention, Abstraction, and Representation
 That we are able to notice novelty so quickly, to zone in on just that substantive 
difference, is remarkable.   How is it, then, that we are able to make such swift shifts, and 
draw attention to those aspects of the visual world?  In the prior section, I discussed the 
orienting reflex, and drew upon the work of Hunt (1995) to suggest the role that the 
process of attention plays in the elaboration and encoding of visual stimuli.  Here, I 
expand on those remarks.
Signals and Attention
 The detection of a signal, the onset of a stimulus, has been studied extensively in 
psychology.  In these experiments, a signal is the stimulus being presented to a test 
subject, while noise is understood to be the rest of the environment (Goldstein, 2013). 
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Particular attention has been given to the awareness and report of the stimulus, through 
experiments which test the subject’s ability to detect near-threshold signals (signals which 
are just distinguishable from the background noise) (Posner et al., 1980).  The theory of 
signal detection (Green & Swets, 1966) makes the assumption that the observer is not-
passive, but actively determines through some process whether or not to report the 
presence of a signal.  Thus, in signal detection theory, not only is there the notion of 
sensitivity (the difficulty of distinguishing the signal from the background noise) but 
there is the notion of bias, the extent to which an answer (signal present/signal absent) is 
more probable. Both sensitivity and bias vary with the observer (Green & Swets, 1966).  
 The detection of a visual signal from a background, as one might expect in a task 
involving novelty, however differs from most of the experiments involving signal 
detection, as Posner et al. point out in a crucial way: the given signal is clearly above the 
noise threshold and 100% detectable (Posner et al., 1980).  What is varying is the spatial 
position the signal occupies in the visual scene.  This signal somehow attracts visual 
processing or attention, evoking a search of the scene for the signal itself.  
 Cognitive psychology offers at least two models for how visual attention shifts: 
the spotlight model and the zoom-lens model. In 1980, Posner et al. proposed the 
spotlight model of attention (Posner et al., 1980). The spotlight model describes attention 
as having a focus area of very high visual resolution, and a fringe area surrounding the 
focus but with a substantially lower visual resolution.  The size of the spotlight, and the 
relative proportion sizes of the focus and fringe, are fixed.  The zoom-lens model is the 
spotlight model, but relaxes the constraint of the sizes (Ericksen & St. James, 1986).  
 The tradeoff between these models rests in how much information is carried into 
the incoming signal, through the shifting in size of the region of high visual resolution.  
Both models maintain that the center of attention is wherever the geometric center of the 
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focus area happens to land within the visual field.  It’s that last bit–the geometric center 
of the focus area–that poses an issue.  How does one decide where to focus?  Perhaps it is 
driven by some innate properties of objects in the visual field to focus on those areas: 
exogenous orienting is caused by stimuli in the visual periphery or an unusually bright or 
sharp contrast. Attention maybe driven endogenously, by what one is thinking at the time, 
by expectations about the scene, past experiences, or the task at hand, to direct the eyes to 
focus other places (Goldstein, 2013).  It may be a bit of both (Berger et al., 2005). 
Attention and Abstraction
 It seems that one regards the entire image somehow, and then some further 
processing happens which directs the attention to focus on certain regions.  When we 
receive a visual scene, high quality visual information is acquired only from a limited 
spatial region surrounding the center of gaze (the fovea of the eye): visual quality falls off 
rapidly and continuously from the center of gaze into a low-resolution visual surround 
(Henderson, 2003).  Thus, the scene itself, for each gaze, varies in resolution: to obtain a 
more uniform resolution across the entirety of the scene requires the shifting of gaze, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.2.  The visual scene then is available to be reinterpreted at a finer 
granularity in this manner.  The degree to which the visual scene may be abstracted into 
finer or coarser resolution is mediated by some attention mechanism. 
 We humans effortlessly shift these levels of abstraction, changing the way in 
which the inbound visual world is modulated, all in the context and service of some task 
at hand.   Yet we also are agents embedded in the world we receive, and have other means 
to modulate the abstraction level of the visual scene.  We are able to move ourselves 
toward or away from a scene, or perhaps move some object closer to or further from us.  
In doing so, we alter the amount of the scene received by our eyes. As Wagemans et al. 
(2012a) point out, to deem something as novel involves the complex interaction of at 
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least two relationships: the relationship between the observed and its context, and the 
relationship between the observed and the observer.
Binding, Integration and the Point of View
 When we received the visual scene, we receive a great deal of information about 
the color, motion, and location.  Treisman and Gelade (1980) proposed Feature 
Integration Theory as a two-stage process by which individual objects within a scene 
might be perceived, through the binding of features received at spatial locations to objects 
located there.  To Treisman and Gelade, a received visual scene is first encoded in a 
variety of separable features or dimensions such as color, orientation, and brightness, in 
parallel across the entire scene.  Then, through attending to various locations of the scene, 
these separable features at those locations are bound together, forming the perception of 
integral objects at those locations (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
 This perceptual binding of features in a scene into objects represents a deeper shift 
in perception: the shift from a received visual world to a collection of objects over which 
to reason.  Marr (1982) proposed a similarly staged account of how human vision works.
 Vision, according to Marr (1982), is a process that produces from images of the 
external world a description that is useful to the viewer and not cluttered with irrelevant 
information. To that end, Marr argues forcefully for the shift in point of view, from 
received image to representations of 3D models (Marr 1982). This progression of 
representations begins with features ala Treisman and Gelade, although Marr limits 
himself to considering only intensity. From an array of these intensities, a primal sketch 
representation is derived, consisting of lines and edges, boundaries and blobs.  From the 
primal sketch, an analysis is made with respect to how the edges come together, and a 
2½-D sketch is formed, with inferred surface orientations and depth information.  Lastly, 
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from the 2½-D sketch, a 3D model is made by inferring volumetric primitives and their 
arrangement in an object-centered coordinate frame. 
 The result is that through the vision process proposed by Marr, the received visual 
scene is transformed into a collection of representations of the objects contained within 
the scene.  Other received features, such as color or motion, may be bound to these object 
representations, using feature integration theory, because the objects themselves occupy a 




 As I said in the preface of this chapter, my research and this dissertation are 
thoroughly influenced and motivated by studies of human visual reasoning.  However, 
the focus of my research is on artificial intelligence, and the development of intelligent 
agents (Russell et al., 2010).  To that end I would construct systems which could embody 
computationally some model of these processes of visual reasoning, the ability to notice 
novelty, to choose appropriate levels of abstraction, and make analogies over visual 
information.
 Thus, the challenge posed would seem to distill such observations into the 
tractable and the computable.  My body of work is marshaled toward addressing the 
following specific problem statement and research question.  
The Problem Statement
 Given that novelty and abstraction are so fundamental to visual reasoning, the 
problem lies in precisely how this may occur.  This dissertation’s problem statement is:
 
How might a visual scene be received to afford the notice of novelty at an appropriate 
level of abstraction? 
The Research Question
 My work is focused on the creation of computational models, and not expressly 
upon the delivery of a cognitively-plausible explanation of the phenomena. Therefore, the 
research question derived from the problem statement is restricted to computational 
models. Further, the question must be restricted toward problems which involve 
determining novelty or similarity, and in particular problems which involve analogy. 
Thus, this is the dissertation’s research question:
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How might a cognitively-inspired computational model receive a visual scene and, in the 
service of some visual analogical task, notice novelty at an appropriate level of 
abstraction? 
 In the next sections, I will expand upon what I mean by the visual scene and 
visual tasks, to motivate my thesis statement and its attendant hypotheses.
Figure 1.3. A 2D visual scene
Receiving a Visual Scene
 Simply put, for humans, to receive a visual scene is to gaze upon it, and receive 
light information into the eyes. Computationally, it is analogous: a scene is received once 
it is input in some format. Figure 1.3 shows one such scene.
 However, it is important to draw a distinction between what the world is and what 
the world affords.  Some object in the world may be labelled as novel by a particular 
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observer, but that is not sufficient to suggest that the object in question would be regarded 
as novel by every plausible observer.  Novelty depends upon context, and every 
observer’s context–her internal, perceptual context–will vary.
 Similarly, while a visual scene arriving from the world is continuous, it does not 
directly offer a notion of abstraction, merely offering an opportunity for an observer to 
receive the world in differing manners through some enaction of the observer upon or 
within the world (changing the nature of the light which falls upon an object or 
manipulating the object somehow) or through some modification of the observer as an 
entity within the world (moving closer or further to an object, or changing the visual 
system mechanically via squinting, and the like).  
Requirements
 The acts of noting novelty and shifting abstraction are cognitive acts which occur 
entirely within the mind of a human observer.  The visual scene of the world itself affords 
them, but it is the observer performs them. That is, some set of cognitive processes occurs 
within the observer to accomplish these feats.  
 As the goal of this research has been to create one or more cognitively-inspired 
computational models, then a subgoal would be that the models must exhibit analogs to 
these processes.  If such processes are present in the computational model, then the 
models’ performance on certain tasks may be characterized, and contrasted where 
appropriate with human performance on those tasks.
 Even so, these acts are available to be performed not only due to some variety of 
processes, but also because some sufficient representation of the received visual scene 
which affords them. 
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Representation of knowledge
 The representation of the visual scene received by the agent contains information 
and knowledge about the world from which the scene is taken.  In the preceding section, I 
described the feature integration theory of Treisman and Gelade (1980) as a means by 
which humans come to associate visual features and information with objects inferred 
from the scene (perhaps using the vision theory of Marr (1982)). But as I am dealing in 
artificial intelligence and computational models, how might this be accomplished in an 
intelligent agent?  The information used by the agent must be more than a data structure 
containing the scene: it should be organized into a knowledge representation.
 While use of the term “representation” is quite commonplace in the artificial 
intelligence literature, what is a knowledge representation?  In their paper, Davis et al. 
(1993) note that knowledge representations play five distinct, critical roles:
• as a surrogate;
• as a set of ontological commitments;
• as a fragmentary theory of reasoning;
• as a medium for efficient computation; and
• as a medium of expression.
 Each of these aspects matters when regarding visual reasoning.  The fidelity of the 
correspondence between the representation as surrogate and the received visual scene of 
the world affects and informs the possible levels of abstraction.  The ontological 
commitment of what within the received signal to represent (and what to leave out) 
contribute to the constraints the knowledge representation may impose upon reasoning. 
The fragmentary reasoning that a knowledge representation affords stems from what 
inferencing it allows, and how that set of allowed inferences may be constrained.  The 
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guidance a knowledge representation gives for computation arises from its role as an 
organizational mechanism for the corresponding received information, and reflects upon 
the adequacy with which that information is captured.  The utility of the knowledge 
representation for communicating information directly affects the agent’s ability to mix 
new data with old into newer data, and provides the way in which comparison arises.
 In the subsequent two chapters of the dissertation, I develop a particular 
knowledge representation, and discuss in detail why that representation is indeed a 
knowledge representation.
Vision, and visual reasoning
 It may be tempting to view these remarks, and indeed all of my research, as being 
focused on vision.  While there has been substantial research on the detection of objects 
and novelty in computer vision (e.g. Markou & Singh, 2003a,b; Viola & Jones, 2001), my 
efforts concern themselves with visual reasoning, and in particular the role analogy-
making may play when reasoning about visual stimuli.  This dissertation is about 
cognitively-inspired computational strategies, and how they arise from the choices made 
when representing a received visual scene.
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Challenges
My research has been in the development of a computational model which while 
addressing a task of visual analogy exhibits cognitively-inspired processes which can 
distinguish between the familiar and the novel, and which can shift between levels of 
abstraction automatically.  These processes are sanctioned by some appropriate 
representation of the received visual scene which affords re-representation to varying 
levels of abstraction and offered features which may be used for memorization, recall, 
and comparison, as required by the visual analogy tasks.  The act of characterizing and 
developing those processes were thereby co-mingled with the act of describing a suitable 
representation.
To do this, I identified several specific challenges, which I now detail.
The Challenge of Complexity in Representation
Intuitively, the whole visual world is profoundly messy, and the visual signal 
received from it is complex.  A suitable representation would need to be able to capture 
the inherit complexity of the received world.  However, to demonstrate that the attempt to 
characterize and capture every conceivable aspect of the world with sufficient complexity  
would seem intractable.  
This challenge contributed to this research in two important ways. It constrained 
the work to a subset of the world, and thus focused upon visual scenes that are relatively 
simple and largely geometric in aspect. However, to avoid loss of generality, this 
simultaneously forces the consideration of a more universal visual representation, a 
substrate upon which a received visual scene may be built.  It was in facing this challenge 
that I turned to fractals.
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Figure 1.4. Problems of Similarity and Novelty.
The Challenge of Domains
This would be a corollary to the challenge of representation.  The complexity of 
the world does offer up quite the variety of problems and puzzles. While minds might 
capably perform many, many tasks, this research was focused on the exploration of 
novelty and abstraction tasks, in the context of visual reasoning specifically.  Thus, I 
restricted consideration of problems to receive from the world to those domains in which 
novelty or similarity may be determined via visual input alone.  Figure 1.4 illustrates two 
such example problems.
In particular, I chose to restrict the problem domain over which the computational 
model would operate to tasks of visual analogy.   There exists significant prior research 
into visual analogy (e.g. Goldschmidt, 2001; Davies & Goel, 2001; Ferguson, 1994; 
Forbus et al., 2008; Hofstadter, 2008).  Some of the problem domains addressed by that 
research have been in the area of computational psychometrics (Bringsjord & 
Schimanski, 2003; Lovett et al., 2007, 2010; Lovett et al., 2008; Kunda et al., 2010, 2011, 
2012, 2013). 
It has proven somewhat daunting to create models and write code which will be 
compared against others’ code, and it has certainly been true that one’s model and code 
must achieve a certain measure of correctness on those psychometric tests in order to be 
taken seriously in literature reviews.  However, the selection of problems from 
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psychometrics had a distinct advantage over other domains, in that there exists a general 
breadth and availability of human performance data on those tests.
The Challenge of Visual Reasoning, Itself
In artificial intelligence, models are built of cognition and computational 
creativity, and those models are subjected to various tests.  Often, these tests are 
themselves artificial, contrived to limit the model’s domain to a carefully composed 
world (classically, the Blocks world (Winograd, 1973; Bobrow & Winograd, 1977)).  Yet, 
critics of AI charge that the composition of the problem domain itself is too carefully 
constrained, and that the resulting model clearly should work, for it, and the world upon 
which it acts, are joined one to another, representationally intertwined (Reeke & 
Edelman, 1988; Brooks, 1991).
There may be many different ways in which a problem may be represented.  
However, a chosen representation expressly determines the nature of the reasoning which 
may operate upon the representation. The selection of representation then must expressly 
afford and sanction the kinds of visual reasoning the research wished to explore.  Thus, 
the selection of representation was restricted to those which both afforded reasoning 
about novelty and similarity, and supported shifting levels of abstraction.
The Challenge of Correspondence
The current theories of visual and analogical reasoning depend upon a significant 
theoretic leap:  that the received world is transformed from a series of received percepts 
into some symbolic representation (e.g. Marr, 1982; Kokinov & Petrov, 2001; Holyoak & 
Hummel, 2001; Barsalou, 2008). The challenge is that this transduction of perception into 
symbolism readily may be viewed as reducing correspondence with the world (that is, 
with reality) (Markman, 1999; Davis et al., 2003).  Reducing correspondence with reality 
affects the correspondence in level of abstraction which might be afforded by the 
symbolic representation.  
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Thus, for the purposes of this research, a suitable representation must maintain as 
strong as practical a correspondence to the received percepts. The need for such strong 
grounding also was a determining factor in my choice to focus on fractals, the argument 
for which I develop in the next two chapters..
The Challenge of Models
As mentioned prior, there exist several kinds of visual analogy problems, and this 
research addresses certain of these. These problems share many common aspects, but 
they have very specific differences as well.  Perhaps it may be assumed that each of these 
problems quite naturally might lead to its own computational model.  
Suppose, instead, that a common representation may be shared amongst those 
models; would that representation provide an account for their commonality?  If so, then 
one may find that though there can be differences in model, there may exist a single 
cognitively-inspired computational architecture upon which those models are founded 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983; Laird et al., 1987; Tversky, 1993).  
Finding first these computational models, and then explicating an underlying 
overall model, has been a goal of this research.  In the chapters of this dissertation 
concerning the various problem domains, I describe the algorithms that constitute the 
computational model addressing the problem, but I also describe the lineage between the 
algorithms, and through those connections establish a common model, rooted in the 
chosen representation.
The Challenge of Judging a Model
According to Cassimatis et al. (2008), computational modeling is a particularly 
important part of understanding higher-order cognition, for two reasons. First, having a 
precise model clarifies notions such as representation and concept. Furthermore, being 
instantiated into a computational model makes the possibility of intelligence arising from 
natural phenomena more plausible (Cassimatis et al., 2008). 
Such models are judged by their degree of ability, empirical coverage and their 
parsimony (Cassimatis et al., 2008).  Judging the ability of a computational model does 
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not mean that there is a direct mapping implied between the performance of the 
computational model and that of a human: Cassimatis et al. (2008) point to Logic 
Theorist (Newell et al., 1958) as proof that what mattered was the demonstration that 
some mechanism could explain some kinds of problem solving. Judging parsimony is 
straightforward: merely note the number of computational methods needed to address the 
problem.  Judging empirical coverage, in contrast, is complicated.
Ordinarily, empirical coverage for computational models has meant that human 
performance levels are achieved, both in the time taken to perform a task, and in the 
number and kind of errors made during a task.  However, to judge a computational 
model’s coverage based on time performance must be reconsidered, for at least two 
reasons.  Firstly, each year machines and devices grow faster and faster, and storage more 
abundant (Schaller, 1997): at some point, the task that satisfactorily covers human 
performance will be performed much quicker by machine.  Thus, the time performance 
metric, as a standard for empirical coverage, diminishes.  Secondly, the algorithms one 
now designs are generally executed in a serial fashion, with strict data flows.  Human 
brains, in contrast, don’t quite seem to follow either aspect, being inherently (and 
massively) parallel, and with bidirectional information flowing (Ullman, 1995). 
For these two reasons, I suggest that judgment be passed upon the research’s 
computational models’ empirical coverage in two ways: by its error patterns vis-a-vis 
human error patterns where available, and by its demonstrated suitability across multiple 
problem domains.  
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Limitations
 My dissertation’s research question is:
How might a cognitively-inspired computational model receive a visual scene and, in the 
service of some visual analogical task, notice novelty at an appropriate level of 
abstraction? 
The challenges just enumerated offered ways with which to constrain the 
question’s exploration.  In light of those constraints, I additionally and deliberately 
limited the scope of this work in two important ways, namely:  
• the work makes a strong commitment to a particular kind of representation; and 
• I focused on developing cognitively-inspired computational models for four 
specific, interrelated problem domains.
Limitation 1: Commitment to a representation
The representation chosen is the fractal representation, a novel visual 
representation which I developed over the course of performing this research.  Indeed, 
this representation is perhaps the key contribution of my research.
The fractal representation arises from the fractal encoding of visual input. Fractal 
encoding itself is an encoding of both spatial and photometric relationships which 
captures the nuances of textures present within a received image. Fractal representations 
capture the similarity between visual images, even if the images are the same. A thorough 
discussion of fractal encoding and the development of the fractal representation are found 
in the subsequent two chapters.
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Limitation 2: Commitment to specific domains
In service to the development of this research, I discovered, developed and tested 
cognitively-inspired computational models based on fractal representations across four 
specific problem domains, two of visual similarity and two of visual novelty.  
For the visual similarity domain, I chose the Ravens Progressive Matrices tests 
(Raven et al., 2003) and the Miller Analogies Test (Meagher, 2006; Pearson, 2011), used 
by Evans  in his seminal early work on analogy (Evans, 1964).  The Ravens tests offer a 
combined set of 204 well-documented, human-tested visual analogy problems, 
distributed across four distinct test sets.  The Miller Analogies Test offers 20 such 
problems.  The Ravens test and the Miller Analogies test have a similar structure: given a 
matrix of figures in which one figure is missing, choose from a set of candidate answer 
figures which one best completes the matrix.
For the visual novelty domain, I choose two particular sets of problems. The first 
chosen, the Odd One Out test, developed by Adam Hampshire and colleagues at 
Cambridge Brain Sciences (Owen et al., 2010), consists of almost 3,000 3x3 matrix 
reasoning problems organized in 20 levels of difficulty, in which the task is to decide 
which of the nine abstract figures in the matrix does not belong (the so-called “Odd One 
Out”). For the second set, I chose the Dehaene test of core geometry (Dehaene et al., 
2006), consisting of 45 problems designed to measure whether an individual has a notion 
of certain principles of geometry.  Both the Odd One Out test and the Dehaene core 
geometry test have a similar structure: given a matrix of figures, decide which one does 
not belong.
My intention was that by considering problems of similarity (Ravens and Millers) 
independently from problems of novelty (Odd One Out and Dehaene), distinct models 
would emerge, one for similarity and one for novelty.  From these models, the intention 
was to extract those domain-generic techniques to form the basis of a cognitively-inspired 
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computational model, one in which noting novelty and adjusting levels of abstraction are 
fundamental and strategic acts, afforded expressly by the fractal representation.
I point out that these problem domains are static, 2D worlds.  If this research were 
concerning itself with vision in the general sense, one would have to choose additional 
dynamic domains which would offer the opportunity to address the challenges of 
occlusion, motion, noise, and the like.  Although I believe this work may hold promise in 
those areas, as noted above this research is not about vision: it is about visual reasoning, 
and the role analogy-making and representation play in it.   Nonetheless, I did explore the 
potential connection with vision and other visual perception, by performing minor 
experimentation in using fractal representations and similarity as latent support for 
flocking behaviors in agents, and in modeling perceptual instability when considering the 
Necker cube.
These domains, the developed computational models, and the results of all 
experiments are presented in detail in the subsequent chapters devoted to each.
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Thesis & Hypotheses
With these challenges, limitations and intentions in mind, I make the following 
sufficient, expressive thesis statement and collection of hypotheses.
The Thesis Statement
My dissertation concerns itself with this thesis statement:
Reasoning using fractal representations is a novel, feasible and useful 
computational technique for solving certain problems of visual similarity and novelty.
I developed three primary hypotheses from this thesis statement, and the balance 
of the dissertation provides a detailed account of my research to confirm them.  The three 
hypotheses are:
• that using the fractal representation, a robust cognitively-inspired computational 
strategy may be determined which automatically adjusts the representation to an 
appropriate level of abstraction;
• that using the fractal representation, a robust cognitively-inspired computational 
model can be derived for certain classes of  problems of visual similarity, such as the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices tests; and
• that using the fractal representation, a robust cognitively-inspired computational 
model can be derived for certain classes of problems of visual novelty, such as those in 
the Odd One Out set.
In addition to these three primary hypotheses, I make a zeroth hypothesis 




Using the fractal representation, a robust cognitively-inspired computational 
strategy may be determined which automatically adjusts the representation to an 
appropriate level of abstraction.
In support of hypothesis 1, I discovered, developed and implemented an original 
and novel algorithm, the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm.  The ABR* 
algorithm is based on the premise that analogy begins by being reminded of something, 
and integrates the return of a measure of similarity with a retrieved analog. Furthermore, 
the algorithm also provides how the ambiguity or uncertainty with which an answer to a 
visual analogy problem may be characterized can be attributed to those features naturally 
arising from fractal representations.  I showed that such a characterization can be used 
concurrent with problem solution, as a mechanism for driving level-of-abstraction 
refinement.   
Beginning with Chapter 2’s robust discussion of the fractal representation and 
continuing through Chapter 4, using as a visual similarity task as a basis, my dissertation 
presents a complete description of the algorithm, its motivation, and an argument that the 




Using the fractal representation, a robust cognitively-inspired computational 
model can be derived for certain classes of  problems of visual similarity, such as the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices tests.
In support of hypothesis 2, I describe herein the problems of the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices tests, in terms of their individual nature as well as their importance 
in the realm of human psychometrics.  I developed both a visual reasoning strategy and 
an algorithm which embodies that strategy, based upon and relying solely upon the fractal 
representation of a Raven’s problem, which can, as shown in Chapter 5, solve the 
problem without intervention.  This dissertation clearly illustrates the algorithm as 
implemented in both pseudo-code and in the Java programming language (available on 
our research lab’s website), and presents the results of the algorithm’s execution against 
the full set of Raven’s Progressive Matrices tests.  
Similarly, in Chapter 6, the dissertation shows the same for the problems of the 
Miller Analogies Test, with no modification to the underlying algorithm or representation. 
The performance of the Fractal Raven and Fractal Miller algorithms compares quite 
favorably to all prior computational approaches to these problem domains, as I illustrate 
in the corresponding chapters.
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Hypothesis 3
Using the fractal representation, a robust cognitively-inspired computational 
model can be derived for certain classes of problems of visual novelty, such as those in 
the Odd One Out set.
In support of hypothesis 3, I first describe, in Chapter 7, the problems of visual 
oddity, in terms of their individual nature as well as their distinction from visual 
reasoning as required for problems of the Raven’s test.  I developed a visual reasoning 
strategy and an algorithm which embodies that strategy, based upon and relying solely 
upon the fractal representation of an Odd One Out problem, and demonstrated that the 
algorithm will solve the problem without intervention.  I wrote the algorithm in code and 
executed that code against a large corpus of Odd One Out problems (approximately 
3,000, at varying levels of human difficulty). In Chapter 8, I report the results of the 
algorithm’s performance.  
In addition, the visual oddity algorithm developed for the Odd One Out was 
extended and used to address those problems present in the Dehaene set of core 
geometry.  This dissertation presents the results of those experimental runs as well, in 
Chapter 9, and compares those results with a prior computational approach to the 
Dehaene set as well as to human results.
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The Zeroth Hypothesis
The fractal representation is a knowledge representation.
In support of this hypothesis, in Chapter 2 I fully motivate, develop and illustrate 
the fractal representation.  Furthermore, I present the manner by which the fractal 
representation may be extended, from a representation of a single image, to any number 
of images.  In Chapter 3, drawing on the criteria and roles of knowledge representations 
in general of Markman, Davis, and others, I illustrate precisely how the fractal 




I explored two additional problem domains with the fractal representation, using 
the core machinery of the Extended Analogy by Recall (ABR*) strategy.  
In Chapter 10, I report the details of an exploration of fractal perception in 
interacting agents.  In this chapter, I describe first how computer graphics simulations of 
flocking agents occurs.  I implemented such a simulation, which contained hundreds to 
thousands of those agents. I then introduce the idea of providing a perceptual processing 
system to one of those agents, based on fractal representations, and show how the 
behavior of the agent can remain analogous to the other agents, as a full participant in the 
flock.
In Chapter 11, I report a computational model of perceptual bistability, using the 
Necker cube as the subject of study.  I provide a review of prior attempts to characterize 
perception of the Necker cube, and then, through the use of three sets of exemplar 
images, present the ambiguous Necker cube, represented fractally, to the Extended 
Analogy by Recall algorithm.  In my results, I show that the Necker cube as perceived by 
my computational strategy remains in a perceptually ambiguous state, regardless of 
exemplar or level of abstraction.  To my knowledge, this is among the first ever 
computational models of perceptual bistability. Furthermore, these results suggest that my 




My dissertation and the body of research it describes makes two primary, novel, 
and significant contributions to science. 
The first contribution is the Extended Analogy by Recall (ABR*) algorithm, a 
parsimonious, cognitively-inspired computational model for visual reasoning which 
automatically adjusts its representations to an appropriate level of abstraction. The 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation show unmistakably that the strategy contained 
within the ABR* algorithm is suitable to meet the demands of a variety of visual analogy 
problems.  In addition to this primary contribution, several algorithms, which address 
reasoning specifically in visual similarity and visual oddity tasks, as well as algorithms 
which afford or mimic aspects of visual perception, are contributions in their own right.
The second contribution is the fractal representation itself, a new and novel 
knowledge representation that will open the door for analogy researchers, cognitive 
scientists, and computer scientists to explore the role self-similarity and perceptual 
complexity play in analogy making.
The concluding chapter of this dissertation expands upon a number of potential 
future research directions suggested by these contributions.
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A Guide to this Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into five sections.  
The first of these sections is introductory in nature, and includes the present 
chapter and a chapter on knowledge representation and the fractal representation.  The 
details of exactly how to transform an image into the fractal representation are presented 
in that chapter, and pseudo-code is provided.
The second section concerns itself with visual reasoning, and in particular the 
visual similarity domain.  Chapter 4 develops the overall approach to fractal visual 
reasoning and introduces the visual similarity algorithm.  Later in that chapter, I continue 
the refinement of visual reasoning, incorporating levels of abstraction and automatic 
abstraction shifting, and introducing the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm. 
In the third section, the visual similarity domain is explored by example.  Chapter 
5 presents the development of the Fractal Ravens algorithm and shows, by way of 
extensive example, how it may be used to solve problems of the Ravens Progressive 
Matrices tests.  The particular results of the algorithm upon the Ravens tests may be 
found in Chapter 5, along with comparison to human performance data.  Chapter 6 
concerns the adaption of the Fractal Ravens algorithm into the Fractal Miller algorithm  
and its use on the Miller’s analogy problems.
The fourth section devotes itself to the visual oddity domain.  Chapter 7 builds 
upon the lessons learned from the Fractal Ravens algorithm, and introduces the visual 
oddity algorithm.  The Odd One Out problems suite is discussed at length in Chapter 8, 
and the results of running the ABR* algorithm against the large corpus of oddity 
problems.  Chapter 9 is an explication of the Dehaene core geometry problems, and 
presents the results of an experiment in which the ABR* algorithm is made to address 
them.
The final section summarizes the dissertation and its implications.  It begins with 
two chapters (Chapters 10 and 11) which describe the preliminary experiments into 
fractal perception and the emergence of perceptual instability when using the model to 
reason about a classic problem of perceptual gestalt psychology.  The final chapters 
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(Chapters 12 and 13) provide a review of the claims made by this dissertation, the 




 In this chapter, I discuss the development and construction of the fractal 
representation, as a powerful means of representing images. 
Fractal Encoding and Representations
An image, as held in memory in a computer, is a representation which may occur 
in a variety of forms.   In one case,  a vector image, the image might be represented as a 
proximal sum of a variety of lines, curves, and polyhedral shapes.  Vector images are 
quite well suited for representing diagrams.  In another, more common example, the 
image might be represented in bitmap fashion, a rectilinear array of pixels (photometric 
values) of a specific width and height.  Bitmapped images are typically used as methods 
for storing so-called “natural images.”  In either case, a coordinate system typically is 
inferred to ascribe the position and orientation of various spatial elements, be they pixels 
or polygons. 
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Figure 2.1. A Circle, As Pixels.
The challenge of representing an image, in any fashion, stems from this: to what 
end is the representation intended?  As shown in the previous section, a representation 
entails a set of possible inferences, and implicates a surrogate standing.  An image 
representation is arrived at from some putative input.  We receive the world, and we 
represent it.
Fractals
Benoit Mandelbrot coined the term “fractal” from the Latin adjective fractus and 
its corresponding verb (frangere, “to break” into irregular fragments), in response to his 
observation that shapes previously referred to as “grainy, hydralike, in between, pimply, 
pocky, ramified, seaweedy, strange, tangled, tortuous, wiggly, wispy, wrinkled, and the 
like” could be described by a set of compact, rigorous rules for their production 
(Mandelbrot, 1982).  
The computer graphics community has generated fractal imagery, similar to this 
figure, for several decades.  Indeed, there are several different kinds of fractals described 
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within the literature of computer graphics, physics, and mathematics.  Here are a few 
examples. 
Figure 2.2. A Fractal Fern, Constructed From Other Ferns.
Iterated Function Systems
Iterated function systems (IFSs) were devised by Barnsley and his colleagues 
(Barnsley & Demko, 1985) as a means of generating a broad class of fractals, using a set 
of affine maps and an associated set of probabilities. Each such IFS resolves to a single 
attractor set. In the early 1980s, much effort was focused on the generation of naturally 
occurring, complex phenomena, such as clouds, plants, and landscapes. Demko et al. 
proposed the use of iterated function systems as one such method for creating computer 
graphic models of these phenomena (Demko et al., 1985). The relatively small set of 
affine maps and overall compact nature of IFSs was demonstrated by Demko et al. 
successfully. The iconic fractal fern shown in figure 2.2 is due to a three-map IFS 
discovered by Barnsley.  Iterated function systems have been used to model single-valued 
discrete-time sequences (Mazel & Hayes, 1992), neural networks (Stark, 1991), and 
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image compression (Barnsley & Sloan, 1990).  It is from this later work, as image 
compression, that my own research and development of fractal representations stems.
Figure 2.3. Strange Attractors
Strange Attractors
Studies of turbulence in fluid mechanics and nonlinear physics gave rise to a more 
mathematical class of fractals known as strange attractors (Grassberger & Proccaccia, 
1983; Eckmann & Ruelle, 1985). In a physical model, the whole system is represented by 
a number of modes - independent oscillators of variables, or states.  While each mode can 
be thought of as periodic, the whole system is quasi-periodic (a superposition of the 
modes), and a system can be seen as progressively more turbulent as the number of 
modes increases (Eckmann & Ruelle, 1985). An attractor is a mathematical description of 
the stable oscillation of the dynamic system as transient behaviors decrease. However, 
there are systems in which this behavior itself is unstable.  Such systems are deemed 
chaotic by Eckmann & Ruelle (1985) and thereby possess a strange attractor.  A 
companion way to consider a strange attractor is to think of the attractor itself as a 
particular configuration of a system (set of states) and a probability that the system would 
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be in that particular configuration (Halsey et al., 1986).  In this way, one can make an 
analogy that the set of states and probabilities view of strange attractors is similar to the 
iterated function system notion of set of affine transformations and probabilities. 
Figure 2.4. Lindenmayer Systems
Lindenmayer Systems
As early as 1968, Lindenmayer developed mathematical models of cellular 
interaction and growth (Lindenmayer, 1968).  Lindenmayer (Lindenmayer et al., 1990) 
fully realized his system of describing plant growth as a technique of originating with a 
string of symbols (an initial condition) and a set of rules for transforming a substring of 
symbols into a different set of symbols.  Each of these rule might be interpreted as an 
instruction for generating part of a plant (grow longer, branch left, fork at a certain angle, 
etc.).  Probabilities could be associated with the advent of each rule.
As computer graphics techniques improved through the 1980s, Smith (1985) 
turned to Lindenmayer’s descriptions of string-rewriting rules as a method for generating 
realistic renditions of plants. These fractal plants were determined both by their initial 
conditions, and by the probabilistic choice of which of several rewriting rules would be 
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used during construction.  The advent of procedural modeling in computer graphics saw 
Lindenmayer systems applied to a variety of models, including the modeling of cities 
(Parish & Muller, 2001). 
Again, it may be seen that the notion of a set of rules and an associated set of 
probabilities is very much akin to that of an iterated function system.
Figure 2.5. Escape-time Systems
Escape-Time Systems
Renderings of Julia sets and Mandelbrot sets are the most commonly seen images 
associated with the word “fractal.”  Both of these sets, however, are examples of escape-
time systems.  In an escape-time system, for each point in a set there exists a recurrence 
relationship.  That is, when one arrives a particular point in the system, there is a function 
over that point in the set which maps the point to another point in the set.  The 
colorization of the renderings of a Julia or Mandelbrot set can be thought of as the 
distance between the point and its subsequent mapping.
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Figure 2.6. Random Fractals
Random Fractals
Space-filling curves and surfaces such as Hilbert curves, Koch snowflakes and 
Sierpinski gaskets as well-known, and have broad application (e.g. Baliarda et al., 2000 
for a description of using Koch curves for compact antenna design).  In general, these 
surfaces and curves are formed through the consistent and repeated application of a 
specific rule, or set of rules: for Koch snowflakes, replace any line segment with four 
segments, each one third the length of the original, with the middle third of the original 
segment replaced by two segments joined as if to form an equilateral triangle with the 
original middle third. 
However, the mathematical regularity of such curves and surfaces can be 
perturbed by deciding, based on some stochastic method, when and where to apply the 
rules. Such a process, while chaotic, can generate curves and surfaces with the same 
fractal nature and the same expressive natural rendering potential (Krapivsky & Ben-
Naim, 1994; Mandelbrot, 1975; Schenider & Westermann, 2001). These random fractals 
begin with some initial condition (to which they are sensitive), and then extend the 
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general notion of set-of-rules plus probabilities for application to include the idea that the 
probabilities themselves may vary.  Put differently, the random fractal has a form which 
contains the transformation rules and a range of putative probabilities for each, rather 
than a single value.
Fractal imagery
While the various formulas for generating fractal imagery is quite well-known, 
many images of real-world artifacts appear to have “fractal” properties.  Indeed, the quest 
to render apparently real-world artifacts propelled the discovery and use of fractal 
descriptions and techniques in computer graphics as noted above.  If these images are 
“fractal” in some sense, then what formula (to be more specific, what representation) may 
underlie these images?  We must now consider a fundamental question: what, precisely, is 
fractal?
Fractals in the Real World
The mathematical derivation of fractal image representation expressly depends 
upon the notion of real world images, i.e. images that are two dimensional and 
continuous (Barnsley & Hurd, 1992).  Both of these assumptions are important.  That an 
image is two dimensional means that there is an ability to assign a coordinate system to 
the image, and that the photometric elements, the pixels, within that image have a spatial 
relationship to one another (that there is a distance metric upon the space).  That an image 
is continuous implies that no matter how closely one might choose to examine the image, 
there still will remain finer and finer gradations of the pixels.  In a sense, the continuity of 
the image suggests that the selection of an image’s resolution (the ability to resolve or 
describe a single pixel) is under the control of the observer.  In this assumption, a pixel 
gains the descriptive quality of a photometric region.
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Figure 2.7. Images with Fractal Properties.
Real world imagery, in the definition above, encompasses not only that which 
occurs in the natural world, but all imagery. Natural and artificial scenes, all diagrams 
and schemata, every image which arises as a result of light being reflected by or 
transmitted from any surface and subsequently falling upon the photoreceptors and made 
available to the human visual system is a real world image.  Images generated internally 
or those arising from some act of visual imagination or via some other means 
(specifically, those images whose arrival does not encompass perception and the 
enactment of the early visual system, the lensing system, and especially, the striate and 
pre-striate cortex) are excluded from the definition of real world imagery.
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Figure 2.8. A Field of Sunflowers, Showing Repetition and Similarity at Scale.
A key observation by Barnsley and Hurd (1992) is that all naturally occurring 
images perceived appear to have similar, repeating patterns. Another observation is that 
no matter how closely you examine the real world, you find instances of similar 
structures and repeating patterns.  The twin ideas, of repeating patterns and of repetition 
at differing scales (or resolution), combine to provide the basis for labeling such images 
as “fractal.”  Importantly, the repetitive nature of these images persists at all observable 
scales, down to the resolving power of the observer.  
Figure 2.9. Broccoli, Illustrating Similarity and Repetition.
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These powerful observations suggest that it is possible to describe the real world 
in terms not of traditional graphical elements, but of observed similarity and repetition 
alone.  This is the crucial idea upon which the fractal representation is formulated.
The Mathematical Basis for Fractals as Operations 
The mathematical derivation of fractal representation as an operation over images 
expressly depends upon the notion of real world images, i.e. images that are two 
dimensional and continuous (Barnsley & Hurd, 1992). Every image received by the 
human visual system may be construed as meeting this requirement, with the proviso that 
the notion of continuity has a resolution limit, and that limit plays a significant role in 
visual abstraction, as shall be discussed later in this dissertation.  
Collage Theorem 
Computationally, the determination of the fractal representation of an image can 
be performed through the use of the fractal encoding algorithm. The collage theorem 
(Barnsley & Hurd, 1992) at the heart of the algorithm can be stated concisely: 
For any particular real world image, there exists a finite set of affine 
transformations which, if applied repeatedly and indefinitely to any other real world 
image, will result in the convergence of the latter into the former.
It is important to note that the collage theorem is describing a set of 
transformations which are derived by mapping an image into another.  In other words, 
fractal encoding determines an iterated function system which is applied repeated to some 
source image, with the result that the encoded image emerges.  
The Development of the Fractal Representation
Let us suppose F() is a fractal encoding of image B.  Then, since I have 
designated fractal encoding as an iterative function system, the successive application of 
F() onto its prior output will converge upon the image B.  Thus, given any other image A:
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F(A) = A1, F(A1) = A2, F(A2) = A3 ... and so on, until F(A∞) ≐ B 
According to the Collage Theorem, F() is itself a finite set of affine 
transformations T which describe how to modify portions of an image such that 
convergence is assured. Therefore, 
 F() ≣ T ≣ { T1, T2, T3, ... , Tn }
Each of the constituent affine transformation may affect some or all of the given 
image, but it is the unordered union of their actions which comprises the resultant image.  
Thus:
F(A) = T(A) = ∪ Ti(A), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Dependencies 
There are several, interrelated dependencies implied in the Collage theorem.  
These are specificity, partitioning, and search. I shall describe each in turn now, in the 
context of the theorem, and later, in the context of the algorithm and the subsequent 
representation.
Dependency upon the specificity of the source and the destination.
The first dependency is that such a fractal encoding is dependent not only upon 
the destination image, but also upon the source image, from which the set of affine 
transformations T is discovered.  However, once the fractal encoding has been 
determined, the application of that encoding to any source image will result in the target 
image. This dependency is to suggest that, a priori any application of the encoding, a 
particular fractal encoding is determined uniquely by a particular source image.
Dependency upon the partitioning of the destination image.
The cardinality of set of transformations is determined exactly and solely by the 
partitioning scheme chosen for the image being encoded.  It is presumed that the image 
being encoded admits to being partitioned in some manner, however. 
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Images may be partitioned using a variety of methods.  In computer vision, one 
typically seeks to segment an image into regions or shapes (Ray & Turi, 1999; Zhu & 
Yuille, 1996).  Another segmentation scheme would seek to segregate an image into two 
segments, a foreground and a background (Kim, et. al., 2005).  Other partitionings of 
images may be regular, such as the division of computer-based images into pixels, at 
some resolution. It must be noted that the choice of partitioning scheme affects the 
computational complexity of enacting the partitioning.
The Collage theorem imposes no constraint upon the choice of partitioning save 
one, and that is that the union of all partitions wholly cover the image to be encoded.  
Topologically speaking, the image B is treated as a set, and the partitioning P() of that 
image into a finite collection of subsets is a cover of that set if:
P(B)  = { b1, b2, b3, ... bn } 
B ⊆ ∪ bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n
Dependency upon the search of the source image.
The essential implied step of the Collage theorem is that there is a match for each 
subimage of the destination, as determined by the partitioning, to be sought within the 
source image. Through this searching process, the affine transformation for that subimage 
is obtained.  However, the quality and character of the match, as well as the 
computational complexity of the algorithm, depends upon the constraints selected for 
comparing the destination subimage with some portion of the source.
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Fractal Encoding Algorithm 
Given a target image B and a source image A, the fractal encoding algorithm 
seeks to discover this particular set of transformations T. 
Algorithm 2.1. Fractal Encoding of B in terms of A
 As can be seen in Algorithm 2.1, the fractal encoding of image B in terms of 
image A consists of two phases: partitioning and searching.  I shall now discuss each 
phase.  
Partitioning
 The target image B is first partitioned into a set of other images.  As one is dealing 
with computer images, one may safely assume that the image B will have some finite 
resolution, and thus a limit as to the smallest achievable partition.  Practically, this 
smallest resolvable unit is a unitary pixel, which would denote both a spatial location and 
a photometric value.  
 As noted above, the Collage theorem places a topological constraint on the 
partitioning scheme, and requires that it form a topological cover over the image B.  Such 
a constraint admits a wide variety of methods for partitioning the image, but many of 
these partitionings may prove computationally expensive.  
First, choose a partitioning scheme P to systematically divide 
the destination image B into a set of images, such that  
B ⊆ {b1, b2, b3, … bn}. 
For each image bi: 
· Search the source image A for an equivalent image fragment ai 
such that an affine transformation of ai will likely result in bi. 
· Collect all such transforms into a set of candidates C.
· Select from the set C that transform which most minimally 
achieves its work, according to some predetermined metric.
· Let Ti be the representation of the chosen transformation 
associated with bi.
The set T = {T1, T2, T3, … } is the fractal encoding 
of the image B.
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 In the interest of reducing computational complexity, one may impose two 
additional constraints:  each subimage in the partition must be simply connected to at 
least one other subimage, and the union of all of the subimages must be exactly 
equivalent to the image B.  Stated mathematically:
P(B)  = { b1, b2, b3, ... bn } is a valid partitioning iff: 
∀ i ∃ j ≠ i : simplyconnected( bi ∪ bj ), and
B ≡ ∪ bi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
where 
simplyconnected( X ) → ∄ x,y ⊂ X : x ∩ y = ∅
One computationally inexpensive way to achieve such a constrained partitioning is to 
impose upon the image B a uniform, rectilinear grid, and select the subimages based upon 
some chosen grid size, as expressed in units of pixels.   
 Thus, a stronger specification of the fractal encoding T may be thought of as a 
function of three variables, the source image A, the target image B, and the partitioning 
scheme P:
T( A, B, P ) = { T1, T2, T3, ... , Tn } 
where the cardinality of the resulting set is determined solely by the partitioning P. That 
is, each subimage bi that P extracts from B will be represented by exactly one element of 
the set T.
Partitioning and Level of Detail 
 Choosing a partitioning determines the level of detail at which an image is 
encoded.  Thus, the coarsest level of detail possible for an image is the partitioning into a 
single image (the whole image).  The finest level of detail achievable is that set of images 
wherein each image is but a single pixel.  
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Figure 2.10. Levels of Partitioning.
 The choosing of a grid size, and of a partitioning in general, may be interpreted as 
an indication of the level of detail at which an image may be encoded.  Figure 2.10 
illustrates the effect of partitioning an image into a variety of levels of detail, using a 
regular rectangular grid.
 The ability to express level of detail as an artifact of partitioning, whether by 
controlling grid size, by altering the consistency of partition size, or by modification of 
the shape and nature of the underlying regions and their spatial arrangement (i.e.  
hexagonal versus rectilinear scaffolding, or polar versus Cartesian coordinates) is an 
important aspect of the encoding, and a key feature entailed by the fractal representation.
Searching 
 The partitioning scheme P extracts a set of images bi from the target image B.  
The next step of the algorithm is to perform a systematic examination of the source image 
A for fragments of A which can be said to best match a particular image bi.  The method 
by which the search is conducted may be varied, as can the meaning of what is said to be 
a “best match.”
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Global and Local Coordinates 
 An image bi extracted by the partitioning scheme can be considered as a region 
containing a number of pixels which are addressable in some fashion.  The addressability 
of these pixels may be viewed as a local coordinate system imposed upon the region.  
Additionally, the region described by the image bi has a location and orientation within 
the image B, strictly determined by the partitioning scheme.  Thus, the image bi may be 
considered as an ordered set of pixels, having both a local (intrinsic) coordinate system 
and extent, and a position and orientation within a global (within image B) coordinate 
system.  Figure 2.11 illustrates the local and global coordinate systems.
Figure 2.11. Global and Local Coordinates.
 However, the same partitioning scheme necessarily does not need to be applied to 
the source image. The entire source image A may be examined in any manner for a 
fragment that most closely matches bi. 
Discovering the “Best Match” 
 The source image A is examined to determine which fragment of it, which I shall 
label ak, can be said to “best match” the sought-for image bi from the target image B.   
That is, the correspondence between ak and bi can be said to be “best” if it is the 
minimum value of the following function: 
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Correspondence( ak, bi ) = PhotometricCorrespondence( Transform( ak, t ), 
bi )
     ∀ ak ⊂ A, t ∈ AdmissibleTransformations
where AdmissibleTransformations is a finite set of spatial transformations applied by the 
operator Transform() to the pixel values contained within ak, and 
PhotometricCorrespondence() is a pixel comparison operation.  
Photometric Correspondence 
The photometric correspondence between the fragment ak from the source image A and bi 
from the destination image B is calculated to be the difference between the photometric 
values found in those fragments under a given alignment of their pixels.   I wish to 
propose a metric to ensure that this difference would be 0 if the two fragments were 
identical photometrically.  Such an algorithm to calculate the photometric correspondence 
is given by Algorithm 2.2:
Algorithm 2.2. Photometric Correspondence 
 The corresponding pixel in ak is determined by imposing the same local 
coordinate system used in bi upon ak.
 The Photometric value of a pixel used in this calculation may vary according to 
the nature of the image itself.  For example, if the image is in full color, the photometric 
value may be a triplet of actual values; if the image is monochromatic, then the 
photometric value will be single valued.  Since it is desired to calculate a photometric 
correspondence which is single-valued, a mapping from multivariate photometry to a 
single value is typically employed.  This can be seen, globally, as mapping from one 
color space into another.  For example, to reconcile traditional computer graphics images 
Let C ← 0.
For each pixel x ∈ bi and corresponding pixel y ∈ ak:
 C ← C + ( Photometric( x ) - Photometric( y ) )2
The value C is then the photometric correspondence between ak 
and bi.
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given in triplets of red, green, and blue values into single grayscale values, a formula 
such as this may be used, which seeks to equate the colorimetric luminance of the RGB 
image to a corresponding grayscale rendition (McGreggor, et al. 1999):
Photometric( <R,G,B> ) = 0.3 R + 0.59 G + 0.11 B
 Careful consideration of the underlying photometric nature of the image being 
encoded therefore must be given, but only at this particular moment in the overarching 
algorithm for encoding.  The choice of the Photometric() function determines the 
interrelationship of the image’s colorimetry and its constituent importance to the 
matching function.
Affine Transformations 
 The fractal encoding algorithm seeks to find the best matching fragment in a 
source image which corresponds to a given image partitioned from the target image.   As 
shown above, this matching is achieved by calculating the photometric correspondence 
function between two fragments, while considering all admissible transformations of the 
fragment from the source.  The set of admissible transformations is a subset of affine 
transformations known as similitude transformations. 
 An affine transformation, in two dimensions, may be considered to be of the form:
W(x,y) = (ax + by + e, cx + dy + f ) 
where a, b, c, d, e, and f are all real numbers. This equation, which maps one point in a 
two-dimensional plane into another point in a two-dimensional plane, may be rewritten 
into matrix form like so:
 In this way it can be seen that an affine transformation is a combination of a linear 
transformation followed by a translation.    
 Not all affine transformations are admissible for the fractal encoding transform, 
however.  In particular, those which are admissible must be invertible (Barnsley & Hurd, 
W(<x,y>) = [ a b ]( x ) + ( e )c d y f
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1992).  Intuitively, this means that each point in space can be associated with exactly and 
only one other point in space.  Mathematically, this means that the inverse has this form:
W-1(x,y) = (dx - by - de + bf, -ex + ay + ce - af) / (ad - bc)
and the denominator must not be equal to zero to satisfy invertibility.
Similitude Transformations 
An important group of affine transformations are those which are called similitudes.  A 
similitude transformation may be expressed in one of these two forms:
 Thus, a similitude transformation is a composition of a dilation factor r, an 
orthonormal transformation (a rotation about the angle ϴ where 0 ≤ ϴ < 2π), and a 
translation (e,f).  Similitude transformations are invertible except when r = 0.
Defining the AdmissibleTransformations set 
Given this formulation for similitude transformations, one can imagine having to consider 
a great many potential rotational angles to find the best match.  Indeed, the computational 
complexity of the encoding would seem a function of the angles under consideration.  In 
practice, I find that only eight of these orthonormal transformations need to be 
considered, as shown in Figure 2.12.
W(<x,y>) = [ r cos θ  -r sin θ ] ( x ) + ( e )r sin θ  r cos θ y f
W(<x,y>) = [ r cos θ  r sin θ ] ( x ) + ( e )r sin θ  -r cos θ y f
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Figure 2.12. The Eight Operations over 2x2 Pixels.
Consider the smallest region of pixels for which orthonormal transformations upon those 
pixels would result in a visible change.   The size of this region is an area two pixels wide 
by two pixels high.  This small region has four lines of symmetry.  Taking into account 
each line of symmetry, and reflecting the pixels in the region about each in turn, there are 
eight possible outcomes.
 My implementation of the fractal encoding algorithm examines each potential 
correspondence under each of these possible transformations.  These form the set of 
admissible transformations.  The transformation from this set which yields the best 
photometric correspondence is noted by the search algorithm.
Translation arises from searching 
 The searching process examines each potential fragment in a given source image 
for correspondence to a particular fragment of the target image.   Let us presume that the 
coordinate systems of the source and the target images may be aligned such that their 
origins exactly coincide.   Then, the relative location of a potential fragment in the source 
image can be mapped to a location within the target image.   This mapping, from the 
potential fragment’s local origin to the particular fragment’s local origin, is a translation, 
and it is this mapping which forms the translation portion of the sought-for similitude 
transformation.
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Dilation and Fractals 
 Taken together, the orthonormal transformation and the translation provide a 
sufficient means for describing self-similarity which may exist within an image.  
However, that self-similarity is not quite sufficient for describing how the similarity may 
occur at different levels of detail.  The dilation factor, r, is used to invoke a contraction of 
space, whenever r < 1.0.  The fractal encoding algorithm prescribes that the dilation 
factor to be used when searching may be conveniently set as r = 0.5.   In practice, this 
entails that the source image, as a whole, may be scaled to one-half its original size, and 
then searched for photometrically corresponding fragments.  
 Mathematically, choosing r < 1.0 ensures that the encoding derived for the entire 
image, if applied successively and indefinitely to an image, will cause the resulting image 
to converge upon the desired destination image (Barnsley & Hurd, 1992). 
Colorimetric Contraction 
 As a final step, having located the best photometrically corresponding source 
fragment, the algorithm determines a rate at which the two regions may be brought into 
colorimetric harmony.  To do this, the average colorimetric description of both regions is 
calculated, and the distance between the two is multiplied by a dilation.  The formula 
used to calculate the colorimetric contraction is:
colorContraction( ak, bi ) = 0.75 * ( colorMean( bi ) - colorMean( ak ) )
where the colorMean of a region is the average of all colorimetric information available 
in that region, taking into account the multivariate nature of the underlying image as 
previously discussed.   The derivation of the colorimetric dilation factor of 0.75 is given 
by Barnsley and Hurd (1992), and is shown to be correlated to the spatial dilation factor 
of 0.5.
Exhaustive Searching 
 The search over the source image A for a matching fragment is exhaustive, in that 
each possible correspondence ak is considered regardless of its prior use in other 
54
discovered transforms. By allowing for such reuse, the algorithm affords the first 
Mandelbrot fractal observation, the notion of repetition.
Refining Correspondence 
 There may be many fragments in the source image which may have identical 
photometric correspondence to the sought for fragment bi.  This is particularly true when 
all of the values in the two fragments are identical.  To break these potential ties, a further 
refinement of the correspondence function is necessary.
 I compute a simple distance metric upon the images, and give it a weighting.  
Thus, the correspondence calculated between two fragments becomes:
 Correspondence( ak, bi ) = w1 PhotometricCorrespondence( Transform( ak, t), bi )
+ w2 Distance( ak, bi )
     ∀ ak ⊂ A, t ∈ AdmissibleTransformations
where the weights w1 and w2 are chosen such that the calculation of correspondence is 
dominated by the value of the photometric correspondence.  This can be ensured if the 
following relationship is held:
 w2 maximalDistance ≪ w1 minimalJustNoticeablePhotometric
where maximalDistance is the longest possible distance between the origins of bi and any 
fragment in the corresponding source image, and minimalJustNoticeablePhotometric is 
the PhotometricCorrespondence which would be calculated if the photometric difference 
between bi and any fragment were so small as to be indistinguishable.  Practically, I set 
this value such that this is as small as possible yet not zero, given the color system used 
in the images.  For example, for 8-bit greyscale images where the value 0 represents 
“black” and the value 255 represents “white,” the minimalJustNoticeablePhotometric 
would be set to a value of 1.
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Fractal Codes 
 For each image bi taken from a partitioning of the target image B, the fractal 
encoding algorithm locates, via exhaustive search over the source image A, a 
corresponding fragment ak which the algorithm has deemed to be most minimally distant 
photometrically under a discovered transformation.  The algorithm constructs a 
description of its discoveries, in a representation called a fractal code.  A fractal code 
consists of six elements, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Elements of a Fractal Code.
 
 Note that the dilation factor, for both spatial and photometric properties, is not 
represented here.  This is for efficiency, as these dilations are presumed to be global.
 Further efficiencies of expression also may be found by dropping the colorimetric 
operation (a way of describing how the colorimetric contraction value is to be combined 
into the region).  Since the set of orthonormal transformations the search mechanism uses 
is finite, I represent the transformation as a referent to that transformation’s ordinal 
membership in the set.  The size and shape of the region may be reduced itself, if the 
partitioning of the image is regular.  In my implementation, I use a regular, uniform 
partitioning, which forms a grid.  Thus, the size and shape of the region can be expressed 
with a single integer, which represents the width and height of the region in pixels.
Arbitrary selection of source
 The choice of source image A is arbitrary. Indeed, the target image B may be 
fractally encoded in terms of itself, by substituting B for A in the above algorithm. 
Although one might expect that this substitution would result in a trivial encoding (in 
Spatial Photometric
sx, sy Source fragment origin C Colorimetric contraction
dx, dy Destination fragment origin Op Colorimetric operation
T Orthonormal transformation
S Size/shape of the region
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which all fractal codes correspond to an identity transform), this is not the case, a fractal 
encoding of B will converge upon B regardless of chosen initial image. For this reason, 
the size of source fragments considered is taken to be twice the dimensional size of the 
target image fragment, resulting in a contractive affine transform. Similarly, as shown 
above, color shifts are made to contract.  This contraction, enforced by setting the dilation 
of spatial transformations at 0.5, provides the second key fractal observation, that 
similarity and repetition occur at differing scales. 
Arbitrary ordinality of encoding
 The ordinality of the set of fractal codes which comprise a fractal representation is 
similarly arbitrary.  The partitioning P may be traversed in any order during the matching 
step of the encoding algorithm.  Similarly, once discovered, the individual codes may be 
applied in any order, so long as all are applied in any particular iteration. 
Fractal Representation is Fractal Encoding
 The fractal encoding algorithm, while computationally expensive in its exhaustive 
search, represents the relationship between two images (or between an image and itself) 
as a much smaller set of fractal codes, an instruction set for reconstituting the 
relationship, with inherently strong spatial and photometric correspondence.  It is through 
this encoding that the fractal representation of the relationship between those two images 
is derived.  Indeed, the fractal representation is the fractal encoding.
Features from Fractals 
 The fractal representation of an image is an unordered set of fractal codes, which 
compactly describe the geometric alteration and colorization of fragments of the source 
image that will collage to form the target image. While it is tempting to treat contiguous 
subsets of these fractal codes as features, I note that their derivation does not follow 
strictly Cartesian notions (e.g. adjacent material in the destination might arise from non-
adjacent source material). Accordingly, each of these fractal codes can be considered 
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independently, and candidate fractal features can be constructed from the individual 
codes themselves, and not from clusters of codes.
 Each fractal code yields a small set of features, formed by constructing subsets of 
its underlying six-tuple. These features are determined in a fashion to encourage both 
spatial- and photometric-agnosticism, as well as specificity. My algorithm creates 
features from fractal codes by constructing subsets of each of the six members of the 
fractal code’s tuple.    
 I further chose to represent each feature as a concatenated string in memory.  I 
form these strings by attaching a character tag to each field in the fractal code and then 
converting that field into string format prior to concatenation, like so:
sx, sy (source fragment origin)  →  Ssxsy (string representation)
 The choice of the particular tag is arbitrary, but tagging itself is not: tagging is 
necessary to avoid in-string matching between the different kinds of fields (e.g. an 
numerical value may appear in multiple fields of a fractal code).  Doing so attributes a 
world grounding to each field, and collectively to the entire fractal code.
Number of Features
 As mentioned above, the features are constructed by extracting subsets of each of 
the six members of the fractal code’s tuple.  In theory, the number of available subsets 
would be equivalent to the size of the power set of those six members, or 26 = 64.  
However, we may generate more that that number of features, by noticing that two of the 
primary features (the source fragment origin and destination fragment origin) themselves 
consist of pairs of numbers.  Therefore, the available number of features is at least 1024 
(210).  Moreover, we may further extract additional features by considering these two 
pairs under a different coordinate system (polar coordinates, as an example, would yield a 
distance and an angle, if we take the destination to be the origin, and the source fragment 
origin as an endpoint for a ray).
 In practice, I notice that the photometric operation typically is constant 
(corresponding to a “copy” operator), and that the source fragment and destination 
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fragment origins may be treated without loss of generality as their constituent portions.  
Therefore, the number of available features is closer to 128 (27).  This is further 
diminished as we consider that we want the order of the features in each subset to be 
unimportant.
 The selection of which features to use, and whether to numerically combine or 
repurpose them via alternate coordinate systems, may be viewed as an additional control 
mechanism for algorithms which operate over fractal representations.
Mutuality 
 The analogical relationship between source and target images may be seen as 
mutual; that is, the source is to the destination as the destination is to the source. 
However, the fractal representation is decidedly one-way (e.g. from the source to the 
destination).  To capture the bidirectional, mutual nature of the analogy between source 
and destination, I now introduce the notion of a mutual fractal representation. Let us label 
the representation of the fractal transformation from image A to image B as TAB.  
Correspondingly, let us label the inverse representation as TBA. I shall define the mutual 
analogical relationship between A and B by the symbol MAB, given by this equation:
MAB = TAB ∪ TBA 
 By exploiting the set-theoretic nature of fractal representations TAB and TBA to 
express MAB as a union, the mutual analogical representation affords the complete 
expressivity and utility of the fractal representation.
Extended Mutuality
 I note that the mutual fractal representation of the pairings may be employed to 
determine similar mutual representations of triplets, quadruplets, or larger groupings of 
images.  As a notational convention, I construct these additional representations for 
triplets (Mijk) and quadruplets (Mijkl) in a like manner:
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Mijk = Mij ∪ Mjk ∪ Mik   
Mijkl = Mijk ∪ Mikl ∪ Mjkl ∪ Mijl 
 Thus, in a mutual fractal representation, there is the necessary apparatus for 
reasoning analogically about the relationships between images, in a manner which is 





 In the preceding chapter, I illustrated the development and construction of the 
fractal representation.  In this chapter, I specifically address the question of whether the 
fractal representation is a knowledge representation.
What is a Knowledge Representation
 Acts of cognition involve the manipulation of knowledge, represented in some 
manner.  While the term “representation” is quite commonplace and its use may be 
familiar, it is significant to note that very rarely is the notion tackled of what a 
representation actually may be.  However, in the AI literature, a paper by Davis, Shrobe, 
and Szolovits, did address this issue (Davis et al., 1993), and Sowa later expanded on 
their criteria, albeit from a perspective of knowledge engineering (Sowa, 2000).  Guarino 
(1995) also addressed the ontological aspects of representation.
The roles of representation
 A representation can be said to have meaning when in service toward a particular 
task.  Davis et al. (1993) note that representations play five distinct, critical roles.  Those 
roles are as a surrogate, as a set of ontological commitments, as a fragmentary theory of 
reasoning, as a medium for pragmatically efficient computation, and as a medium of 
human expression.   Let us consider each role in brief, and begin to bring aspects of 
visual search into the discussion.
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Representation, as a surrogate
 When a mind reasons about its world, this reasoning occurs internally, while the 
majority of what it reasons about exists externally.  A representation then must act as a 
surrogate for things which exist outside the reasoning agency.  Direct interaction with real 
world objects are paralleled by operations upon the internal representations of those 
objects.
 Davis et al. (1993) raise two significant points concerning surrogates:  what is a 
surrogate a surrogate for, and what is the fidelity of a surrogate?  Some correspondence 
between the surrogate and its counterpart in the world must be specified.  With respect to 
fidelity, what attributes of the original are preserved, omitted, or implied with the 
surrogate must be addressed, for perfect fidelity is impossible.  
 Representations, then, must be imperfect, and since reasoning operates upon 
representations, so to must reasoning itself arrive at imperfect conclusions, even if the 
reasoning process itself is sound.  It is this correspondence aspect which must be 
adequately addressed in any system which seeks to concern itself with levels of 
abstraction. 
Representation, as a set of ontological commitments
 Selecting a representation involves a decision about how and what to represent 
from the arriving world.  A set of commitments, then, is made that both define the extent 
of the representation’s capture of the world and define the way that extent is expressed or 
embodied within the representation ontologically.  Here, the task at hand acts as a guide 
toward the selection of an appropriate ontology.  These commitments start at the moment 
a representation begins to form, and likely accumulate as the representation is used.  As 
Davis et al. (1993) note, the representational power lies in the correspondence of the 
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representation to something in the world and in the constraints that that correspondence 
impose.
Representation, as a fragmentary theory of reasoning
 Representations are formed to allow cognition to occur within some agency.  
Even though the theory of reasoning arising from a representation may be implicit, it can 
be seen through three aspects: what the representation defines as inferencing, the set of 
inferences it allows, and the subset of those inferences which it recommends.  I refer the 
reader to the Davis paper for a thorough discussion of what it is to make intelligent 
inferences.
 Allowed inferences are those inferences which can be made from available 
information.  As a representation might arise in any number of ways, so too might the 
allowed inferences vary.  As Davis et al. (1993) point out, this flexibility is acknowledged 
so as to admit the legitimacy of the various approaches.  Having this flexibility at its core 
provides a framework for re-representation.
 Clearly, the set of allowable inferences may become untenably large. A smaller, 
constrained subset of these inferences is necessary.  Whether by specifying the constraints 
with which to select recommended inferences, or by providing them somewhat explicitly, 
some process or reasoning or insight must be at work to frame them.  In this way, Davis 
et al. (1993) citing Minsky by way of example, illustrates that representation and 
reasoning are intertwined in a deep, theoretical manner.  They also observe that much of 
the reasoning which informs recommended inferences has been provided by observation 
of human behavior.
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Representation, as a medium for efficient computation
 The information processing stance of human cognition holds that cognition is a 
computational process. In the same sense that a representation recommends inferences, so 
to does it imply the manner in which it may be used in computation.  This guidance 
speaks to the adequacy of the representation, as an organizational mechanism for 
information, for the task at hand. 
Representation, as a medium of expression
 Although the Davis paper addresses itself to the notion of representations as 
vehicles for human expression, I wish to stress that the internal dialogue of, about, and 
with representations is as important as the external one.  In so complex a system as the 
human brain, information must pass from subsystem to subsystem, preferentially without 
substantial degradation and with increasing specificity. The expression of representations 
internally is a process of systematic reassembly of aspects of those representations into 
new ones, through which other systems may operate upon the newfound representations, 
with the core roles of representations implied by those systems’ tasks. Herein, cognitive 
models are formed. 
The representation definition and criteria of Markman
 In his book “Knowledge Representation,” Markman offers both a definition of 
representation as well as a set of criteria for assessing a representation (Markman, 1999).  
Let us first consider Markman’s remarks. 
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Defining representation
 Markman (1999) gives a definition of representation with four components.  The 
four components are:
1. a represented world - the domain that the representations are about;
2. a representing world - the domain which contains the representations;
3. representing rules - a set of rules which map elements in the represented 
world to elements in the representing world; and
4. a process which uses the representation.
  Markman notes that in all known representational systems, the representing world 
loses information about the represented world (Markman, 1999).  Specifically, he assigns 
this loss of information to the decision made about what aspects of the represented world 
to be included in the representing world. That is, the agent constructing the representing 
world must decide what to include, and what to exclude, and that decision carries forward 
into the representation the consequences of it. 
 Markman notes that the representing rules determine the isomorphism (or 
homomorphism) of the representation: if each unique element in the represented world is 
mapped to a unique element in the representing world, the representation is isomorphic 
(Markman, 1999). The correspondence given by the representing rules also imply loss of 
information: if a representation is homomorphic, then more than one element in the 
represented world maps in an undifferentiable manner to the same element in the 
representing world, and therefore the ability to discriminate between those represented 
world elements is lost.  This loss of information, through deliberate omission and through 
potential homomorphism, affords the capacity for reasoning about the missing 
information from that which is not missing. 
 Markman’s requirement that the representation must be associated with some 
process which uses it implies that utility to an agent is the rationale for the construction of 
the representation. Markman additionally notes that Marr (1982) remarks that a given 
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representation makes some information about the represented world easier to access than 
other information, via the representing rules and the loss of information.
Characterization
 There are additional ways to characterize representations, and both Markman 
(1999) and Nersessian (2008) provide insights into how to achieve such characterizations.
Analog / Symbolic
 Markman further distinguishes representations as either analog or symbol. A 
representation is an analog if the representing world has an inherent structure about how 
it operates and that the relationships between elements in the representing world are not 
arbitrary. A representation is symbolic if a convention exists which links all of the 
elements in the representing world, the convention being arbitrary in a sense that 
representing rules could be changed to determine a wholly new convention.  In this way, 
the representing rules determine, Markman seems to suggest, the nature of a 
representation’s analogism or symbolism. 
Iconic / Propositional
 Nersessian (2008), in a discourse on mental modeling, uses slightly different 
terminology to emphasize the same point.  To Nersessian, a representation may be 
characterized as as iconic if it demonstrates a structural relationship to the thing it 
represents.  Iconic representations therefore afford an ability to assess similarity or 
goodness of fit, and provide a notion of “accurate” or “inaccurate” (Nersessian 2008). A 
Nersessian iconic representation is thereby closely associated with Markman’s analog 
representation.  
 In contrast, Nersessian holds that if the relationship between a representation and 
what it represents stands for a kind of “truth” and if the operations over the representation 
preserve this “truth” via the use of a consistent set of symbols which themselves stand for 
a stable collection of properties, then the representation is deemed propositional 
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(Nersessian, 2008).  Therefore, Nersessian propositional representation is most closely 
aligned with Markman’s symbolic representation.
Modal / Amodal
 Nersessian (2008) further delineates representation along a dimension which 
pertains to the degree to which its symbols can be associated with perceptual states 
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Modal symbols are analog (in the Markman sense) 
representations of the perceptual states from which they are extracted. Amodal symbols, 
on the other hand, are arbitrarily (but consistently) assigned.  
 Therefore, in Nersessian’s view, a propositional representation uses amodal 
symbols, but an iconic representation may use either modal or amodal symbols, or both.  
Markman representational dimensions
 Markman further suggests that proposed representations be assessed with respect 
to at least three dimensions: their endurance, the presence of symbols, and their 
abstractness.  By endurance, Markman means not that some specific values within a 
representation be maintained (a state), but that the representation itself may be temporary 
or long-lasting. By the presence of symbols, this is a distinction between representations 
which are symbolic and which are not.  Markman invokes the use of a space (as a 
structure upon which elements have some positional meaning) as an example of non-
symbolic representation. Lastly, by abstractness, Markman suggests that this is the degree 
to which the process which uses the representation is distinct from the representation 
itself. Markman further develops the notion of the power of a representation as a 
convolution of another way in which to describe the suitability of the representation to 
the process which intends to use it with the expressivity of the representation (the degree 
to which it may be able to represent all represented worlds).
Fractal representations, in light of Markman
 Let me now reflect on the fractal representation as a representation, working in 
somewhat the reverse order of the Markman definition and criteria.
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Fractal representations and the represented / representing worlds
 By beginning with the fractal encoding process, the fractal representation is a 
capture of that unordered set of transformations which transform one image into another 
image. The represented world is the set of the source and target images.  The representing 
world is the set of transformations. There is a commitment, via the chosen partitioning 
scheme, as to what aspects of the represented world are selected as being contained in the 
representing world.  Indeed, the partitioning scheme itself is the constructing agent’s 
primary method by which the inclusion/omission of represented world information is 
made.  The fractal representation satisfies this aspect of Markman’s definition.
Fractal representations and the representing rules
 Again, due to the use of the fractal encoding process itself in conjunction with the 
partitioning scheme, the representing rules clearly and distinctly map the represented 
world (source/target images) with the representing world (set of transformations).  
Moreover, this mapping is isomorphic, as the partitioning scheme must meet the 
connectivity and covering requirements described above.  Therefore, the fractal 
representation satisfies this aspect of Markman’s definition.
Fractal representations and symbolism
 The fractal representation is non-symbolic in the Markman sense, in that it rests 
upon an inherent structure given by the representing rules which is non-arbitrary.  
However, as I point out above, the aspects of the fractal representation, the fractal 
features, may themselves by represented according to any suitable arbitrary convention, 
so long as they allow for discrimination between themselves. While the symbols chosen 
may indicate correspondence to certain non-arbitrary aspects of the representing world (a 
position in space, a color, etc.), the manner in which the features are denoted itself is 
independent and arbitrary with respect to inherent structure of the fractal representation 
and to the manner in which the comparison between features is made. Thus, fractal 
features are symbolic in the Markman sense, but the fractal representation from which 
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they are derived are not. Even so, the fractal representation satisfies this aspect of 
Markman’s definition.
The expressivity and power of fractal representations
 The fractal representation is able to represent any two arbitrary real-world images. 
Furthermore, as developed in the section on mutual fractals, the fractal representation 
may be extended to represent any arbitrarily large set of images. Thus, the fractal 
representation affords a tremendous expressivity.  But does this mean that it is a powerful 
representation? According to Markman, the power of a representation can only be 
determined via its suitability to some task.  It is my belief that through the demonstration 
of the fractal representation’s utility in addressing a wide variety of problems of visual 
similarity, visual oddity, and perception, I have provided reasonable evidence to suggest 
that the fractal representation is quite powerful with respect to those tasks.
 But let me take it one step further.  The expressivity and power of fractal 
representations is also rooted in the powerful association of the representation and the 
mathematical notions of iterated function systems.  As seen in the prior chapter, iterated 
function systems have been used to characterize and to create models of a wide variety of 
physical and mathematical systems.  The fractal representation provides a direct means to 
reconstruct the target image from its represented world if it is used in an iterated function 
system (IFS) manner; that is, a sufficient fidelity rendering of the target image may be 
obtained if the representation is used to calculate as an IFS, from any original image, for 
the target image is the encoded attractor. The power of the fractal representation stems 
not only from this aspect, but from the explicit use of the source image as the initial 
condition, forming a structural, spatial relationship between that initial condition and the 
attractor.
 Lastly, the fractal representation is specifically and deliberately modal, for it 
expressly relates the received perceptual input of source and target images from the 
represented world and establishes an isomorphic mapping between that input and the 
representing world.
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The knowledge representation roles of Davis et al.
 Let me now address the roles of Davis et al. (1990) and fractal representations. 
The five roles are as a surrogate, as a set of ontological commitments, as a fragmentary 
theory of reasoning, as a medium for pragmatically efficient computation, and as a 
medium of human expression.
Fractal representation as a surrogate
 Davis et al. (1990) argue that a knowledge representation is a surrogate for the 
world, over which reasoning is performed. A fractal representation is the representation of 
a pair (or more) of real-world images (source and target) as a finite set of similitude 
transformations. No reasoning about a fractal representation involves the original, 
represented world: reasoning is only performed on the set of transformations (or fractal 
features derived from them). The representation maintains a strong, direct 
correspondence between the represented and representing worlds, a consequence of the 
act of encoding and the choice of the partitioning scheme used by the encoding. 
Furthermore, the fidelity of the correspondence is determined precisely by the 
partitioning scheme.  This commitment of the fractal representation to correspondence 
and fidelity, driven largely by the partitioning, allows the representation both to satisfy 
the first role as well as affords a powerful means by which the fidelity may be tuned, 
providing a different kind of abstraction (different from the Markman sense) which I 
develop in a subsequent chapter.
Fractal representation as a set of ontological commitments
 The fractal representation, through the encoding process by which it is derived 
and the partitioning scheme which the encoding process uses to carve up the represented 
world, clearly makes a deliberate commitment and mapping between the represented and 
representing worlds. But is this ontologically sound? 
 My answer is yes. There is absolute grounding between each transformation in the 
representing world and the fragments derived from the represented world.  Moreover, the 
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mapping is wholly isomorphic.  Thus, there is no other potential meaning for any of the 
transformations other than it precisely stands as the capture of the mapping between the 
fragments. Each transformation is complete, concise, and deliberately excludes 
implication or information from any other portion of the represented world. Thus, the 
fractal representation satisfies the second role.
Fractal representation as a fragmentary theory of reasoning
 To consider the fractal representation as a fragmentary theory of reasoning, we 
must consider what the representation defines as inferencing, the set of inferences it 
allows, and the subset of those inferences which it recommends.  As for inferencing, or in 
the broader sense of intelligent reasoning (ala Davis et al. 1990), I refer the reader to 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation, in which I explore in detail the fractal 
representation’s suitability to addressing problems in visual similarity, visual oddity, and 
perception. But let us consider more closely the afforded and sanctioned “inferences” of 
the fractal representation.
 The fractal representation clearly affords the ability to determine subsets of its 
core set of transformations.  It also affords the determination of fractal features from each 
of these transformations, as well as the collection into strings or sets various collections 
of those features. It, at least in principle, admits the combination of aspects of its 
transformations into subsequent transformations, a topic which I explore in some detail at 
the end of this dissertation, under fractal composition.
 The fractal representation specifically sanctions all of the above as well, but it 
does not, perforce, sanction the partial combination of aspects of one transformation with 
aspects of another. Why? Because to do so would negate the strong correspondence 
between the represented and representing worlds.  Indeed, the only sanctioned operations 
are those which expressly maintains that correspondence.  
 Notice that a powerful operation that the fractal representation sanctions is the 
modification of the partitioning scheme used by the encoding process. This ability itself 
provides the mechanism by which a fractal representation can be rerepresented into a 
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more coarse or more finer correspondence. This ability to shift levels of abstraction 
between the represented and representing worlds, afforded by modifying partitioning, is 
developed later in this dissertation.
 All of the examples of reasoning using fractal representations contained in this 
dissertation specifically require this sanctioning.  In this way, fractal representations 
satisfy the third role.
Fractal representation as a medium for pragmatically efficient computation
 While process of encoding a pair of images fractally is computationally intensive, 
it is not to say that the resultant fractal representation itself carries that burden. In fact, 
one of the most common uses I make of the representation is to use fractal features as 
indices for storing or retrieving the representation in a memory. In this regard, the 
representation is phenomenally effective, as I demonstrate through the development and 
description of the Analogy by Recall algorithm subsequently. Furthermore, as I outline in 
the latter chapter of the dissertation, the ability to construct new fractal representations 
without resorting to recalculating the encoding is both computationally efficient and 
afforded and sanctioned.  In this manner, the fractal representation satisfies the fourth 
role.
Fractal representation as a medium of human expression
 This last role of Davis et al. proves the most vexing to argue for, for at its core, 
this would seem to require the communication of fractal representations between two 
agents in order to assess its expressivity. Let me tackle it in this way.
 The fractal representation may need to be examined as a series of subsets of its 
original state, or rerepresented into a more coarse or more fine correspondence, in order 
for the agent to accomplish its task.  The representation itself is far more compact than 
the original (and arguably infinite) data in the represented world.  Thus, any subsystem 
which makes use of the representation or shares it with another (for example, from a 
memory system to a system which calculates featural similarity) benefits from the 
efficiency of this compaction.
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 So, is the fractal representation an effective means of human expression? Perhaps 
not, for I make no claim that what I have developed is a cognitive model (which is, after 
all, what Davis et al. (1990) address indirectly through the development of their 
knowledge representation roles. Instead, let me say that the fractal representation affords 
a profound computational model, clearly cognitively inspired. 
The Fractal Representation is a Knowledge Representation
 In light of the strength with which the fractal representation satisfies the criteria of 
Markman and meets the roles of Davis et al., I claim that, yes, the fractal representation is 
a knowledge representation.  Furthermore, and to be quite specific ala Markman and 




FRACTALS AND VISUAL SIMILARITY
 This chapter will discuss visual similarity, and a class of problems from visual 
analogy in which similarity calculations are used to derive an answer.  This chapter serves 
to introduce the Analogy By Recall (ABR) algorithm.
Visual Analogy and Similarity
 Suppose there is a visual analogy, expressed symbolically as A : B :: C : D, with 
the symbols representing images, as shown in Figure 4.1.  This can be interpreted as 
suggesting that some operation T exists which captures the relationship between image A 
and image B (“A is to B”).  Likewise, some other operation T’ is proposed which captures 
the relationship between image C and image D (“C is to D”).  
Figure 4.1. An Example of Visual Analogy
 In this manner, it is seen that the central analogy in such a problem rests not with 
the images themselves, but in the degree to which the two operations T and T’ are 
analogous or similar.  I can express the problem to make plain this distinction thus:
A : B :: C : D   ⟶  T(A,B) :: T’(C,D) 
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Similarity between operations
 The nature of this similarity may be determined by a number of methods, many of 
which might associate visual or geometric features to points in a coordinate space, and 
compute similarity as a distance metric.  Tversky developed an alternate approach by 
considering objects as collections of features, and similarity as a feature-matching 
process (Tversky, 1977).  
 I adopt Tversky’s interpretation of similarity, and thus seek to express these 
operations T and T’ in some representation which both is robust and affords sufficient 
feature production to permit feature-matching (Ashby & Ennis, 2007).  A particular 
nuance of Tversky’s approach, however, is that either the representation or the features 
derived from the representation must be formable into sets, as the calculation for 
similarity employed requires the counting of elements within sets (and their union and 
intersection).   
 Thus, I can revisit the typical visual analogy A : B :: C : D, where T and T’ are 
now representations which meet Tversky’s featural requirement.  To make a comparison 
between the two representations, I first derive features from each, and then calculate a 
measure of similarity based upon those features.
Similarity metric
I desire a metric of similarity which is normalized, one where the value 0.0 means 
entirely dissimilar and the value 1.0 means entirely similar.  Accordingly, I use the ratio 
model of similarity as described by Tversky (1977), wherein the measure of similarity 
between the two representations T and T’ is calculated thus:
 S(T,T’) = Ƒ(T ∩ T’) / [Ƒ(T ∩ T’) + α Ƒ(T-T’) + β Ƒ(T’-T)] 
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where the operator Ƒ(Y) derives the number of features in some set Y.  The particular sets 
involved may be considered as indicating, respectively, those features the two 
representations share (T ∩ T’), those features in T but not in T’ (T-T’), and those features 
in T’ but not in T (T’-T).
 Tversky (1977) notes that the ratio model for matching features generalizes 
several set-theoretical models of similarity proposed in the psychology literature (e.g. 
(Bush & Mosteller, 1953) and (Gregson, 1976)), depending upon which values one 
chooses for the weights α and β. Later in this discussion, I shall revisit these weights, and 
illustrate the significance of their choice.
 A Strategy for Visual Analogies
 One can interpret visual analogies as suggesting that some operation T exists 
which captures the relationship between image A and image B (“A is to B”).  Likewise, 
some other operation T’ is proposed which captures the relationship between image C and 
image D (“C is to D”).  Let us now consider a class of visual analogy puzzles, an example 
of which is shown in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2. A visual analogy puzzle. 
 In this problem, the image D is missing, and the challenge is to determine which 
of the offered candidate images would best fit into the matrix.  That is, it must be 
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determined which of these candidate images, if selected as image D, would establish 
transformation T’ as most analogous to transformation T.
 Analogies in a general sense are based on similarity and repetition (Hofstadter, 
2008). I would seek to employ a suitable representation, one which affords the capture of 
these qualities as well as sanctions reasoning over them. As I showed previously, fractals 
capture self-similarity and repetition at multiple scales (Mandelbrot, 1982), and I 
therefore propose that fractal representations are an appropriate choice for addressing 
certain classes of analogy problems. 
 One method for solving this puzzle is this: from this set of candidates, form the 
fractal representations from the fractal encoding of the transformation of each candidate 
image X in terms of image C.  
∀ X ∈ { candidate answers }, Tx ≔ FractalEncode(C,X)
Ω = { T1, T2, T3, T4, … Tn } and T’ ∈ Ω
This provides a set of possible transformations, which I shall label Ω, from which to seek 
the most analogous transformation T’ and thereby find which candidate image was 
responsible for it.
The Analogy By Recall (ABR) Algorithm
 I claim that analogy initiates with an act of being reminded, and that fractally 
representing both that triggering percept as well as all prior percepts affords 
unprecedented similarity discovery, and thereby analogy-making.   I have developed and 
implemented an algorithm, called Analogy By Recall (ABR), to assist in illustrating and 
refining these claims.
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The Generality of Representations
 While in this dissertation I exclusively shall use fractal representations in the 
examples and subsequent discussion, the overall approach is agnostic with respect to 
representations, and may be used with any representation which affords the ability for 
objects thus represented to be decomposed into a set of features.  The approach is 
distinguished from other analogical algorithms in that it presumes no explicit relationship  
between objects or between features of objects. 
Introducing the Analogy By Recall (ABR) Algorithm
 My approach compares each transform in the set Ω to the original transform T by 
means of recalling common features and calculating similarity metrics.  This method is 
divided into several stages. I now present the algorithm in pseudo-code form, and then 
describe each stage of the algorithm in detail.
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Algorithm 4.1. The Analogy by Recall (ABR) Algorithm.
Analogy by Recall: Preparatory Stage
 My system uses a feature-based similarity approach to analogy.  Consequently, I 
chose data structures which facilitate the storage and retrieval of information based upon 
aspects of the data, specifically by using a hash table as a data structure surrogate for 
memory. As transformations will be hashed into memory, I define two additional 
To determine the transform T’ which is most analogous to transform 
T from a set of transformations Ω ≔ { T1, T2, T3, T4, … Tn }:
 P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let Ω* ≔ { T } ∪ Ω
Construct a memory M as an empty hash table.
Let F() be a function which generates a set of features.
Let Κ() be an injective hash function for M.
 I N D E X I N G  
For each transform τ ∈ Ω*, hash τ in M by: 
· Generate a set of features F(τ) = { f1, f2, f3, … }.
· For each feature fj ∈ F(τ), store τ into M, using Κ(fj) as a key.  
 R E T R I E V A L  
For each transform Ti ∈ Ω, calculate Si as the similarity  of T to Ti 
by:
· Set a ← b ← c ← 0.
· Generate a set of features F(Ti) ≔ { f1, f2, f3, … }.
· For each feature fj ∈ F(Ti): 
•Use Κ(fj) as a key to retrieve a set of entries µ from M.
•If T ∈ µ, then a ← a + 1 ∵ fi ∈ F(Ti) ∩ F(T).
•If T ∉ µ, then c ← c + 1 ∵ fi ∈ F(Ti) − F(T).
· Generate a set of features F(T) ≔ { f1, f2, f3, … }.
· For each feature fj ∈ F(T):
•Use Κ(fj) as a key to retrieve a set of entries µ from M.
•If Ti ∉ µ, then b ← b + 1 ∵ fi ∈ F(T) − F(Ti).
· Calculate Si from the values a, b, and c:
Si ←a / ( a + α*b + β*c )
Determine ζ ←max { S1, S2, S3, S4, … Sn }
T’ is therefore that transform Ti ∈ Ω which corresponds to the 
maximal similarity ζ, and is deemed the most analogous to 
transform T.
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operators: F(), a method to generate a set of features from a given transformation; and 
K(), an injective hash function which operates solely over the domain of the features.  
 I made the commitment to a hash table for two reasons beyond that of wishing to 
use features.  First, it is desirous to find some overlap in the features which occur 
between two transformations, such that a perfect overlap would deem the transformations 
perfectly analogous.  The hash function K() may result in hashing multiple 
transformations to the same feature, and therefore K() must operate only upon a given 
feature, and not take into consideration the transformation which gave rise to that feature.  
Second, F(), the method which generates features from a transformation, must do so in a 
manner such that each generated feature affords salience, or information content (Tversky  
1977).
Analogy by Recall: Indexing Stage
 I wish to store each transformation in the hash table memory M. The set of 
possible analogous transformations Ω is combined with the original transformation T to 
form a new set Ω*.  The algorithm iterates over each member τ ∈ Ω*, and from each 
member calculates a set of features using F(τ).  For each feature fi ∈ F(τ), the 
transformation is indexed as an ordered pair (K(fi), τ). That there likely will be hash 
collisions at key value K(fi) is expected and desired.
Analogy By Recall: Retrieval Stage
 A measure of similarity between the original transformation T and each possible 
analogous transformation Ti ∈ Ω must be determined. The choice of metric reflects 
similarity as a comparison of the number of features shared between candidate pairs 
taken in contrast to the joint number of features found in each pair member (Tversky, 
1977).  I desire a metric which is normalized with respect to the number of features under 
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consideration.  In my implementation, the measure of similarity between the target 
transform T and a candidate transform Ti is calculated using the ratio model (Tversky, 
1977):
 S(T,Ti) = Ƒ(T∩Ti) / (Ƒ(T∩Ti) + α Ƒ(T-Ti)  + β Ƒ(Ti-T))
and Ƒ(Y) is a function which determines the number of features which may be extracted 
from the set Y.   These values may be calculated effectively, using hash table retrieval as a 
surrogate for distinguishing and counting common and distinct features within the sets 
T∩Ti , T-Ti, and Ti-T respectively.
 Tversky notes that the ratio model for matching features generalizes several set-
theoretical models of similarity proposed in the psychology literature, depending upon 
which values one chooses for the weights α and β (Tversky, 1977). I have found that 
significant discrimination between candidate answers may be found by using the Jaccard 
similarity; that is, by setting α ← β ← 1.0, and thus favoring features from either 
transformation equally. As Tversky (1977) notes, by equating α and β, I ensure that the 
calculation of similarity is symmetric with respect to the transformations under 
comparison.
 Once the algorithm has calculated the similarity function over all of the candidate 
transforms, it is a straightforward matter to determine which transformation has generated 
the maximal similarity.  This transformation, T’, is deemed to be the most analogous to 
the original transformation T.
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An Example
 I now present an example of using fractal representations and my strategy to solve 
the visual analogy puzzle shown in Figure 4.2 above. 
The primary and candidate transformations
In this example, the problem is to determine for which of the candidate images the 
transformation T’ is made most analogous to transformation T.  I first will represent T as 
a fractal representation, and then generate a set of candidate transformations Ω as shown 
in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. The primary and candidate transformations
 I arbitrarily may select any partitioning scheme, so long as that partitioning meets 
the criteria of coverage outlined above.  For the purpose of this example, let us choose to 
partition each image into a series of 16x16 pixels, forming a regular grid.   Each of these 
images is 134 pixels wide and 84 pixels high.  Thus, each image is to be partitioned into 
54 blocks.  
 Each of these blocks will be represented by a single fractal code.  In my present 
implementation, each fractal code generates 63 features.  Therefore, at this partitioning, 
each primary transformation will be indexed into memory using the 54 x 63 x 2 = 6804 
features generated from mutual fractal representation of that transformation. 
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Calculating similarities and selecting the most analogous.
 After the primary transformation T is indexed into memory using features derived 
from the fractal codes, a similarity value for each of the candidate transformations in the 
set Ω may be calculated using the Tversky formula as noted.  Table 4.1 illustrates the 
values calculated for each of the candidate transformations.
Table 4.1. Candidate transformation similarities
 
 It may be seen that the fourth transformation is the most similar to the primary 
transformation T, with a value of 0.842.  Therefore, for this puzzle, the answer is 
candidate answer 4.
Confidence
 In the Analogy by Recall algorithm, and as illustrated by the example above, a 
candidate representation can be found to be the most analogous by a straightforward 
calculation of its featural similarity, using the Tversky formula.  But a question quickly 









though an answer may be selected based on maximal similarity, how may that choice be 
contrasted with its peers as the designated answer? 
 A potential path forward would be to assess the given similarity calculation as a 
member of the set of all such similarity calculations for the collection of potential 
answers.  Let us suppose that for a given collection of answers, a strategy such as ours is 
used to calculate a corresponding set of similarity values:
ABR( {A1, A2, A3, A4, ... An }, problem ) →{ S1, S2, S3, S4, … Sn }
∀Si, 0.0 ≤ Si ≤ 1.0
The ABR algorithm would offer 
ζ ← max( { S1, S2, S3, S4, … Sn } )
as the maximal similarity value, and thereby deem the answer which generated that value 
as the most analogous.  It may be determined, additionally, how statistically distinct the 
value ζ is from its peers, by first calculating the mean, standard deviation, and standard 
error of the mean for the set of similarity values, and then, assuming a normal 
distribution, calculating the deviation of each of the values from the mean of the set:
µ = n-1 Σ Si    and   σ = √ [n-1 Σ (Si-µ)2]   ∀i, 0 < i  ≤  n
σµ = σ/√n
then
Deviations ← { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn }
∀i, 0 < i  ≤  n, Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
where the set Deviations is a t-distribution of the similarity values. The most analogical 
answer, the one corresponding to the maximal similarity value ζ, would have the largest 
positive deviation value under this reformulation:
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Sx = ζ ← max( { S1, S2, S3, S4, … Sn } ) iff
∃ x = y, Dy = max( { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn } )
 This, then, suggests that the most analogical answer would in a sense “stand 
apart” from the rest of the answers.  The degree to which it “stands apart” may be 
interpreted as a metric of confidence in selecting the answer.  Indeed, assuming a normal 
distribution, a confidence interval based upon the standard deviation may be calculated, 
and score each of these values along such a confidence scale, where 0.0 would indicate 
no variation at all from the answer, and 1.0 would indicate an utterly apparent and distinct 
value.  Thus, the problem of selecting the most analogous answer is transformed into a 
problem of distinguishing which of the possible answers is a statistical outlier.
Ambiguity
 The similarity scores generated by the ABR algorithm may vary widely.  As 
shown above, the problem of selecting the most analogous answer may be considered as 
the companion problem of determining the statistical outlier.  The challenge is that there 
may be more than one such outlier, or none at all.  I deem these situations ambiguous.
 To resolve such ambiguity, one must first examine why such a situation might 
arise.  I argue that the ambiguity arises due to a data problem, but it is more: it is a 
problem with the representation itself, from whence the data arise. The similarity value 
calculated by the ABR algorithm is determined by the Tversky formula for similarity:
 Si ← S(T,Ti) = Ƒ(T∩Ti) / (Ƒ(T∩Ti) + α Ƒ(T-Ti)  + β Ƒ(Ti-T))
which is itself wholly dependent upon Ƒ(), the number and nature of the features being 
considered, and the intersection and difference of the sets of those features.  
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Homogeneity and Sparsity
 Therefore, it is the homogeneity of the features (those which occur in both sets, 
Ƒ(T∩Ti) ), and the sparsity of the number of features, which directly affect the similarity 
calculation.  These two factors in turn affect the ability of the ABR algorithm to offer an 
unambiguous selection of the most analogous answer.
 To address the sparsity of data, there must be determined a way to create more of 
it.  To address homogeneity of data, the manner in which the data is created must be 
modified, so as to afford potential variance.  In either case, what is sanctioned by the 
representation over which the analogies are being formed must be examined. 
Resolving Ambiguity
As noted in Chapter 3, Davis et al. (1993) describe the five distinct roles that 
representations play: as a surrogate, as a set of ontological commitments, as a 
fragmentary theory of reasoning, as a medium for pragmatically efficient computation, 
and as a medium of human expression. Even though the theory of reasoning arising from 
a representation may be implicit, it can be seen through three aspects: what the 
representation defines as inferencing, the set of inferences it allows, and the subset of 
those inferences which it recommends. 
 Allowed inferences are those inferences which can be made from available 
information.  As a representation might arise in any number of ways, so too might the 
allowed inferences vary.  As Davis, et al. (1993), point out, this flexibility is 
acknowledged so as to admit the legitimacy of the various approaches.  Having this 
flexibility at its core provides a framework for re-representation.
 However, the set of allowable inferences may become untenably large. A smaller, 
constrained subset of these inferences is necessary.  Whether by specifying the constraints 
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with which to select recommended inferences, or by providing them somewhat explicitly, 
some process or reasoning or insight must be at work to frame them. 
 In the same sense that a representation recommends as well as sanctions 
inferences, so to does it imply the manner in which it may be used in computation.  
According to Davis et al. (1993), it is this guidance which speaks to the adequacy of the 
representation, as an organizational mechanism for information, for the task at hand.
Sanctioned operations on fractal representations
 Performing reasoning afforded by the fractal representation of the relationship 
between images limits the mechanisms to those which the representation sanctions.  
There are two primary sanctions of the representation: the number of fractal codes which 
constitute the representation, and the creation of features from those fractal codes.  These 
two sanctions offer methods by which the data problem of ambiguity that arises in 
analogical reasoning by recall may be addressed.
Fractal Abstraction
 The features available from a fractal representation are derived from that 
representation’s constituent fractal codes.  The number of fractal codes in a particular 
fractal representation is determined solely by the partitioning scheme chosen when 
constructing the representation.  The twin key observations of images which entailed 
fractal encoding (repetition and similarity at different scales) may be exploited here.  In 
essence, partitioning is a modeling of how coarsely or finely an image is received or 
regarded, and that granularity determines the algorithm’s ability to capture within the 
representation any present repetition or inherent similarity at that limit.  Thus, the 
partitioning affords a level of visual abstraction.
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 Increasing the degree of partitioning accomplishes two acts: more fractal codes 
are created, and the possible variety of features arising from those codes increases.  Both 
of these may address ambiguity in the data.  
 However, a closer consideration reveals further nuances in abstraction.  As the 
partitioning becomes finer, there likely is a level at which the ambiguity is resolved.  
However, as the partitioning surpasses that point, and becomes finer, the answer may well 
become ambiguous once again.  What does this suggest with respect to a balancing 
between the sparsity of data (the number of available features) and the homogeneity of 
data?
Emergent Sufficient Abstraction
 As the level of abstraction becomes finer (resolution increases due to increased 
partitioning), the number of fractal codes, and thereby the number of features, rises.  As 
resolution increases, the fractal codes represent partitioned areas in the image that are 
covering ever smaller areas.  These areas become increasingly more homogenous, and 
therefore the fractal codes become more similar to one another (that is, their features 
become more consistent).  As the abstraction grows finer, more codes are devoted to 
representing areas of consistent color and texture. Even though the number of codes and 
features is increasing, the homogeneity, and thereby the ability to discriminate based on 
those features, is decreasing.  I believe this equates to a frequency apprehension of the 
image, with coarse resolution corresponding to low frequencies (fundamentals), and fine 
resolution corresponding to high frequencies (overtones, and then noise).  
 Thus, the disappearance and reemergence of ambiguity is an emergent 
characteristic.  This emergent sufficient abstraction suggests that the Analogy by Recall 
algorithm may be modified to notice this characteristic automatically, adopted as a meta-
reasoning strategy, sanctioned by the representation.  In doing so, this strategy expresses 
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the first aspect of visual perception: the relationship between the observer and the 
observed.
Ambiguity and Mutuality
 Above, I illustrated how ambiguity may be resolved through re-representation via 
adjusting the level of abstraction (or degree of partitioning), and that a strategy may be 
derived which notices the need for such repartitioning in an automatic fashion.  There 
exists a case which bears brief further discussion: what if every level of detail or 
repartitioning results in continued ambiguity?
 In the case of resolving ambiguity through changing abstraction, the 
representation from which the features are derived remains one in which the relationship 
between objects remains fixed.  Let us examine the situation where the relationship itself 
may vary.
 I described earlier the notion that a fractal representation may capture not just the 
relationship between two images, but that it may be extended to describe the relationship 
between an arbitrary number of images.  This is attributable specifically to the nature of 
the fractal representation itself: it is an unordered set of fractal codes, from which 
features are derived.
 Depending upon the analogy problem, it may be feasible to consider first 
analogies between pairs of images.  Then, should ambiguity be manifested at all practical 
levels of abstraction for those pairs, the algorithm could shift to consideration of triplets, 
quadruplets or other groupings of images, until such a time as ambiguity may be 
resolved.  This shifting to higher order relationships, expressed by complexity in 




 Given these two sanctioned meta-reasoning strategies, I now revisit the ABR 
algorithm and extend it to incorporate them in an autonomous fashion.  This extended 
algorithm I call the ABR* algorithm.
Algorithm 4.2. The Extended Analogy by Recall (ABR*) Algorithm.
Note that as presented above the ABR* algorithm suggests that abstraction be increased 
before complexity grouping.  This is not a strict guideline, and the inner and outer loops 
may be interchanged without loss of generality.  Note also that it is possible that the 
algorithm will be unable to return an answer (if ambiguity fails to be resolved).  In that 
case, the normal ABR algorithm may be used to choose the answer with the maximal 
To determine the transform T’ which is most analogous to transform 
T from a set of transformations Ω ≔ { T1, T2, T3, T4, … Tn }:
P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let A := { 1, 2, 3, ... n } represent an ordered range of abstraction
Let G := { 1, 2, 3, ... m } represent an ordered range of complexity 
groupings
Let Ε be a real number which represents the number of standard 
deviations beyond which a value’s answer may be judged as 
“confident”
 E X E C U T I O N  
For each complexity g ∈ G:
 For each abstraction a ∈ A:
• Re-represent T’ and Ω according to g and a
• Derive the set of similarity  values S := { S1, S2, S3, S4, ... Sn } 
by way of the ABR algorithm
• Set µ ← mean ( S )
• Set σµ ← stdev ( S )/√n
• Set D ← { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn } where Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
• Generate the set C := { Ci ... } such that Ci ∈ D and Ci > E
• If |C| = 1, return T’ as the transform Ti ∈ Ω which corresponds 
to Ci
• otherwise there exists ambiguity, and further refinement must 
occur.
If no answer has been returned, then no answer may be given 
unambiguously.
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similarity metric at a designated abstraction and complexity.  Finally, the value E, which 
is used to designate a confidence level, may itself be varied as a meta-reasoning strategy.
The Example, Revisited
 I return to my earlier example, now with the notion that using the ABR* 
algorithm may vary the level of abstraction to hone into a particular answer with 
confidence.
Determining a range of abstraction
In the ABR* algorithm, the partitioning scheme will vary, with the intention of 
automatically arriving at the appropriate level of abstraction at which the most suitable 
answer image may be selected with some confidence.   To do so, a range of values must 
be established for the partitioning and a manner by which the partitioning will be refined 
at each subsequent step as necessary.
 Let us establish a finest level of possible detail as a grid size of 2 x 2, as I noted 
earlier that such a size is the smallest which affords the set of admissible similitude 
transformations.  The intent is to systematically reduce from a coarsest level of detail to 
this finest level.  In my present implementation, as it resolves in to ever finer levels, the 
grid size is halved.  Therefore, using this strategy of resolutions, for an image with a 
maximal pixel dimension of N, this formula determines the coarsest level of detail:
coarsestLevel ← 2(1 + ⌊log2 N⌋)
The images in the example are 134 pixels width by 84 pixels high, stored in the .PNG 
format.  Thus, images with a maximal pixel dimension of 134, the coarsestLevel will be 
equal to 256.  Using a strategy of halving the grid size, and progressing through each 
level of detail, this will provide for examination of the problem at 8 levels of detail.  Each 
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of the 134 x 84 pixel images will be placed into the center of a new 256 x 256 empty 
image, and it is these new images from which the ABR algorithm will commence.
Choosing a level of confidence
 Since the set of deviations determined is a t-distribution of the similarity values, 
the choice of a level of confidence in selecting the answer can be made using 
conventional statistics.  
 If a normal distribution of the deviations is assumed, then an interval may be 
devised such that with an expected confidence of C for any deviation d, the probability of 
d in that interval is C:
P( -z ≤ d ≤ z ) = C
Note that this also lets one say that that the probability of d outside of the interval [-z,z] 
is:
P( d < -z ) = P( d > z ) = ½(1.0 - P( -z ≤ d ≤ z ) ) = ½ (1.0 - C )
The set of deviations is a t-distribution of the similarity values.  If this is a normal 
distribution:
P( -z ≤ d ≤ z )  = Φ( z ) - Φ( -z ) = erf( z / √2 )
z = √2 erf-1( C ) 
where Φ() is the cumulative normal distribution function and erf() is the error function.  
Therefore, given some value C, the equation above will determine the boundary.
 Let us suppose, as an example, that for C = 90%, some answer Xi is the most 
analogous one.  This would imply that the probability of that answer’s corresponding 
deviation Di obeys this:
z = √2 erf-1( 0.90 ) = 1.644853 
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Thus, if the deviation Di is larger than 1.644853, with 90% confidence, the answer Xi is 
the most analogous.
 For this example, let us chose a 95% confidence value, therefore seek a deviation 
which is larger than 1.959964, approximately a 2-sigma signal.
Calculating deviations and selecting an answer with confidence
 In Table 4.2, I present the deviation values found for all eight levels of 
abstraction.  Note that even at the coarsest levels, the correct answer to the puzzle 
(transformation #4) is significantly more deviant from the mean.  But the information in 
the table warrants further consideration.
Table 4.2. Candidate transformation similarities
T’ deviations
0 -1.46 0.60 0.55 0.33 3.23 3.71 4.39
-2.24 -0.97 -1.81 -1.73 -1.83 -2.19 -2.26 -1.89
0 0.03 -1.03 -1.66 -1.11 -1.81 -1.77 -2.04
4.47 4.87 4.68 4.71 4.76 2.93 2.09 0.712
0 -1.48 -0.79 -0.84 -0.68 -0.56 0.12 0.36
-2.24 -0.97 -1.65 -1.03 -1.47 -1.60 -1.90 -1.54
grid size 256 128 64 32 16 8 4 2
 µ 0.492 0.283 0.307 0.298 0.606 0.684 0.758 0.866
 σµ 0.116 0.095 0.098 0.085 0.049 0.038 0.027 0.013
codes 2 4 12 30 108 374 1428 5628
features 126 252 756 1890 6804 23562 89964 354564
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Abstraction and Ambiguity
 My experimental data suggests that there exists states of abstraction of a 
representation at which ambiguity vanishes, and others for which ambiguity is present.  
A strategy for determining an appropriate level of abstraction might entail first 
discovering those conditions at which there are marked changes in ambiguity.  In earlier 
sections, I established the connection between ambiguity and abstraction: I now formalize 
the relationship, and explore how to conduct this discovery of ambiguity changes. 
Ambiguity as a function
 Ambiguity might be modeled expressly as a function of abstraction. In so far as 
the level of abstraction could be considered as a continuum from most coarse to most fine 
given a particular representation, this function also may be viewed as continuous. 
 Then would ambiguity as a function be thus:
ξ = f( a ), ∀ a ∈ A, 
where A is the set of abstractions derivable from some representation R.
 Note that here I refer to some representation R.  Even those I have previously 
considered the problems and examples in this dissertation as separate representations, I 
now wish to regard R as the summation of those individual representations.  For example, 
one may say that R is the set of representations that encompass the candidate solution 
images for a matrix problem.  I presume here to seek those levels of abstraction which 
cause one aspect of R to be distinguishable from all other aspects of R. 
 With ambiguity expressed as a function, the boundary conditions of abstraction 
may be regarded mathematically as those places at which the function achieves a local 
minima or maxima.  For convention, let us denote an ambiguity value of 0 as a best 
94
possible local minima; that is, for an ambiguity value of 0, the level of abstraction is such 
that an aspect of R is completely distinct from all other aspects of R. 
The emergence of abstraction boundaries
The deviations presented in table 4.2 appear to suggest that if one starts at the 
very coarsest level of abstraction, the answer is apparent.  Additionally, it seems to 
suggest that if one starts at the finest level of abstraction, another quite different answer is 
apparent.  Both of the deviations for these levels, 4.47 for the coarsest and 4.39 for the 
finest, are unique for the set of answers at those levels, and deviations of that magnitude 
would suggest confidence levels of >99.99% if a normal distribution of error is 
presumed.
Extrema in data
I propose that in both cases, at the extrema of abstraction, the ABR* algorithm is 
operating with either too sparse a data set (at the coarsest) or with too homogeneous a 
data set (at the finest).  Indeed, one can see that at the coarsest abstraction, there are 126 
features upon which to calculate similarity, and at the finest abstraction, there are more 
than 350k features.
The data in the table offers the possibility of automatically detecting these 
situations.  I suggest that the average similarity measurement should increase as the 
number of features against which it is calculated increases. Yet, one can see that the 
average similarity measurement at the coarsest abstraction is 0.492, but then falls, at the 
next level of abstraction, to 0.283, only to thereafter generally increase.  I claim this 
constitutes an emergent boundary for coarse abstraction. 
Other shifts
There exist other changes of note within the data.  The average similarity 
measurement abruptly shifts value between grid sizes 32 and 16. In addition I specifically  
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observe the arrival of ambiguity for grid sizes 8 and 4, in the sense that no value achieves 
the sufficient level of confidence required to make an answer.  
Sufficient Abstraction
My interpretation is that the emergent sufficient level of abstraction, then, is at a 
grid size of 16, at that place where there appear to be a substantial number of features 
available for reasoning and yet those features retain discriminatory power that finer 
abstraction levels lack.
The Interplay of Observer, Observed, and Context
To deem some apprehended object as similar or novel involves the complex 
interplay of at least two relationships (Wagemans et al, 2012a and 2012b): the 
relationship between the observer and the observed, and the relationship between the 
observed and its context. The relationship between the observing agent and the observed 
object may vary depending upon some act taken by the observer.  For example, if one 
wishes to appreciate an object at a higher level of detail, one might move closer to the 
object, or bring the object closer, resulting in the object occupying a larger expanse of the 
observer’s field of view.  This action modifies the resolution of the object: at differing 
levels of resolution, fine or coarse details may appear, which may then be taken into the 
consideration of the novelty of the object. The observed object also is appreciated with 
regard to other objects in its environment.  Comparing an object with others around it 
may engage making inferences about different orders of relationships. The comparison 
may begin at a lower order but then proceed to higher orders if needed. The context also 
sanctions which aspects, qualities, or attitudes of the objects are suitable for comparison.  
Analogies in a general sense are based on similarity and repetition (Hofstadter, 
2008), and so I hold that fractal representations are a suitable representation, one which 
affords the capture of these qualities as well as sanctions reasoning over them.  
The strategies employed in the Extended Analogy by Recall (ABR*) algorithm 
address both aspects of similarity and novelty detection I described above.  It models the 
relationship between the observer and the observed by starting with fractal 
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representations encoded at a coarse level of resolution, and then adjusts to the right level 
of resolution for addressing the given problem. It models the relationship between the 
observed and its context by searching for similarity between simpler relationships, and 
then shifts its searches for similarity between higher-order relationships.  In each aspect, 
these adjustments are made automatically by the strategy of ABR*, by characterizing the 




 Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test suite is a set of standard and common tests of 
intelligence (Raven et al. 2003). The standard version of the test consists of 60 geometric 
analogy problems. Figure 5.1 illustrates a problem typical to those that appear on the test. 
Throughout this dissertation, when I refer to Raven’s problems, I use example problems 
which are similar to those found on Raven’s tests, due to copyright concerns and to 
ensure the integrity of the tests themselves.  The results I report below, however, are from 
the actual test problems. 
 The task in the problem is to pick one of the eight choices in the bottom of the 
figure for insertion in that bottom-right element of the 3x3 matrix in the top of the figure. 
The chosen element should best match the patterns in the rows and columns of the 
matrix.
 Figure 5.1. Problem similar to those of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test.
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 The Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) test paradigm is intended to measure 
eductive ability, the ability to extract and process information from a novel situation 
(Raven et al. 2003).  Eductive ability stands in contrast to reproductive ability, which is 
the ability to recall and use previously learned information.
 The problems from Raven’s various tests are organized into sets.  Each successive 
set is generally interpreted to be more difficult than the prior set.  Some of the problem 
sets are 2x2 matrices of images with six possible answers; the remaining sets are 3x3 
matrices of images with eight possible answers.  
 The tests are purely visual: no verbal information accompanies the tests.  The test-
taker is asked to select from the available possible answers the single answer that best 
completes the matrix (Raven et al. 2003).
A Raven’s Example  
 Let us illustrate the use of fractal representations and the ABR* algorithm for 
solving Raven’s matrices problems.   I shall use as an example the 3x3 matrix problem 
shown above.  
Figure 5.2. The simultaneous relationships
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Simultaneous Relationships, Multiple Constraints.
 An aspect of any Raven’s problem, whether 2x2 or 3x3, is that there exist 
simultaneous horizontal and vertical relationships which must be maintained by the 
selection of the most analogous answer.  In a 2x2 problem, there is one horizontal and 
one vertical relationship which constrain the selection.  In a 3x3 problem, there are two 
horizontal and two vertical relationships.   In my implementation, I represent these 
relationships as mutual fractal representations.
 In Figure 5.2, I illustrate these relationships using the example problem.  As 
shown, relationships H1 and H2 constrain relationship H, while relationships V1 and V2 
constrain relationship V.  There are other possible relationships which can be suggested 
by this problem: I have chosen to focus on these particular four relationships for clarity.
 To solve a Raven’s problem, one must select the image from the set of possible 
answers for which the similarity to each of the problem’s relationships is maximal.  For 
the example, this involves the calculation of a set of similarity values Θi for each answer 
Ai:
Θi ← { S( H1, H(Ai) ), S( H2, H(Ai) ), S( V1, V(Ai) ), S( V2, V(Ai) ) }
 ∀ i, 1 ≤ i  ≤  8
where S(X,Y) is the Tversky similarity between two sets X and Y, and H(Ai) and V(Ai) 
denote the relationship formed when the answer image Ai is included in the H() or V() 
set, respectively.
Reconciling Multiple Analogical Relationships  
 For each candidate answer, the similarity of each potential analogical relationship 
is considered as a value upon an axis in a large “relationship space.” The dimensionality 
of this space is determined by the problem at hand. Thus, for a 2x2 Raven’s problem, the 
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space is 2-dimensional; for a 3x3 Raven’s problem, the space is 4-dimensional, using the 
relationships as shown above.  
 A single value for the similarity is desired.  To do so, I treat these 
multidimensional sets as a vector, and determine its length, using a Euclidean distance 
formula:
Si ← √ Σ Θij2    ∀ i, 1 ≤ i  ≤  8 and ∀ Θij  ∈ Θi
Thus, the longer the vector, the more similar; the shorter the vector, the more dissimilar. 
 Generally, no particular relationship is favored; that is, I do not, as an example, 
weight more decisively those values found upon the horizontal relationships over those 
upon the vertical relationships.  Giving preferential weighting to a relationship is a 
straightforward extension to the calculation above, but choosing which relationship to 
prefer may be non-trivial.
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The Fractal Raven Algorithm
 My algorithm for solving Raven’s problems is itself a slight modification of the 
Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm.  I now present the Fractal Raven 
algorithm in pseudo-code form. I separate the algorithm into two parts: the preparatory 
stage and the execution stage.
Algorithm 5.1. The Fractal Raven Algorithm, preparatory stage.
Given an image P containing a Raven’s problem, determine an 
answer.
P R O B L E M  S E G M E N T A T I O N
By examination, divide P into two images, one containing the 
matrix and the other containing the possible answers.  Further 
divide the matrix image into an ordered set of either 3 or 8 matrix 
element images, for 2x2 or 3x3 matrices respectively.  Likewise, 
divide the answer image into an ordered set of its constituent 
individual answer choices.
Let M := { m1, m2, ... } be the set of matrix element images.
Let C := { c1, c2, c3, ... } be the set of individual answer choices.
Let η be an integer denoting the order of the matrix image (either 2 
or 3, for 2x2 or 3x3 matrices respectively).
R E L A T I O N S H I P  D E S I G N A T I O N S
Let R be a set of relationships, determined by the value of η as 
follows:
If η = 2:
 R ← { H1, V1 } where
 H1 ← MutualFractal( m1, m2 )
 V1 ← MutualFractal( m1, m3 )
Else: (because η = 3)
 R ← { H1, H2, V1, V2 } where
 H1 ← MutualFractal( m1, m2 , m3 )
 H2 ← MutualFractal( m4, m5 , m6 )
 V1 ← MutualFractal( m1, m4 , m7 )
 V2 ← MutualFractal( m2, m5 , m8 )
 A B S T R A C T I O N  L E V E L  P R E P A R A T I O N  
Let d be the largest pixel dimension for any image in the set M ∪ C.
Let A := { a1, a2, ... } represent an ordered range of abstraction 
values where
 a1 ← d, and  ai ← ½ ai-1  ∀ i, 2 ≤ i ≤ ⌊ log2 d ⌋  and  ai  ≥  2  
The values within A constitute the grid values to be used when 
partitioning the problem’s images.
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The Fractal Raven Algorithm: Preparatory Stage
 In the first stage of the Fractal Raven Algorithm, an image containing the entire 
problem is first segmented into its component images (the matrix of images, and the 
possible answers).  Next, based upon the complexity of the matrix, the algorithm 
determines the set of relationships to be evaluated.  Then, a range of abstraction levels is 
determined. 
 As I have implemented it, the abstraction levels are determined to be a 
partitioning of the given images into gridded sections at a prescribed size and regularity.
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Algorithm 5.2. The Fractal Raven Algorithm, execution stage.
The Fractal Ravens Algorithm: Execution Stage
 The algorithm concludes by using a variant of the ABR* algorithm to determine 
the confidence in the answers at each level, stopping when ambiguity is sufficiently 
resolved.  Thus for each level of abstraction, the relationships implied by the kind of 
Raven’s problem (2x2 or 3x3) are re-represented into that partitioning.  Then, for each of 
the candidate images, a potentially analogous relationship is determined for each of the 
Given M, C, R, A, and η as determined in the preparatory  stage, 
find the answer.
P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let Ε be a real number which represents the number of standard 
deviations beyond which a value’s answer may be judged as 
“confident”
Let S(X,Y) be the Tversky similarity metric for sets X and Y
 E X E C U T I O N  
For each abstraction a ∈ A:
• Re-represent each fractal representation r ∈ R according to 
abstraction a
• S ← ∅
• For each answer image c ∈ C :
• If η = 2:
H ← MutualFractal( m3, c ) according to abstraction a
V ← MutualFractal( m2, c ) according to abstraction a
Θ ← { S( H1, H ), S( V1, V ) }
• Else: (because η = 3)
H ← MutualFractal( m7, m8, c ) according to abstraction a
V ← MutualFractal( m3, m6, c ) according to abstraction a
Θ ← { S( H1, H ), S( H2, H ), S( V1, V ), S( V2, V ) }
• Calculate a single similarity metric from vector Θ: 
t ← √ Σ θ2    ∀ θ  ∈ Θ
S ← S ∪ { t }
• Set µ ← mean ( S )
• Set σµ ← stdev ( S )/√n
• Set D ← { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn } where Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
• Generate the set Z := { Zi ... } such that Zi ∈ D and Zi > E
• If |Z| = 1, return the answer image Ci ∈ C which corresponds 
to Zi
• otherwise there exists ambiguity, and further refinement must 
occur.
If no answer has been returned, then no answer may be given 
unambiguously.
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existing relationships and a similarity value calculated.  The vector of similarity values is 
reduced via a simple Euclidean distance formula to a single similarity.  The balance of the 
Fractal Ravens algorithm follows the ABR* algorithm, using the deviation from the mean 
of these similarities, continues through a variety of levels of abstraction, looking for an 
unambiguous answer that meets a specified confidence value.
The example, solved.
 Table 5.1 shows the results of running the Fractal Ravens algorithm on the 
example problem, starting at an original gridded partitioning of 200x200 pixels (the 
maximal pixel dimension of the images), and then refining the partitioning down to a grid 
of 3x3 pixels.  The table gives the mean (µ), standard deviation (σµ), and number of 
features (f) for each level of abstraction (grid).  The deviation and confidence for each 
candidate answer are given for each level of abstraction as well.  A confidence level of 
95% is sought.  In the table, I color a cell yellow if it exceeds the desired confidence 
level, and red if it does so unambiguously for the given grid partitioning.
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Table 5.1. Image Deviations and Confidences
Discussion of the example results
The deviations presented in table 5.1 appear to suggest that if one starts at the very 
coarsest level of abstraction, the answer is apparent (image choice 3).  Indeed, the 
confidence in the answer never dips below 99.83%, across all levels of abstraction.
 I see evidence that operating with either too sparse a data set (at the coarsest) or 
with too homogeneous a data set (at the finest) may be problematic.  The coarsest 
abstraction (200 pixel grid size) offers 378 features, whereas the finest abstraction (3 
pixel grid size) offers more than 1.5 million features for consideration. 

















































































































grid size 200 100 50 25 12 6 3
µ 0.589 0.310 0.432 0.690 0.872 0.915 0.948
σµ 0.031 0.019 0.028 0.015 0.007 0.005 0.003
codes 6 24 96 384 1734 6936 26934
features 378 1512 6048 24192 109242 436968 1696842
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 The data in the table continues to suggests the possibility of automatically 
detecting these boundary situations.  The average similarity measurement at the coarsest 
abstraction is 0.589, but then falls, at the next level of abstraction, to 0.310, only to 
thereafter generally increase.  This constitutes further evidence for an emergent boundary 
for coarse abstraction. 
 I suspect that ambiguity exists for ranges of abstraction, only to vanish at some 
appropriate levels of abstraction, and then reemerges once those levels are surpassed. I 
see evidence of such behavior in this example, where there exists ambiguity at grid sizes 
100, 50, 25, and 12, then the ambiguity vanishes for grid size 6, and then reemerges for 
grid size 3.  This suggests that there are features within the image which are sufficiently 
discriminatory only at certain levels of abstraction.
Results of Fractal Ravens on the Raven’s progressive matrices
 I have tested my Fractal Ravens algorithm on all problems associated with the 
four main variations of the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Tests: 60 problems of the 
Standard Progressive Matrices test, 48 problems of the Advanced Progressive Matrices 
test, 36 problems of the Coloured Progressive Matrices test, and 60 problems of the SPM 
Plus test.  To my knowledge, this is the first account of any computational model’s 
attempt at the entire Raven’s test. In this section, I present my results and discuss my 
findings.
Inputs used for the test
 To create inputs for the Fractal Ravens algorithm, each page from the various 
Raven test booklets were scanned, and the resulting greyscale images were rotated to 
roughly correct for page alignment issues. Then, the images were sliced up to create 
separate image files for each entry in the problem matrix and for each answer choice. 
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These separate images were the inputs to the technique for each problem. No further 
image processing or cleanup was performed, despite the presence of numerous pixel-level 
artifacts introduced by the scanning and minor inter-problem image alignment issues. 
Additionally, the fractal algorithm attempted to solve each problem independently: no 
information was carried over from problem to problem, nor from test variant to test 
variant.  The correct answers for the individual problems were provided in an answer key 
that came with the source material for each test suite.
 The code used in conducted these runs is precisely the same code as used in the 
earlier example.  This code is available for download from our lab website.  The images 
scanned, however, are copyrighted and thus are not available for download.  However, I 
believe that the instructions for preparing the images provided above will allow for 
someone with access to the Ravens materials to reproduce these results.
Levels of abstraction considered and calculations performed
 The images associated with each problem had a maximum pixel dimension of  
between 150 and 250 pixels.  Accounting for variation within each test problem, and 
setting a minimum grid size of 4 pixels, the algorithm therefore calculated five or six 
levels of abstraction for each problem, using the formula described above for determining 
maximum grid size and using a strategy of halving the pixel dimension at each 
successively finer level of abstraction.  
 At each level of abstraction, the similarity value for each possible answer was 
calculated, as proscribed by the Fractal Ravens algorithm.  Those calculations used the 
Tversky formula, and set alpha to 1.0 and beta equal to 0.0, conforming to values used in 
the coincidence model by Bush and Mosteller (1953). From those values, the mean and 
standard deviation were calculated, and then the deviation and confidence for each 
answer was determined.  Which answers provided a confidence above the chosen level 
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were noted, as well as whether for each abstraction level the answer was unambiguous or 
ambiguous, and if ambiguous, in what manner.  In those cases where ambiguity was 
found, I explored several different data techniques to assist in the resolution.  I describe 
those techniques after the presentation of the performance.
Assessment of Fractal Ravens performance against human norms
 There are three main assessments that can be made following the administration 
of a Raven test to an individual: the total score, which is given simply as the number of 
correct answers; an estimate of consistency, which is obtained by comparing the given 
score distribution to the expected distribution for that particular total score; and the 
percentile range into which the score falls, for a given age and nationality (Raven et al. 
2003). A score is “consistent” if the difference between the actual score and the expected 
score for any given set is no more than ± 2 (Raven et al. 2003).
The Standard Progressive Matrices test
The Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test consists of 60 visual analogy 
problems, organized into five sets of 12 problems each. The problem sets are denoted by 
the letters A through E.  The problems are ordered in approximate degree of difficulty by 
set, but this increase in difficulty is not uniform.   
Performance on the Standard Progressive Matrices test
On the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test, the Fractal Ravens algorithm 
detected the correct answer at a 95% or higher level of confidence on 50 of the 60 
problems.  The number of problems with detected correct answers per set were 12 for set 
A, 10 for set B, 11 for set C, 9 for set D, and 8 for set E.  Of the 50 problems where the 
correct answers detected, 38 were determinable by one or more of the ambiguity-
resolution strategies. Of the remaining 12 problems noted answers, all but three were 
109
ambiguous between two or three particular answers.   Table 5.2 provides a summarization 
of these results.
Table 5.2. SPM Results
As shown in Chart 5.1, the score differences for Fractal Ravens on each set were 
no more than ±1. For a human test-taker, this score distribution generally would indicate 
that the test results do provide a valid measure of the individual's general intellectual 
capacity. This score pattern illustrates that the results achieved by the algorithm fall well 
within typical human norms on the SPM for all sets.





between 2 or 3
Total 50 38 9
set A 12 11 1
set B 10 8 1
set C 11 8 3
set D 9 6 2
set E 8 5 3
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Using norms from the United States, a total score of 50 corresponds to the 95th 
percentile for children about 12 years old, the 75th percentile for children around 14 
years old, and the 50th percentile for children older than 16 years old (Raven et al. 2003).
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The Advanced Progressive Matrices test
The Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices test consists of 48 visual analogy 
problems, organized into two sets of 12 and 36 problems, respectively. The problem sets 
are denoted by the letters A and B.  The problems are ordered in approximate degree of 
difficulty by set, but this increase in difficulty is not uniform.  
Performance on the Advanced Progressive Matrices test
On the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices test, the Fractal Ravens algorithm 
detected the correct answer at a 95% or higher level of confidence on 42 of the 48 
problems.  The number of problems with detected correct answers per set were 10 for set 
A, and 32 for set B.  Of the 42 problems where the correct answers detected, 28 were 
determinable by one or more of the ambiguity-resolution strategies. Of the remaining 14 
problems noted answers, all but four were ambiguous between two or three particular 
answers.   Table 5.3 provides a summarization of the APM results.
Table 5.3. APM Results
The score differences for Fractal Ravens on both APM sets were no more than ±1, 
indicating consistency and that the results achieved by the algorithm fall well within 
typical human norms on the APM for both sets.  A total score of 42 corresponds to the 
95th percentile for adults between 50 and 60 years old, and exceeds the 75th percentile 





between 2 or 3
Total 42 28 10
set A 10 6 4
set B 32 22 6
112
The Coloured Progressive Matrices test
The Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices test consists of 36 visual analogy 
problems, organized into three sets of 12 problems. The problem sets are denoted by the 
letters A, AB, and B.  The problems are ordered in approximate degree of difficulty by 
set, but this increase in difficulty is not uniform.    
Performance on the Coloured Progressive Matrices test
On the Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices test, the Fractal Ravens algorithm 
detected the correct answer at a 95% or higher level of confidence on 30 of the 36 
problems.  The number of problems with detected correct answers per set were 12 for set 
A, 11 for set AB, and 7 for set B.  Of the 30 problems where the correct answers detected, 
24 were determinable by one or more of the ambiguity-resolution strategies. Of the 
remaining 6 problems noted answers, all were ambiguous between two or three particular 
answers.   Table 5.4 provides a summarization of these results.
Table 5.4. CPM Results
As shown in Chart 5.2, the score differences for Fractal Ravens on each set were 
no more than ±2, indicating consistency. This score pattern also illustrates that the results 





between 2 or 3
Total 30 24 6
set A 12 11 1
set AB 11 8 3
set B 7 5 2
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Chart 5.2. Human norms comparison for CPM score of 30.
Using the United States norms, a total score of 30 on the CPM test corresponds to 
the 95th percentile for children about 7 years old, the 75th percentile for children about 9 
years old, and the 50th percentile for children about 11 years old (Raven et al. 2003).
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The SPM Plus test
The Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Plus test consists of 60 visual analogy 
problems, organized into five sets of 12 problems. The problem sets are denoted by the 
letters A, B, C, D, and E.  The problems are ordered in approximate degree of difficulty 
by set, but this increase in difficulty is not uniform.  
Performance on the SPM Plus test
On the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Plus test, the Fractal Ravens 
algorithm detected the correct answer at a 95% or higher level of confidence on 50 of the 
60 problems.  The number of problems with detected correct answers per set were 10 for 
set A, 9 for set B, 9 for set C, 11 for set D, and 11 for set E.  Of the 50 problems where 
the correct answers detected, 39 were determinable by one or more of the ambiguity-
resolution strategies. Of the remaining 11 problems noted answers, all but one were 
ambiguous between two or three particular answers.   Table 5.5 provides a summarization 
of these results.





between 2 or 3
Total 50 39 10
set A 10 9 1
set B 9 8 1
set C 9 5 4
set D 11 8 2
set E 11 9 2
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Comparison to other computational models
 While this is the first published account of a computational model’s attempt at the 
entire suite of Raven’s tests, there are other computational models which have been used 
on some or all of certain tests.  For those accounts which report scores, I compared their 
results with those achieved by the Fractal Raven algorithm.  Table 5.6 documents the 
performance of the Fractal Ravens algorithm against those contemporaries. 
Table 5.6 Comparing Fractal Ravens to Other Models
Carpenter et al. (1990) report results of running two versions of their algorithm 
(FairRaven and BetterRaven) against a subset of the APM problems.  The subset of 
problems chosen by Carpenter et al. reflect those whose rules and representations were 
deemed as inferable by their production rule based system (Carpenter et al. 1990).
Lovett et al. (2007, 2010) report results from their computational model’s 
approach to the Raven’s SPM test.  In each account, only a portion of the test was 
attempted, but Lovett et al. project an overall score based on the performance of the 
attempted sections.  The latest published account by Lovett et al. (2010) reports a score of 
44 out of 48 attempted problems from sets B through E of the SPM test, but does not 
offer a breakdown of this score by problem set. Lovett et al. (2010) project a score of 56 
SPM Results APM Results
model Total # att. A B C D E Total # att. A B
Carpenter et al. “FairRaven” 23 34 7 16
Carpenter et al. “BetterRaven” 32 34 7 25
Lovett et al. (2007) 22 24 - 12 10 - -
Lovett et al. (2010) 44 48 - unreported
Cirillo & Ström 28 36 - - 8 10 10
Kunda et al. Affine 50 60 11 12 10 8 9 18 48 5 13
Fractal Ravens 50 60 12 10 11 9 8 42 48 10 32
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for the entire test, based on human normative data indicating a probable score of 12 on 
set A given their model’s performance on the attempted sets.
Cirillo and Ström (2010) report that their system was tested against Sets C 
through E of the SPM and solved 8, 10, and 10 problems, respectively.  Though 
unattempted, they predict that their system would score 19 on the APM (a prediction of 7 
on set A, and 12 on set B).
Kunda et al. (2011, 2012) report the results of running their Affine algorithm 
against all of the problems on both the SPM and the APM tests, with a detailed 
breakdown of scoring per test.  They report a score of 50 for the SPM test, and a score of 
18 on the APM test. 
Specific comparison of Fractal Ravens vs Kunda et al. Affine
The agreement of scores between the Fractal Ravens algorithm and the Kunda et 
al. Affine algorithm on the SPM warrant further inspection and remarks.  Kunda et al. 
(2012) inspect each row and column of a Raven problem, comparing pixels between 
images under both a series of similitude transformations (indeed, they employ the same 
eight similitude transformations used by the fractal encoding process) and other pixel 
transformations.  Once a candidate transformation has been selected, then the 
transformation is applied to the images in the final row and column of the problem, 
generating a prediction image.  This prediction image is then compared against the 
candidate images by calculating a similarity score based on pixel correlation.  The 
candidate image with the maximum similarity score is selected as the answer.
Although Kunda et al. (2012) do not report the ambiguity of their results, I 
received their similarity data for the SPM, APM, and CPM test results via private 
communication, and made the calculation using the techniques described above for the 
ABR* algorithm.  Table 5.7 directly compares the specific results of the Kunda et al. 
Affine algorithm and the Fractal Ravens, color coded to indicate ambiguity.
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Table 5.7. Comparison of SPM Results between Affine and Fractal Ravens
Table 5.7 shows the results of both algorithms at a 95% level of confidence. 
While both algorithms answer 50 of the 60 problems, the degree of ambiguity differs 
substantially.  The Fractal Ravens algorithm has ambiguous results on 12 problems, while 
the Affine algorithm is ambiguous on 31 problems.  This discrepancy can be attributed at 
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least in part to the single level of abstraction at which the Affine algorithm operated.  In 
contrast, the Fractal Ravens algorithm examined five or six levels of abstraction for each 
problem.
The pattern of agreement between the algorithms is likewise intriguing. Of the 60 
problems, the algorithms agree (both either correct, ambiguous, or incorrect) on 25 
problems.  This is expected, as both algorithms use representations which are imagistic in 
nature rather than the propositional representations used in Lovett et al. (2007 and 2010). 
On 15 problems, the Fractal Ravens algorithm selects the correct answer, while the Affine 
algorithm is ambiguous. This result also is expected, for as indicated above, the Fractal 
Ravens algorithm operates over substantially more levels of abstraction. In contrast, only 
on one problem (B3) is the Affine algorithm correct while the Fractal Ravens algorithm is 
ambiguous. A closer inspection of the Fractal Ravens activity on that problem indicates 
that at the middle level of abstraction, the correct answer is unambiguously identified, yet 
at more coarser and more fine levels of abstraction, other answers would have been 
selected. Thus, while the Fractal Ravens algorithm notes the correct answer, it cannot be 
selected unambiguously.
Each algorithm fails to spot the correct answer on 10 problems, but they fail in 
common on only three problems (D8, E10, and E12).  The pattern of discrepancy for the 
remaining 14 problems falls into three categories:  Fractal Ravens correct / Affine 
incorrect (A11, C2, C9, D6, and D12); Fractal Ravens ambiguous / Affine incorrect (D7 
and E7); and Fractal Ravens incorrect / Affine ambiguous (B9, B10, C3, D10, D11, E1, 
and E3).  There was no problem in which the Affine algorithm was correct while the 
Fractal Ravens algorithm was incorrect.
With regard to the third pattern of discrepancy (Fractal Ravens incorrect / Affine 
ambiguous) in which the Affine algorithm outperformed the Fractal Ravens algorithm, 
three of the problems (C3, E1, and E3) involve the addition of two of the three horizontal 
or vertical images.  The Affine algorithm employs a specific pixel addition transformation 
as well as the eight similitude transformations, and it is likely that this accounts for the 








































































Ravens algorithm fails to note the answer unambiguous at the considered levels of 
abstraction. Three problems (B9, B10 and D10) have the answer noted as among the best 
three answers at certain levels, but in each instance noted below the 95% confidence 
level. The remaining problem (D11) has the answer noted as an ambiguous possibility, 
but prefers instead to choose an answer which has the correct aspect (closed figure) and 
shape (wave), but is truncated instead of full.
Thus, while the scores of the two algorithms are in close agreement, the 
differences in the algorithms’ approaches and the representations used lead to specific 
distinctions in the individual answers on the SPM test.  As shown, the Fractal Ravens 
algorithm, by dint of its use of several levels of abstraction, is substantially less 
ambiguous than the Affine algorithm.  
Choice of psychological model
As noted earlier, the Tversky formula for featural similarity offers the ability to 
vary the similarity metric through the selection of weights for common or unique 
features.  In my assessment, I looked at the Fractal Ravens algorithm’s performance on 
all of the Raven tests using three such psychological models of similarity:  the Gregson-
Sjoberg model, the Eisler-Ekman model, and the Bush-Mosteller model. 
The Gregson-Sjoberg model establishes α = β = 1.0  This yields a similarity 
metric which is the Jaccard similarity, a balanced approach which favors neither 
transformation:
 S(T,T’) = Ƒ(T ∩ T’) / Ƒ(T ∪ T’)
Tversky (1977) points out that the Eisler-Ekman model, setting α = β = 0.5, yields 
a a similarity metric of the form:
 S(T,T’) = 2Ƒ(T ∩ T’) / (Ƒ(T) + Ƒ(T’))
A slightly different formulation for Eisler-Ekman is given by Junge (1977):
S(T,T’) = 2q / (1 - q)  where q = RT/RT’
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where the values RT and RT’ are the responses to stimuli T and T’.  Junge’s reformulation 
using the response ratio introduces an asymmetry (through the choice of which response 
is to be judged as the denominator).
Of the models considered, only the Bush-Mosteller model, which sets α = 1.0 and 
β = 0, offers a strictly Tversky-formulated asymmetric view of the transformations.  In 
doing so, this model introduces the notion of directional salience (Santini & Jain, 1999).  
This asymmetry  creates a violation of the strictly geometric distance axioms associated 
with a distance metric. Another interpretation is that using the Bush-Mosteller model, 
S(T,T’) > S(T’,T) whenever Ƒ(T) < Ƒ(T’)
This implies a relationship between the asymmetry of the model and the 
homogeneity of the features being used to discrimination T and T’.
In my experiments, I found that the choice of model had little or no effect on the 
results obtained on the APM and CPM tests.  On the SPM and the SPMPlus tests, the 
outcomes did change, but only very slightly.  The Bush-Mosteller model generated the 
highest score on the SPM (a score of 50), while the Gregson-Sjoberg model generated the 
lowest score of 48.  I conclude that the selection of the psychological model for similarity  
distance has little effect on the general outcome of the Fractal Ravens, though testing 
other models and similarity metric calculations would be a good exercise for future 
research.  
I speculate that the lack of outcome differential when using the Bush-Mosteller 
model in my results is due to the juxtaposition of that model’s implicit directional 
salience with the mutual fractal representation.  I will offer further speculation on the 
relevance of this model a bit further ahead in this discussion.
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Performance at varying levels of confidence
I also ran the Fractal Ravens algorithm against the Ravens test suite using a 
variety of levels of confidence.  Chart 5.3 provides the details of these test runs.
Chart 5.3. Percentage of Correct Scores, Performance per sigma
As the confidence level, expressed here in terms of the deviation, increased from 
38% confidence (at 0.5-sigma) to 99.99% confidence (at 4-sigma), the test performance 
decreased.  Note that at 95% confidence (about 2-sigma), for all tests, the scores are at or 
above 80%, and there is a sharp falloff in certain tests (the CPM in particular) for 3-sigma 
and beyond.  Even so, the SPM and SPMPlus, while different in content but similar in 
composition, exhibit performance curves which resemble one another.
As confidence increases, the agreement in scores between those noted correct and 
those discernible as correct via some strategy also increases.  I believe my computational 
evidence suggests that increasing confidence decreases ambiguity, and thus provides 
sufficient data for the various strategies to determine an answer.  That, in turn, leads to 
the convergence in score agreement as confidence increases. 
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CHAPTER 6
FRACTALS AND MILLER ANALOGIES
 In this chapter, I describe the use of a derivation of the Extended Analogy By 
Recall (ABR*) algorithm on a classic set of geometric analogy problems, those first used 
by Evans in his 1964 study (Evans, 1964). This chapter develops and illustrates the 
Fractal Miller algorithm, and provides a comparison of its performance against 
contemporary studies and human behavior on the Evans suite of problems.
Miller Analogies Test
 The Miller Analogies Test (MAT) is a high-level mental ability test which requires 
the solution of problems presented as analogies (Meagher, 2006; Pearson 2011).  The test 
is used by a large number of graduate studies programs as one of several criteria for 
admission, as the abilities to recognize and to construct analogies are thought to be key 
indicators of constructing explanations and building arguments, and represents a 
fundamental way in which understanding is formed and communicated (Gentner, 
Holyoak, & Kokinov, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1996). Psychologists also suggest that 
the format of the Miller Analogy Test represents an efficient and effective way to sample 
reasoning processes and to measure verbal reasoning, inferential ability, and analytical 
intelligence (Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004; Lohman, 2004; Sternberg, 1977, 1985, 
1988). 
MAT Analogies
  The problems on the MAT are entirely verbal, and are referred to as MAT 
analogies.  MAT analogies have the general form “A : B :: C : ____” with four possible 
answer choices given.  To solve a MAT analogy, one must recognize some relationship 
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between two of the given terms, and then look for that same relationship between the 
third given term and one of the answer choices.   This yields two possible interpretations 
for “A : B :: C : ___”:
A is to B as C is to (one of the answers)
A is to C as B is to (one of the answers)
The Miller Analogy Test expressly precludes the remaining interpretation (Pearson 2011):
B is to C as A is to (one of the answers)
Here are some examples of MAT analogies:
Plane : Air :: Car : _____
(a . motorcycle, b . engine, c . land, d . atmosphere)
Induction : _____ :: Soldier : Priest
(a . confirmation, b . graduation, c . ordination, d . resistance)  
 In the first example, the sought-for relationship is “travels by”: a plane “travels 
by” air.  Thus, one can consider in turn which of the possible answers would best satisfy 
the statement: car “travels by” ____.  In this example, the answer is “c. land.”   In the 
second example, the sought-for relationship is “ceremony for becoming”: a soldier 
becomes one by being inducted.  The answer to the second example, then, is “c. 
ordination”: a priest becomes one by being ordained. 
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 Note also that the second example is given in a format which is different but 
semantically equivalent:  C : ____ :: A : B.  Indeed, on the Miller Analogy Test, the 
problem may be posed in any of these formats:
A : B :: C : _____
A : B :: _____ : C
C : _____ :: A : B
_____ : C :: A : B
 Regardless of the manner in which the missing term is presented, the challenge of 
solving a MAT analogy remains the same:  there will exist one relationship which best 
describes either the pair A and B or the pair A and C, and therefore one sought-for 
answer. 
Solving a MAT Analogy
 Schematically, if one treats the original analogy as A : B :: C : X, then there are 
two candidate relationships R1 and R2 which can be expressed in a functional notation:
R1(A,B) :: R1(C,X)
R2(A,C) :: R2(B,X)
The challenge with solving a MAT analogy, then, is to determine which of these 
relationships R1 or R2 is the sought-for relationship.  This determination will be informed 
by all of the given terms (A,B,C), as well as the four potential answers to be substituted 
in for X. 
Geometric variations of the Miller Analogy Test and AI
 In 1964, Evans published a paper entitled “A heuristic program to solve 
Geometric Analogy Problems” (Evans, 1964).  In the paper, he describes his efforts to 
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address a ‘wide class of intelligence test problems of the “geometric-analogy” type 
(“figure A is to figure B as figure C is to which of the following figures?”).’  What Evans 
proposed, and produced, was the first such program to tackle geometric variations of the 
Miller Analogy test.  
 Evans used a canonical format for his problems: A : B :: C : (a, b, c, d, e), with 
three given images (A, B, C), and five potential answers (a,b,c,d,e).  An example problem 
from those Evans addressed is shown in Figure 6.1.
: :: : ?
a b c d e
Figure 6.1. An Evans analogy problem
Evans (1964) notes that his approach does not concern itself with the original capture of 
the figural information, and instead presumes the capture process results in a list-structure 
representation, comprised of geometric descriptions.  For example,  (DOT (X . Y)) would 
be inferred to mean that there is a DOT at coordinates (X,Y), and (SCC ((X1 . Y1) 0.0 
(X2 . Y2) 0.0 (X3 . Y3) 0.0 (X1 . Y1))) would be inferred as a “simple closed curve” 
describing a triangle with vertices at (X1,Y1), (X2,Y2), and (X3,Y3).   Other descriptions 
included ways to denote spatial relationships between pairs of objects (e.g. (INSIDE A B) 
meant that object A was wholly contained inside of object B).  Each of the given objects 
in a geometric MAT problem and all of the possible answers were represented in this 
manner.
 With this representation of the problem, Evans made another simplifying decision 
and restricted his work to being an interpretation of the R1 relationship of the more 
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general MAT problems; that is, the form A : B :: C : X is always interpreted as R1(A,B) :: 
R1(C,X), removing the problem of determining which of the two relationships should be 
sought.  This in turn provided two-part strategy for Evan’s solver. First, the solver 
determined all of the possible ways in which the spatial relationships of A and B can be 
matched, and from those matchings established one or more rules for transforming A into 
B (thereby determining R1(A,B)).  Next, a candidate set of rules is determined for 
transforming C into each of the potential answers, using the same technique.  Then, each 
of those rules are compared against the set of R1(A,B) rules, and the similarity between 
each is noted (in terms of how much or little of the original rule appears in the candidate 
rule, and the manner in which the variables are used).  Finally, the rules which are found 
to resemble each other are applied to the objects A and C, to determine which information 
is preserved in the construction of B from A and the construction of the candidate answer 
from C (Evans, 1964).  
 Evans (1964) points out that although there may be many such rules determined 
by the first part of the solver, he coded the solver to seek the “best” or “strongest” rule, 
one that results in the most descriptive answer or is the least alteration of the rule (Evans 
permits for the production of an answer which uses some but not necessarily all of the 
elements of a rule).  As Evans notes, if a single rule meets this criteria, it is chosen as the 
analogy, and the potential answer from which it was generated is selected as the answer 
to the problem (Evans, 1964).  If a tie results, the method is deemed to have failed to 
produce an analogy.
 Evans’ aim was to develop a method by which a program could form a “theory” – 
the R1(A,B) rule – on the basis of the evidence present in the descriptions of A and B, and then 
generalize the theory as required (through rule modification) to fit further evidence (in the form 
of C).  Once generalized, the program would use the theory to make a prediction from that 
evidence, and test that prediction via comparison of the output to the potential answers, iteratively 
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modifying the rule and retesting its predictions until a singular answer was determined or no 
further modifications could be formed.
Contemporary approaches to Miller Geometric Analogies
While there are several published accounts of models and systems which address 
geometric analogies (Bohan & O’Donoghue 2000; Ragni et al., 2007; Schwering et al., 
2007), the largest body of contemporary work on address the specific challenges of the 
Evans set of geometric MAT problems comes from the work of Kenneth Forbus and his 
colleagues.  Several of the publications report on the problem of constructing input from 
sketches (Forbus et al., 2001; Forbus et al., 2008).  Two papers in particular, however, 
specifically address geometric MAT problems in details.
 In Tomai et al. (2004), the authors develop and defend the notion that qualitative 
visual structure combined with analogical processing can produce human-like results, 
using the domain of geometric MAT problems. The paper illustrates the general purpose 
nature of the Structure-Mapping Engine (SME).  With regard to Evans, however, Tomai 
et al. demonstrate that processing only differences (as opposed to similarities) in the 
second stage of their model leads to sufficient results.
 In Lovett et al. (2009), the authors further their argument that second-order 
analogies over differences computed via analogies between images are sufficient.  They 
make an extensive comparison between the results of their model’s output and that of a 
behavioral experiment performed on humans taking the Evans problem suite.
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The Fractal Miller algorithm
 In the course of my research, I developed the Fractal Ravens algorithm as 
presented in an earlier chapter.  Since the mechanisms for deriving an answer based upon 
multiple relationships were already available through that algorithm, the derivation of the 
Fractal Miller algorithm from the Fractal Ravens algorithm was straightforward.  
An example
Let us use the example problem from Evans’ research as the basis for describing the 
algorithm.  Recall that in the problem, there is exactly one relationship which must be 
considered (as opposed to the several that must be simultaneously considered when 
addressing a Raven’s problem).   Let us denote this left-side relationship as R, and the 
right-side relationship as R’, as shown in Figure 6.2.
: :: : ?
R R’
Figure 6.2. the R and R’ relationships
To solve a Miller’s problem, one must construct a set of similarity values Θi for each of 
the five potential answers Xi:
Si ← S( R, R’(Xi) )   ∀ i, 1 ≤ i  ≤  5
where S(X,Y) is the Tversky similarity between two sets X and Y, and R’(Xi) denotes the 
relationship formed when the answer image Xi is included in the R’() set.
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The algorithm, presented
 My algorithm for solving geometric MAT problems, like the Fractal Ravens 
algorithm, is itself a slight modification of the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) 
algorithm.  Here is the algorithm in pseudo-code form. I separate the algorithm into two 
parts: the preparatory stage and the execution stage.
Algorithm 6.1. The Fractal Miller Algorithm, preparatory stage.
The Fractal Miller Algorithm: Preparatory Stage
 In the first stage of our Fractal Miller Algorithm, a geometric Miller’s Analogy 
Test problem is first segmented into its component images (the matrix of the given 
images, and the collection of images of possible answers).  Next, the algorithm 
determines the relationship between the first two given images, expressed as a mutual 
fractal representation.  Then, a range of abstraction levels is determined. 
Given a geometric Miller’s Analogy Test problem, determine an 
answer.
P R O B L E M  S E G M E N T A T I O N
By examination, divide the problem into two segments, one 
containing the matrix of givens and the other containing the 
possible answers.  Further divide the matrix of givens into an 
ordered set of 3 images.  Likewise, divide the answer segment into 
an ordered set of its constituent individual answer choices.
Let M := { m1, m2, m3 } be the set of matrix element images.
Let C := { c1, c2, c3, ... } be the set of individual answer choices.
R E L A T I O N S H I P  D E S I G N A T I O N S
Let R be a relationship, determined as follows:
 R ← MutualFractal( m1, m2 )
 A B S T R A C T I O N  L E V E L  P R E P A R A T I O N  
Let d be the largest pixel dimension for any image in the set M ∪ C.
Let A := { a1, a2, ... } represent an ordered range of abstraction 
values where
 a1 ← d, and  ai ← ½ ai-1  ∀ i, 2 ≤ i ≤ ⌊ log2 d ⌋  and  ai  ≥  2  
The values within A constitute the grid values to be used when 
partitioning the problem’s images.
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 As I have implemented it, the abstraction levels are determined to be a 
partitioning of the given images into gridded sections at a prescribed size and regularity.
Algorithm 6.2. The Fractal Miller Algorithm, execution stage.
The Fractal Miller Algorithm: Execution Stage
 The algorithm concludes by using a variant of the ABR* algorithm to determine 
the confidence in the answers at each level, stopping when ambiguity is sufficiently 
resolved.  Thus for each level of abstraction, the relationship R is re-represented into that 
partitioning.  Then, for each of the candidate images, a potentially analogous relationship 
is determined and a similarity value is calculated.  The balance of the Fractal Miller 
algorithm follows the ABR* algorithm, using the deviation from the mean of these 
Given M, C, R, A, and η as determined in the preparatory  stage, 
find the answer.
P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let Ε be a real number which represents the number of standard 
deviations beyond which a value’s answer may be judged as 
“confident”
Let S(X,Y) be the Tversky similarity metric for sets X and Y
 E X E C U T I O N  
For each abstraction a ∈ A:
• Re-represent each fractal representation r ∈ R according to 
abstraction a
• S ← ∅
• For each answer image c ∈ C :
R’ ← MutualFractal( m3, c ) according to abstraction a
S ← S ∪ { S( R, R’) }
• Set µ ← mean ( S )
• Set σµ ← stdev ( S )/√n
• Set D ← { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn } where Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
• Generate the set Z := { Zi ... } such that Zi ∈ D and Zi > E
• If |Z| = 1, return the answer image Ci ∈ C which corresponds 
to Zi
• otherwise there exists ambiguity, and further refinement must 
occur.
If no answer has been returned, then no answer may be given 
unambiguously.
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similarities, continues through a variety of levels of abstraction, looking for an 
unambiguous answer that meets a specified confidence value.
The example, solved.
 Table 6.1 shows the results of running the Fractal Miller algorithm on the example 
problem, starting at an original gridded partitioning of 59x59 pixels (the maximal pixel 
dimension of the images), and then refining the partitioning down to a grid of 7x7 pixels.  
The table gives the mean (µ), standard deviation (σµ), and number of features (f) for each 
level of abstraction (grid).  The deviation and confidence for each candidate answer are 
given for each level of abstraction as well.  A confidence level of 95% is sought.  In the 
table, I color a cell yellow if it exceeds the desired confidence level, and red if it does so 
unambiguously for the given grid partitioning. 
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Table 6.1. Image Deviations and Confidences
Discussion of the example results
As with the Fractal Ravens example results, here the deviations presented in table 6.1 
appear to suggest that if the algorithm starts at the very coarsest level of abstraction, the 
answer is apparent (image choice 4).  The confidence in that answer tapers off as the level 
of abstraction becomes finer.









































grid size 59 29 14 7
µ 0.2889 0.1644 0.1382 0.2033
σµ 0.0508 0.0197 0.0069 0.0020
codes 2 18 50 162
features 126 1134 3150 10206
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 Again, as with the Fractal Ravens results, I see evidence that operating with either 
too sparse a data set (at the coarsest) or with too homogeneous a data set (at the finest) 
may be problematic.  The coarsest abstraction (59 pixel grid size) offers 126 features, 
whereas the finest abstraction (7 pixel grid size) offers more than 10,000 features for 
consideration. 
 The data in the table continues to suggests the possibility of automatically 
detecting these boundary situations.  The average similarity measurement at the coarsest 
abstraction is 0.2889, and falls steadily at finer levels of abstraction, to sharply increase at 
the finest level.  Unlike the Fractal Ravens example, I believe this provides evidence for 
for an emergent boundary for finer abstraction. 
 I note also that the only level for which the answer is unambiguous is the most 
coarse level of abstraction, and that all other tested levels offer ambiguity.  To me, this 
suggests that while there may be a sufficient level of abstraction (even if it is coarse) at 
which an unambiguous answer may be obtained, perhaps the fact that there is but only 
analogical relationship at play in a geometric MAT problem, as opposed to the multiple 
analogical relationships present in a Raven’s problem, implies that the additional 
constraints of multiple relationships may serve to increase the confidence in the answer.  
Running the algorithm against the Evans problems
 I tested the Fractal Miller algorithm on all of the problems originally used by 
Evans in his 1964 paper.  I now present the results of that experiment, and a discussion of 
those results.
Inputs used for the test
 To create inputs for this experiment, I used the same problems Evans used, but as 
illustrated in the appendix of Lovett et al. (2009).  A screen capture was made of each 
page of the appendix, and segmented into individual problem images. Then, each 
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problem image was sliced up to create separate image files for each of the given items in 
the matrix and for each answer choice. These separate images were the inputs to the 
technique for each problem. No further image processing or cleanup was performed, 
despite the presence of several pixel-level artifacts introduced by capture and 
compression. Additionally, the fractal algorithm attempted to solve each problem 
independently: no information was carried over from problem to problem, nor from test 
variant to test variant. 
 The code used in conducted these runs is precisely the same code as used in the 
earlier example.  This code is available for download from our lab website, along with the 
images themselves.
Levels of abstraction considered and calculations performed
The images associated with each geometric MAT problem had a maximum pixel 
dimension of  59 pixels.  Accounting for variation within each test problem, and setting a 
minimum grid size of 7 pixels, the algorithm therefore calculated four levels of 
abstraction for each problem, using the formula described above for determining 
maximum grid size and using a strategy of halving the pixel dimension at each 
successively finer level of abstraction.  
 At each level of abstraction, the similarity value for each possible answer was 
calculated, as proscribed by the Fractal Miller algorithm.  Those calculations used the 
Tversky formula, with alpha set to 1.0 and beta equal to 0.0, conforming to values used in 
the coincidence model by Bush and Mosteller (1953). From those values, the algorithm 
calculated the mean and standard deviation, and then calculated the deviation and 
confidence for each answer.  Which answers provided a confidence above our chosen 
level were noted, and whether for each abstraction level the answer was unambiguous or 
ambiguous, and if ambiguous, in what manner.  In those cases where ambiguity was 
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found, I explored several different data techniques to assist in the resolution, the same 
techniques which I described in the earlier chapter on Fractal Ravens results.
Performance on the Evans suite of geometric MAT problems
On the Evans suite of geometric MAT problems, the Fractal Miller algorithm 
detected the correct answer at a 95% or higher level of confidence on 13 of the 20 
problems.  Of the 13 problems where the correct answers detected, 11 were determinable 
by one or more of our ambiguity-resolution strategies. Of the remaining two problems 
noted as answers, both were ambiguous between two particular answers.  
Comparison to other computational models
 This certainly is not the first published account of a computational model’s 
attempt at the Evans suite.  For those accounts which explicitly report scores (e.g. Tomai 
et al., 2004), I compared their results with those achieved by the Fractal Miller algorithm.  
I also compared the results against human performance data on the problems as given in 
an experiment detailed in Lovett et al. (2009).  Table 6.2 documents the performance. 
Table 6.2. Comparison to Other Methods
problem FractalMiller Tomai et al. 2004 Human
1 ambiguous yes yes
2 yes yes yes
3 yes yes yes
4 yes yes ambiguous
5 yes yes
6 yes yes
7 yes yes yes
8 yes yes yes
9 yes yes
10 yes ambiguous








18 yes yes ambiguous
19 yes yes ambiguous
20 ambiguous yes yes
Total 13 (2 ambiguous) 15 (1 ambiguous) 20 (7 ambiguous)
Tomai et al. (2004) report the results of a version of their algorithm.  They 
specifically suggest that their efforts are not to improve upon the results of Evans’ 
original program, but to validate the ability of their general purpose system, SME, to 
produce human-like analogy judgments.  The representation of the problems are created 
automatically using sKEA, a sketching knowledge entry associate program.  These 
representations are in turn fed into SME, an implementation of Gentner’s structure 
mapping theory (Gentner 1983).  Tomai et al. report that a number of the problems 
(12-20) were run through only stage 2 of their system due to limitations in recognition.  
They also note that the program did not perform axial symmetry, lacked the ability to 
decompose glyphs, lacked a hierarchical awareness in positional relationships, and did 
not have the ability to reinterpret the example to attempt another solution.  They note that 
these deficiencies were present in some of the correct answers, but other factors were 
able to deduce a correct answer.
In Lovett et al. (2009) the SME program is again employed to solve the Evans set, 
using the output of CogSketch as input.  In addition to the two-stage process of SME, an 
additional model component, the executive, is presented as a means to evaluate whether 
an answer is a sufficient answer (e.g. all the facts determined in the relationships between 
the givens and the candidate answer align).  Additional modes of mapping for the first-
stage area also introduced, but their usage is strongly constrained.  The results reported in 
Lovett et al. (2009) concern themselves more with the discussion of their correlation with 
human-preferred answers rather than providing an explicit account and detailed 
discussion of their computational models.  They do note that their model chooses the 
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human-preferred answer for each of the 20 problems.  Thus, their results can be construed 
as identical to that given in the human column in the table above.
It is also important to note that for the problems in which the human answer is 
given as “ambiguous” this means that I have interpreted any problem in which less than 
95% of the participants preferred that any one particular answer as ambiguous.  This 
decision I made subjectively, but motivated by the desire to mirror the 95% confidence 
level used in the Fractal Miller algorithm. 
Bohan and O’Donoghue (2000) discuss Evans ANALOGY in the context of 
presenting their argument for adding attribute matching to Gentner’s theory (which calls 
for only relational predicate mapping).  However, they offer no evidence of having 
attempted to solve any of the Evans problems.  
Ragni, Schleipen, and Steffenhagen (2007) similarly discuss Evans ANALOGY 
briefly, but only in the service of contrasting against their SRM model, and its focus and 
grid approach.
Schwering et al. (2007) offer an approach for solving geometric analogy problems 
using only a single analogical mapping stage, based on hand-coded representations and 
Gestalt grouping principles.  They offer no evidence of having attempted to solve any of 
the Evans problems using their Heuristic-Driven-Theory-Projection (HDTP) system.
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CHAPTER 7
FRACTALS AND VISUAL ODDITY
 This chapter will discuss visual oddity, and a class of problems from visual 
analogy in which similarity calculations are used to derive an answer.  This chapter 
develops a cognitively-inspired computational model to address that class of problems, 
and introduces the concept of distributed similarity.
Oddity and Novelty
 Let us consider a problem of visual oddity.  Suppose one is presented with a group 
of objects, and are to determine, without further instruction, which one of the objects 
does not belong with the others.  Figure 7.1 shows an example of such a problem.
Figure 7.1. Visual Oddity example
Note that although the problem presents the objects in a matrix fashion, the presentation 
itself is meaningless.  The problem of selecting which one does not belong would remain 
regardless of arrangement. 
 This problem can be interpreted as a classification problem, where one of the 
objects is classified into one category (ODD), and the rest are classified into another 
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category (TYPICAL).  For example, if there are n objects, and all of the objects Oi are in 
some set M initially, one can presume that there exists two mutually exclusive sets ODD 
and TYPICAL:
M = ∪ Oi   ∀ i,  0 < i ≤ n
∃ ODD, TYPICAL → M = ODD ∪ TYPICAL 
and ODD ∩ TYPICAL = ∅
One would seek some function S() which serve to score each object, and then given the 
score be able to assign the object into one of the two sets.  The value of the function 
would act as a threshold T:
Oi ∈ TYPICAL if S(Oi) > T, and 
Oi ∈ ODD if S(Oi) ≤ T
The challenge is that there is no additional information as to how the classification is to 
proceed.  Thus, a problem of visual oddity becomes how to determine the function S() 
and the threshold T.
Oddity as Analogy
Let us consider the function S().  I am addressing a problem of classifying a finite set of 
objects into two mutually exclusive sets.  I then may reinterpret S() as being a function of 
two variables instead of one, and allow S() to consider a given object in terms of some or 
all of the other objects:
S( Oi, X )  where ∃ j, 0 < j ≤ n, X = ∪ Oj ∴ X ⊆ M
Notice that I can further restrict X such that it contains only one object Oj:
S( Oi, X )  where ∃ j, 0 < j ≤ n, X = { Oj }
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As I will be using S() to determine whether an object Oi is classifiable as a member of the 
set { Oj }, I suggest that S() represents in some sense how similar Oi is to the members of 
set { Oj }.   In such a manner, I can proscribe that S() attain a value between 0.0 and 1.0, 
where a value of 0.0 would indicate entirely dissimilar, and a value of 1.0 would indicate 
completely similar.  This characterization is important, for it allows the threshold value T 
to be bound to a range of from 0.0 to 1.0.  
 One could also infer that the value of S() being equal to 1.0 would suggest that an 
object was being considered for membership with a set containing itself as the set’s sole 
element.  Indeed, a value of S() equal or nearly equal to 1.0 would by this reasoning 
suggest that the members of the compared set would share many characteristics in 
common with the compared object Oi, and from that it might be inferred that the 
members of the set would share a similar many characteristics in common with one 
another.  It is from these two inferences (commonality between Oi and the set, and 
commonality between members of the set itself) that I find the basis for comparison, that 
is, how the commonality is calculated.
 However, note that the calculation of that similarity is yet unconstrained.  Let us 
now consider how to restrict the calculation, and specify the role that the fractal 
representation can play in that restriction.
The Two Relationships
 To deem some apprehended object as odd or novel involves the complex interplay 
of at least two relationships (Wagemans et al., 2012a): the relationship between the 
observer and the observed, and the relationship between the observed and its context. The 
relationship between the observing agent and the observed object may vary depending 
upon some act taken by the observer.  For example, if one wishes to appreciate an object 
at a higher level of detail, one might move closer to the object, or bring the object closer, 
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resulting in the object occupying a larger expanse of the observer’s field of view.  This 
action modifies the resolution of the object: at differing levels of resolution, fine or coarse 
details may appear, which may then be taken into the consideration of the novelty of the 
object. The observed object also is appreciated with regard to other objects in its 
environment.  Comparing an object with others around it may engage making inferences 
about different orders of relationships. One may begin at a lower order but then proceed 
to higher orders if needed. The context also sanctions which aspects, qualities, or 
attitudes of the objects are suitable for comparison.  
 Given the importance of perceptual novelty detection, there has been quite a bit of 
work on the topic. Markou & Singh (2003a, 2003b) review statistical and neural network 
techniques for novelty detection. Neto & Nehmzow (2007) illustrate the use of visual 
novelty detection in autonomous robots. Work on spatial novelty and oddity by Lovett, 
Lockwood & Forbus (2008) centered on qualitative relationships in visual matrix 
reasoning problems. They showed that by applying traditional structure-mapping 
techniques (Gentner, 1983) to qualitative representations, analogical reasoning may be 
used to address problems of visual oddity; however, they did not show where the 
representations come from (Indurkhya, 1998).  More recently, Prade and Richard (2011, 
2013) present a logical axiomatic approach to the problem.
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A General Strategy for Visual Oddity
 A strategy for solving visual oddity problems should address both aspects of 
novelty detection described by Wagemans et al. (2012a).  I now present the derivation of 
one such strategy.
Modeling the relationships
 In my research, I model the relationship between the observer and the observed by 
starting with fractal representations encoded at a coarse level of resolution, and then 
adjusting to the right level of resolution for addressing the given problem. I model the 
relationship between the observed and its context by searching for similarity between 
simpler relationships, and then shifting its searches for similarity between higher-order 
relationships.  In each aspect, these adjustments are made automatically by my strategy, 
by characterizing the ambiguity of a potential solution. 
Connecting the relationships to the problem
Let us consider the second relationship (between the observed and its context).  
One way to judge the commonality of one object to another is to consider how its 
relationship between two objects compares to other such relationships.   Let us suppose 
there is an object Oi, selected from a group of N such objects.   I can denote the 
relationship between Oi and another object Oj in this fashion:
R( Oi, Oj )
I model the relationship between Oi and Oj as a mutual fractal representation:
R( Oi, Oj ) ← T( Oi, Oj ) ∪ T ( Oj, Oi )
where T( Oi, Oj ) is the fractal representation of Oi in terms of Oj and T( Oj, Oi ) is 
the fractal representation of Oj in terms of Oi.  In this fashion, a set of relationships 
(indeed, they are now representations) can be determined from the entire set of objects M 
by considering all of the possible subsets of M which contain exactly two members.  
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 Mathematically, if the cardinality of M is n, then the formula for the 2-
combination of the set M is:
C(n,2)  = ( n )  = n!2 2!(n-2)!
Thus, if there are 9 objects in the set M, then a total of 36 possible 2-combinations 
of M would yield 36 relationships defined as mutual fractal representations. Furthermore, 
it is easy to see how the number of relationships could be extended for 3-combinations, 4-
combinations, or higher, through the use of the mutual fractal representation.  In this 
manner, a strategy which uses the mutual fractal representation to model the relationship 
between two or more objects captures the second relationship required of noticing oddity.
The first relationship of Wagemans et al. (2012a), the relationship between the 
observer and the observed, can be captured as noted by varying the level of abstraction 
(or resolution) which at which the fractal representations are calculated.  Thus, a strategy 
which employs fractal representations captures both relationships.  However, as the 
strategy thus far presented considers and affords comparison between relationships, and 
not between objects, additional reasoning must occur.
From relationships to objects
To determine which of the objects is the most novel, the strategy must determine 
how dissimilar each object is from its fellows.  As each of the objects has been placed 
into a variety of fractal representations, the model must first determine how similar each 
of these representations is to all of the others, and then distribute that similarity to the 
objects.  
To calculate a measure of similarity, let us use the Tversky metric described 
elsewhere in this dissertation, which provides a comparison of the number of fractal 
features shared between each pair member (Tversky, 1977).  However, in order to favor 
features from either image equally, and distinguished from the work in visual similarity 
presented earlier, here I choose to set the weights α and β equal to 1.0.  Thus, I calculate 
similarity as a Jaccard similarity:
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 Similarity of A and B = Ƒ(A ∩ B) / Ƒ(A ∪ B)   
where as before Ƒ(X) denotes the number of features in the set X.  
Relationship Space 
As this calculation for each relationship is performed, the model determines a set 
of similarity values for each member of this collection of fractal representations. I 
consider the similarity of each analogical relationship as a value upon an axis in a large 
“relationship space” whose dimensionality is determined by the size of the initial set.  For 
example, if the set M had 9 objects, then for 2-combinations, the space is 36 dimensional. 
For relationships of 3-combinations, the space would be 84 dimensional; for relationships 
of 4-combinations, the space is 126 dimensional. 
Maximal Similarity as Distance 
To arrive at a scalar similarity score for each object of M, the model constructs a 
vector in this multidimensional relationship space and determine its length, using a 
Euclidean distance formula. The longer the vector, the more similar two members are; the 
shorter the vector, the more dissimilar two members are.  As the model is looking for the 
object which is most novel, then it should seek to find the shortest vector, as an indicator 
of dissimilarity.
Distribution of Similarity 
From the similarity score for a relationship between objects given as a mutual 
fractal representation, the model determines individual object scoring, the S( Oi ) value, 
by distributing the similarity value equally among all objects participating in the 
relationship.  If an object is one of the two objects in a 2-combination, as an example, 
then the object’s similarity score receives one half of the 2-combination’s calculated 
similarity score.  Once all similarity scores of the relationships have been distributed to 
the objects, the similarity score for each object is known.  Algorithm 7.1 provides an 
overview of this similarity distribution.
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Algorithm 7.1. Similarity distribution
Thus, I have a general strategy for determining which object is novel.  The 
strategy begins with a determination of the constituent objects.  Each of these objects 
must be somehow represented in a fashion which affords its comparison to its fellow 
objects, in this case, via mutual fractal representations.  Next, reflection occurs over those 
comparisons, to see if one of the objects’ comparisons might be exceptional.  If no one 
object thus stands out, perhaps reexamining some or all of the objects might be in order.  
Upon the conclusion of this iteration of reflection and reexamination, the object which is 
the most novel may be indicated.
Given a set of objects M = { O1, ... On } and a set of 
representations R = { R1, ... Rl }, where each Ri is the mutual 
fractal representation between two (or more) of the objects 
selected from M.
Let Q be a vector of cardinality |M|, initialized to 0: 
Q ← 0, |Q| = |M|
For each representation Ri ∈ R:
· Let S be an vector of cardinality |R|, initialized to 0:  
 S ← 0, |S| = |R|
· For each representation Rk ∈ R:
• If i = k, then Sk = 1 ∵ Ri is identical to itself 
• If i ≠ k, then calculate Sk using the Tversky/Jaccard formula:
Sk ← Ƒ(Ri ∩ Rk) / Ƒ(Ri ∩ Rk) 
·Let V be a scalar value, set to the normalized magnitude of S: 
V ← ǁ‖Sǁ‖ / |S|
· For each object Oj which is represented by Ri:
• Qj ← Qj + V 
The vector Q then contains the distributed similarity of each 
object to one another.
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Visual Oddity, Fractally 
My model for tackling visual oddity problems consists of three phases: 
segmentation, representation, and reasoning. I shall illustrate the technique by working 
through the example problem shown above.
Segmentation Phase 
First, the model must segment the problem into its constituent objects, which shall 
be labelled O1 through O9.  In this example, the problem is given as a 478x405 pixel 
JPEG image, in the RGB color space.  The objects are arrayed in a 3x3 grid within the 
problem image.  At this resolution, I have found that each object fits well within a 96x96 
pixel image, as may be seen in Figure 7.2.  
Note that even though these objects appear to contain regular geometric shapes, 
the algorithm does not interpret them as such, and due to the nature of the JPEG 
compression algorithm, each object contains a certain quantity of noise and image 
artifacts.  There is no processing of these images in any fashion to remove these artifacts: 
the pixels are addressed as received.
⇒
Figure 7.2. Segmentation of a visual oddity problem
Representation Phase
Given these nine objects, the strategy now groups objects as 2-combinations, into 
pairs, such that each object is paired once with the other eight objects, to form the 36 
distinct 2-combinations.  The strategy then calculates the mutual fractal representation Rij 
for each pair of objects Oi and Oj, as described above.
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Figure 7.3. The 36 pair-wise relationships to be represented fractally
The block partitioning used initially is identical to the largest possible block size 
(in this case, 96x96 pixels).  For this example, the strategy shall conduct the finer 
partitioning by uniform subdivision of the images into block sizes of 48x48, 24x24, 
12x12, 6x6, and 3x3 pixels. 
Reasoning Phase
To determine the novel object, the model must determine how dissimilar each 
object is from its fellows.  This is accomplished, using the distributed similarity 
calculation described above.  Accordingly, these are the distributed similarity values 
derived for the objects:
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Table 7.1. Example similarity distribution for the initial 96x96 partition
Concluding the example 
Once that distribution is accomplished, the model must examine the resulting 
similarity values to see if any object has a substantially lower score than the others. A 
tempting way to accomplish this would be to simply select the object with the lowest 
similarity distribution, but as this example illustrates, the distinction between the lowest 
and next-lowest score may be quite fine, and it is difficult to determine whether that 
distinction is substantial enough to warrant the decision.
The way the model makes this assessment is the same manner in which the model 
for visual similarity makes its determination: to calculate the mean of the similarity 
values and the standard deviation of each of the scores from this mean, and then check 
whether any of these standard deviations falls below the mean sufficiently to indicate a 
desired confidence interval (assuming a normal distribution).  For this example, at a 
96x96 partition, the mean score is 20.94 and the standard deviation is 0.68. If one desires 
a confidence of 90%, then some score must be less than 20.15 to be sufficiently novel.  At 
this partitioning, none of the objects manages to achieve this level.  If the confidence is 
relaxed to 80%, then the score must be less than 20.24, a value which two of the objects 
are calculated to be below.
Ambiguity, Abstraction, and Refinement
As the example illustrates, it is not quite so simple to select the novel object, as 
ambiguity may be present.  Let us now be much more precise.
21.301 20.206 20.384 21.301 21.985 21.814 20.639 20.632 20.198
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Ambiguity  
Similarity scores for objects may vary widely. If the score for any object is 
“unambiguously smaller” than that of any other object, then one may deem that object to 
be novel.  By unambiguous, I mean that there is no more than one score which is less 
than some ε, which may be varied as a tuning mechanism for the algorithm. I see this as a 
useful yet coarse approximation of the boundary between the similar and the dissimilar in 
feature space, the T value noted above.  As I have shown, one way to characterize ε is as 
a confidence interval, and indeed this value may be chosen arbitrarily.  I believe it to be 
rigorous to report the novelty as “object X, with Y% confidence.”  In my implementation, 
I use 90% as the de -facto confidence interval.
How might these ambiguities be characterized?  If no object’s similarity value is 
sufficiently lower than the mean to fall below the confidence threshold, then perhaps the 
value itself is derived from a set of data which is too homogenous or too sparse.  If more 
than one object’s similarity value meets the criteria, then it may also be said that the data 
used was too sparse or too consistent.
Abstraction  
I argue then that the ambiguity arises due to a data problem, but it is more: it is a 
problem with the representation itself, from whence the data arise.  If the data is sparse, 
more of it can be created; if it is too homogenous, the strategy can change how data is 
created, potentially affording variance.   
Since the model is performing reasoning afforded by the fractal representation of 
the relationship between objects, it is limited in mechanisms to those which the 
representation sanctions.  There are two primary sanctions of the representation: the 
number of fractal codes which constitute the representation, and the creation of features 
from those fractal codes.  
The number of fractal codes in a particular fractal representation is determined 
solely by the partitioning scheme chosen when constructing the representation.  The twin 
key observations of images which entailed fractal encoding (repetition and similarity at 
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different scales) may be exploited here.  In essence, partitioning is a modeling of how 
coarsely or finely an image is received or regarded, and that granularity determines the 
algorithm’s ability to capture within the representation any present repetition or inherent 
similarity at that limit.  The partitioning affords a level of visual abstraction. Figure 7.4 
illustrates how changes in partition may be thus interpreted.
Figure 7.4. Visual abstraction as partitioning
Increasing the partitioning accomplishes two acts: more fractal codes are created, 
and the possible variety of features arising from those codes increases.  Both of these may 
address the ambiguity illustrated in the data. 
Refinement
Let me now revisit the example, and illustrate the effect of partitioning as 
abstraction.  I redetermine the fractal representation at partitioning levels of 96x96, 
48x48, 24x24, 12x12, 6x6, and 3x3 pixels successively.  After each partitioning, 
Algorithm 7.1 is run, and the similarity distribution and the attendant confidence scores 
determined.  Table 7.2 illustrates the result of these iterations.
96 x 96 48 x 48 24 x 24 12 x 12
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Table 7.2. Confidence scores for various partitions
There is one value, at a partitioning of 24x24, which yields a single answer whose 
confidence value exceeds 90%.  The novel object for this example is therefore object 3.
A closer examination of this table reveals further nuances in abstraction.  As the 
partitioning becomes finer, there is a moment at which the ambiguity is resolved.  
However, as the partitioning surpasses that point, the answer becomes ambiguous once 
again.  In this example, other objects arise as potential candidates (note objects 7 and 8 at 
6x6 and 3x3 in particular), but none exceed the confidence threshold.  As the resolution 
reaches its limit (for these purposes, the 3x3 partitioning), there are two candidate 
answers, and thus ambiguity remains, even though the confidence for either candidate 
approaches 85%.
Ambiguity
As the level of abstraction becomes finer, the number of fractal codes, and thereby 
the number of features, rises.  It is reasonable to presume that not all of these features will 
be unique at any particular level. At 96x96, there is but a single fractal code per object, 
96x96 0.404 -0.719 -0.586 0.404 0.876 0.801 -0.342 -0.349 -0.725
48x48 0.840 0.304 -0.736 0.820 -0.479 -0.235 -0.744 -0.510 0.546
24x24 0.731 0.307 -0.911 0.853 -0.004 0.202 -0.646 -0.579 0.182
12x12 0.780 0.506 -0.657 0.810 -0.040 0.026 -0.777 -0.823 0.246
6x6 0.770 0.635 -0.269 0.722 -0.439 0.033 -0.814 -0.855 0.366
3x3 0.742 0.645 -0.016 0.687 -0.463 -0.142 -0.846 -0.847 0.458
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and 106 features.  As noted earlier, the number of features are determined by a choice of 
which of the primary aspects of the fractal code to use.  In this example, the number 106 
is arrived at by considering most (but not all) of the possible combinations of  six 
features, bound into string structures. At 24x24, there are 16 fractal codes (1,696 
features).  At the finest level, there are 1,024 fractal codes (108,544 features).  Why is it 
that ambiguity appears to resolve at a certain level of granularity, only to retreat at others?
As resolution increases, the fractal codes which represent areas in the object are 
covering ever smaller areas.  These areas become increasingly more homogenous, and 
therefore the fractal codes become more similar to one another (that is, their features 
become more consistent).  As the abstraction grows finer, more codes are devoted to 
representing areas of consistent color and texture. Even though the number of codes and 
features is increasing, the ability to discriminate based on features is decreasing.  I 
believe this equates to a frequency apprehension of the image, with coarse resolution 
corresponding to low frequencies (fundamentals), and fine resolution corresponding to 
high frequencies (overtones, and then noise). 
Thus, the disappearance and reemergence of ambiguity is an emergent 
characteristic of the fractal representation itself.  The strategy to determine novelty is 
determined solely by data arising from reasoning sanctioned by the representation.  In 
doing so, this strategy expresses the relationship between the observer and the observed.
Summary
I have shown, through this example, that ambiguity may be resolved through 
repartitioning, and that a strategy may be derived which notices the need for 
repartitioning in an automatic fashion.  There exists a case which bears brief further 
discussion: what if every level of detail or repartitioning results in continued ambiguity?
I believe that a second strategy is to use not just pairs of objects in the calculation 
of similarity, but to extend that grouping to triplets or even quadruplets of objects.  
Through the use of extended mutual fractal representations as proscribed above, the 
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algorithm for similarity distribution readily extends to accommodate any degree of 
groupings of objects without loss of generality or modification. 
It is this second strategy, of extended mutuality, which captures the relationship 
between the observed and its context.  Like the first strategy, this strategy also follows 
directly as an emergent consequence, an affordance, of the fractal representation.
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CHAPTER 8
FRACTALS AND THE ODD ONE OUT
This chapter discusses the Odd One Out problem set, and illustrates how the visual oddity  
computational model works against the almost 3,000 problems in the corpus.
Odd One Out Problems
General one-one-out (or odd-man-out) tasks can be presented with many kinds of 
stimuli, from words, colors, and images, to sets of objects.  Minimal versions of these 
tasks are presented with three items, from which the “odd” one must be selected.  Three 
item one-one-out tasks, in contrast to two-item response tasks, evaluate a participant’s 
ability to compare relationships among stimuli, as opposed to just comparing stimuli 
features.  It has been shown that these relationship-comparison tasks track general IQ 
measure more closely than do two-item tasks, and this tracking of IQ increases with the 
number of relationships to be considered (Diascro and Brody, 1994). 
Ruiz (2009, 2011) investigated odd-one-out tasks in an effort to understand and 
categorize an individual’s g-factor (Spearman, 1904). Ruiz developed an oddity test (the 
Ruiz Absolute Scale of Complexity Management, or R-ASCM), and collected data from 
186 university students. In particular, Ruiz sought to determine a ratio scale for fluid 
intelligence, based upon an interpretation of entropy as a correlate of the complexity of 
the problem (Ruiz, 2009). This entropy interpretation led Ruiz to develop a system which 
classified such problems based upon repetition of features (Ruiz, 2011). 
The Hampshire Odd One Out Test
I have chosen the Odd One Out test developed by Adam Hampshire and 
colleagues at Cambridge Brain Sciences (Owen et al. 2010).  This particular test consists 
of almost 3,000 3x3 matrix reasoning problems organized in 20 levels of difficulty, in 
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which the task is to decide which of the nine abstract figures in the matrix does not 
belong (the so-called “Odd One Out”).  Figure 8.1 shows a sampling of the problems, 
illustrating the nature of the task, and several levels of difficulty. 
Figure 8.1. Odd One Out problems. 
As is the case in most odd-one-out tasks, the matrix-like arrangement in these 
Odd One Out problems is arbitrary; that is, the “Odd One Out” is odd no matter the 
configuration.  The problems are presented in that arrangement because the original data 
set had them so.
An algorithm for determining the Odd One Out
In the previous chapter, a general strategy for solving visual oddity problems was 
developed, and an example was given showing the application of the strategy to a visual 
oddity problem.  That example problem was taken from the Odd One Out problem set. 
I now present an algorithm which encapsulates the general strategy as a means for 
direct application to the Odd One Out problem suite.  Like the strategy, the algorithm 
consists of three phases: a preparatory phase in which the problem image is segmented 
into the constituent objects, and represented as mutual fractals to afford comparison; a 
reasoning phase, to provide reflection over those comparisons, to see if one of the 
objects’ comparisons might prove exceptional; and a re-representation phase, should no 
one object stand out,.  In practice and as shown below, the re-representation phase occurs 
in concert with the representation phase, as a nested loop. Thus, the two phases of 
reasoning and re-representation occur as a unified execution phase. Upon the conclusion 
of this iteration of reasoning, reflection and reexamination, the Odd One Out may be 
indicated.
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The algorithm for visual oddity is a direct extension of the Extended Analogy By 
Recall (ABR*) algorithm, differing only in its use of the similarity distribution algorithm 
as means of calculating object similarity.
Algorithm 8.1. The Visual Oddity (VO) Algorithm.
To determine from a group of objects M  which of the objects is the 
most novel or “odd.”
P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let M := { O1, O2, ... On } represent a group of objects.
Let A := { a1, a2,  ... al } represent an ordered range of abstraction, 
from most coarse (at a1) to finest (at al).  The cardinality of A, |A|, 
and the members of A themselves are determined according to the 
formula given in the chapter on Analogy and Ambiguity. 
Let G := { g1, g2, ... gm } represent  an ordered range of complexity 
groupings, from 2-combinations (at g1) to (n-1)-combinations (at 
gm). Thus |G| = |M|-2.
Let Ε be a real number which represents the number of standard 
deviations beyond which a value’s answer may be judged as 
“confident.”  E then is the threshold value T which groups objects 
into the TYPICAL or ODD sets according to their similarity value.  
 E X E C U T I O N  
For each complexity g ∈ G:
 For each abstraction a ∈ A:
• Form a set  of relationships R from the objects in M according 
to g and a
• Derive the set of similarity  values S := { S1, S2, S3, S4, ... Sn } 
from the set of relationships R, using the similarity distribution 
algorithm
• Set µ ← mean ( S )
• Set σµ ← stdev ( S )/√n
• Set D ← { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn } where Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
• Set TYPICAL ← ∅
• Set ODD ← ∅
• Distribute the objects Oi ∈ M by this rule:
if Di > E , then ODD ← ODD ∪ { Oi }
else TYPICAL ← TYPICAL ∪ { Oi }
• If |ODD| = 1, return the object Oi ∈ ODD 
• otherwise there exists ambiguity, and further refinement must 
occur.
If no answer has been returned, then no answer may be given 
unambiguously.
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As is the case in the derivation of the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) 
algorithm, the Visual Oddity Algorithm (VO) attempts to isolate the novel object as being 
the statistical outlier.  The threshold value E corresponds to a deviation from the mean 
equivalent to some desired confidence level.
 Solving the Odd One Out
 The Visual Oddity (VO) algorithm was run against 2,976 problems provided by 
Hampshire and associates. The problems were generated by Hampshire, using a private 
program written in the Python programming language, and were provided to me as a set 
of individual images in the .PNG format.  These problems span a range of difficulty in 20 
levels, from the very easiest up to the most difficult, with approximately 150 problems in 
each level. For example, the problem in previous chapter which I used to illustrate our 
algorithm is a level 16 problem.  No additional information as to the nature or derivation 
of the levels was given or sought, save that Hampshire suggested in a private 
correspondence that different rules were used to generate the various levels.  
 The VO algorithm was coded into the Java programming language, and run on a 
Macbook Pro computer.  The process ran for several weeks, due to the large number of 
fractal representations which needed to be calculated.  The abstraction levels used ranged 
from a coarse partition of 96x96 pixels down to a fine partitioning of 6x6 blocks, 5 levels 
of abstraction.  Only 2-combination relationships were used.
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Table 8.1. Results of the VO algorithm on the Odd One Out
Performance
 The overall results are that the VO algorithm solved 1,647 of the 2,976 problems.  
Table 8.1 presents the results broken down per level.   As shown by the data, the VO 
algorithm solves many more at the lower (easier) levels than at the higher (harder) levels. 
  Chart 8.1. Performance and error patterns of the VO algorithm 
Level Total Correct Level Total Correct
1 148 147 11 149 115
2 148 135 12 149 123
3 147 119 13 149 36
4 149 141 14 149 38
5 149 88 15 149 36
6 149 97 16 149 34
7 149 100 17 149 22
8 149 88 18 149 28
9 149 114 19 149 31
10 149 125 20 149 30
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 Chart 1 illustrates the performance of the algorithm, with correct answers and 
subsequent error patterns noted for the various levels of abstraction.  The error patterns 
denoted e96, e48, and so forth indicate levels of abstraction at which an incorrect answer 
was selected.  Note that the VO algorithm stops when an unambiguous answer is reached. 
Thus, an e48 error pattern means that the algorithm chose an incorrect yet unambiguous 
answer at the abstraction level corresponding to a partitioning of 48x48.
 There are quite clear degrees of performance variation generally grouped 
according to sets of levels (levels 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, 13-16, and 17-20). This is consistent 
with the knowledge that the problems at these levels were generated using varying rules.  
Intriguingly, it appears that the technique used by Hampshire to generate the problems at 
various levels enables distinct new rules at levels 5, 9, 13, and 17, which persist for the 
next four levels.  A visual inspection of the problems did not reveal any indication of 
such. Therefore, the algorithm alone was able to indicate a grouping of problems. At 
present, the VO algorithm does not carry forward information between its execution of 
each problem, let alone between levels of problems.  However, that the output illustrates 
such a strong degree of performance shift provides a further research opportunity in the 
areas of reflection, abstraction and meta-reasoning.
Error Patterns
 As I analyzed the errors made at differing partitioning levels, I realized that most 
errors occur when the algorithm stops at quite high levels of abstraction.  I interpret this 
as strong evidence that there exist levels-of-detail which are too gross to allow for 
certainty in reasoning. Indeed, the data upon which decisions are made at these levels are 
three orders of magnitude less than that which the finest partitioning affords (roughly 100 
features at 96x96 versus more than 107,000 features at 6x6).  I find an opportunity for a 
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refinement of the algorithm to assess its certainty based upon a naturally emergent artifact 
of the representation.  Although it has been shown practical to proceed with problem 
solving at the most coarse degree of abstraction, it may be unwise to do so.
 The errors which occurred at the finest level of partitioning (the error pattern 
denoted e6) were caused not due to the algorithm reaching an incorrect unambiguous 
answer; rather, the algorithm was unable to reach a sufficiently convincing or 
unambiguous answer.  This effect is especially noted at Level 13 and above.
 These results are based upon calculations involving considering shifts in 
partitioning only, using 2-combinations of objects. There appear to be Odd One Out 
problems for which considering pairs of objects shall prove inconclusive at all available 
levels of detail.  It is this set of problems which I believe implies that a shift in grouping 
(from pairs to triplets, or from triplets to quadruplets) must be undertaken to reach an 
unambiguous answer. 
 These results led me to reexamine that data in light of abstraction.  From this data, 
I developed the theory of abstraction emergence as outlined previously.  In addition, the 
previous analysis of errors made led me to the conclusion that too coarse a level of 
abstraction may lead to reasoning errors, a result I now realize (and argue above) is 
attributable to too sparse or too homogenous a set of features.  Lastly, errors which 
occurred at the finest level of partitioning I now know are attributable to ambiguity, and 
this led me to develop and refine the use of extended mutuality in the similarity 
distribution algorithm, which gave rise to satisfaction of the second aspect of novelty 
detection as given by Wagemans et al (2012a).
Direction for future work
 Future work on the Odd One Out problem should center on the interplay between 
the first and second strategies.  I believe that it is practical, and perhaps even desirable, to 
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explore both strategies in parallel, and allow the first unambiguous result from either 
strategy to be deemed the Odd One Out.  Other activities to be pursued involve the use of 
the onset or the width of range of unambiguous partitionings as a mechanism for 
characterizing the ease with which a human might solve such problems: a wide range of 
successful partitionings might suggest an easy problem, but a narrow range, or the onset 
of such a range at a fine partitioning might suggest that the problem would be considered 
difficult.
 As it is so strong an indication in the experiment conducted, a potential avenue of 
work is to investigate the coincidence of the failure at the extreme ends of abstraction as a 
signal to shift group abstraction.  
162
CHAPTER 9
FRACTALS AND CORE GEOMETRY
 In this chapter, I develop the notion that reasoning from fractal representations of 
visual stimuli can mimic aspects of core mathematical or geometric reasoning.  I pay 
particular attention to a set of problems developed by Dehaene et al. (2006), and illustrate  
the CoreGeo algorithm, an extension of the Visual Oddity algorithm.  I contrast the 
performance of the CoreGeo algorithm to that of another computational approach.
Mathematical Reasoning and the World Around Us
 Where does mathematical ability come from? Does geometry constitute a core set 
of intuitions present in every human, regardless of language or education?  
 The first of these questions was poised by Lakoff and Núñez (2000) as a way of 
initiating the study of mathematics from a cognitive science perspective.  Their 
arguments, principally that the embodied mind of humans creates mathematics and 
therefore it is subject to analysis in cognitive science methodologies, suggest that there 
may be innate principles in the mind which afford mathematical and spatial reasoning 
capabilities.  From my representationalist point of view, I take this to mean that there are 
representations which the mind uses which afford these kinds of reasoning.  Lakoff and 
Núñez discuss number discrimination in babies, and in particular look at subitizing (the 
ability to determine the number of objects presented from a glance), drawing on the work 
of others (among them, Mandler and Shebo 1982,  and Trick and Pylyshyn, 1993, 1994), 
to note that subitizing is not a pattern recognition process. They point to Dehaene’s work 
with patients who have suffered injury which prevents them from attending to things in 
their environment in a serial fashion (and therefore cannot count them), but nonetheless 
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perform limited subitizing (Dehaene & Cohen, 1994, 1996).  Obviously, statements such 
as these, and others made in their book have attracted much criticism to Lakoff and 
Núñez.  For example, Schiralli and Sinclair (2003) appear to take issue with the use of 
metaphor rather than pattern recognition as the basis of the Lakoff and Núñez argument, 
citing repeated examples of the derivation of mathematical principles precisely due to the 
discovery of patterns.  Insofar as I am aware, the debate of whether the embodied mind 
gives rise to mathematics, or whether mathematical principles are otherwise transcendent 
continues without resolution.
 The second question above, on whether humans possess a core geometric 
intuition, is due to Dehaene (2006). Dehaene and colleagues designed and conducted a 
study of spontaneous geometrical knowledge of the Mundurukú, an Amazonian indigene 
group.  The study looked at two nonverbal tests designed to probe conceptual primitives 
of geometry.  It is the first of these tests, inspired by a test administered in an earlier study 
by Franco and Sperry (1977) of the hemispheric localization of geometric processing in 
patients with a surgical disconnection between the left and right hemispheres of their 
brain, that is of interest here.  This particular test was designed to probe the Mundurukú’s 
intuitive comprehension of the basic concepts of geometry, including points, lines, 
parallelism, and the like (Dehaene et al., 2006).  For each of these concepts, Dehaene et 
al. designed an array of six images, five of which incorporated some desired concept, 
while the sixth image did not.  In essence, each of these problems was a test of perceiving 
visual oddity.
 Dehaene et al. (2006) report that the Mundurukú faired very well with core 
concepts of topology, Euclidean geometry, and basic geometrical figures, but they 
experienced more difficulty in detecting symmetries and metric properties. The 
Mundurukú faired poorly on two domains, each of which Dehaene et al. (2006) point out 
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involve the mental transformation of one shape into another, followed by a second-order 
judgment about the nature of that transformation. Dehaene suggests that perhaps 
geometric transformations are more inherently difficult mathematical concepts, or that the 
detection of such transformations may be more difficult in static images.  Dehaene also 
tested for comparison a group of American children and adults, and found that both the 
American group and the Mundurukú group shared the same difficulties on the task, 
although American adults performed at a higher overall level.  This led Dehaene et al. to 
conclude that there exists some shared competence for basic geometrical concepts, 
regardless of culture (Dehaene et al., 2006).
Visual Oddity and Spatial Geometric Reasoning Tasks
 In their 2008 paper, Lovett et al. describe a computational model for a visual 
oddity task, based on Dehaene’s work (Lovett et al., 2008).  Their rationale for choosing 
Dehaene appears to be two-fold: one, that the Dehaene study was designed to test which 
features people represent when they look at geometric figures in a visual scene, and two, 
that the methodology used in the Dehaene study was an oddity task methodology (e.g. 
look at an array of figures and choose the one which does not belong).  Lovett and 
colleagues specifically examined the qualitative nature of the representations of the 
figures in the oddity task, focusing on two core claims: that when people encode a visual 
scene, they focus on qualitative attributes and relations of objects in the scene (therefore 
an abstract and robust representation) rather than a quantitative representation of the 
scene itself (cf. Forbus et al., 2001); and that people compare low-level visual 
representations using the same process as that used to perform abstract analogies.   This 
latter claim, and the intent of their paper, is to show the versatility of the model of 
comparison they use, which is based on the structure-mapping theory of Gentner 
(Gentner, 1983).
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 The model described by Lovett et al. employs four systems: CogSketch to 
construct the qualitative representations (Forbus et al., 2008); SME to model comparison 
and similarity (Falkenhainer et al., 1986); MAGI to model symmetry detection 
(Ferguson, 1994); and SEQL to model generalization (Kuehne et al., 2000).  They note 
that this particular model has been used in their work on the Ravens test suite, which I 
described in a prior chapter.  The focus of their paper concerns how qualitative 
representations may be generated in CogSketch, but it is important to note expressly why 
these components were chosen and to consider the reasoning power each brings to their 
model.
 The Structure-Mapping Engine (SME) is a computational model of the structure-
mapping theory of Gentner (Gentner, 1983; Falkenhainer et al., 1986; Forbus & Oblinger, 
1990).  SME determines mappings between base and target symbolic representations 
which provide correspondences, an estimate of the similarity of the base and target, and 
potential inferences about the target which can be supported by the mapping and structure 
of the base.  MAGI, based on SME, identifies symmetry by comparing a representation to 
itself (Ferguson, 1994), and is included by Lovett et al. (2008) to facilitate recognition of 
axes of symmetry in the object.  SEQL (Kuehne et al., 2000) is based upon the idea that 
generalizations are learned through progressive alignment (Gentner & Loewenstein, 
2002), that commonalities between representations are discovered as a direct result of 
comparison, and through a process of eliminating the portions of those representations 
which fail to align.
 In their paper, Lovett et al. (2008) note that a key to qualitative representation is 
the encoding of relationships that are unlikely to have occurred by accident, ala 
Biederman’s recognition-by-components theory (Biederman, 1987).  They further 
distinguish qualitative aspects intrinsic to a particular shape from those discernible from 
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the edges of the shape, but they presume that reasoning about the representations will 
prefer one or the other, and not both.  They present twin vocabularies for describing 
shape attributes and relations and for describing edge attributes and edge relations.  The 
CogSketch program is used to generate representations of the input based upon these 
vocabularies.
 In their approach, a chosen Dehaene problem is first segmented into the 
individual images, and those images are then represented via CogSketch.  Next, SEQL is 
used to create a generalization of those representations. The individual images are 
compared against the generalization and scored via SME.  If one image is noticeably less 
similar to the generalization, it is deemed the one that doesn’t belong.  Lovett et al. note 
that the actual processing consists of a series of these “generalize and compare” trials, 
selecting subsets of the individual images from which to create generalizations.  They 
appear to limit these subsets to be either the top three or bottom three images.  Further, 
since their model uses representations of either the shape or the edges of the shape but not  
both, the system decides which version to use based upon an examination of the first 
image in the problem: if the image contains multiple shapes or a shape with a single edge 
(e.g. a circle), then the shape qualitative representation is used; otherwise, the edge 
qualitative representation is used.  They do note that their system will abandon the edge 
representation if SEQL cannot generate a sufficient generalization (for example, if the 
images subject to generalization contain varying numbers of edges).  The system looks 
for a sufficiently distinct candidate (they suggest a confidence of 95% as sufficient).  If 
one is not found, then the system attempts additional trials, switching between shape and 
edge representation or varying the similarity scoring.
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Reasoning based upon the Fractal Representation
 In my research, I am exploring the extent to which the fractal representation 
affords analogical reasoning.  The representations of the visual input given to my system 
represent the whole of the scene, and do not segment or otherwise seek to discriminate 
between objects in the scene.  This represents an instant departure from the 
representations generated from sketches by CogSketch, in that there is no notion of either 
qualitative or quantitive in the fractal representation, nor is there any distinction between 
a shape and its edge.  Furthermore, the Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm I 
developed provides a singular method of using similarity scores (chiefly determined via 
recall of objects indexed via features from memory) as a means both for declaring 
analogically derived answers as well as for providing evidence those cases in which the 
scene should be represented at a different level of abstraction.  There are no other special 
purpose mechanisms (i.e. MAGI or SEQL) which augment the analogical reasoning of 
my system.  
 However, if one considers the general approach used in both my work and that of 
Lovett et al., the reasoning architecture itself is strongly similar.  In both, the input is 
represented with strong commitment.  In both, individual representations are compared to 
representations of subsets of images.  In both, a sufficient score must be determined, or 
the models make variances in representation and try again. 
 For these reasons, exploring the effects of the fractal representation and the ABR* 
and Visual Oddity algorithms on the Dehaene problem set seemed prudent.  In addition, I 
wished to explore the extent to which strictly visual representations and the perceptual 
history of an agent constructing a received world in such a manner could afford that agent 
rudimentary geometric reasoning capacity.
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The CoreGeo algorithm
 In the previous chapter on Visual Oddity, a general strategy for solving oddity 
problems was developed.  I now present an algorithm which is derived from the general 
strategy expressed in the Visual Oddity algorithm as a means for direct application to the 
Dehaene set of core geometry problems.  Like the general strategy, this algorithm, called 
CoreGeo, consists of three phases: a preparatory phase in which the given problem is 
segmented into its constituent images and represented as mutual fractals to afford 
similarity comparisons; a reasoning phase which reflects on those comparisons to see if 
any of them may prove exceptional; and a re-representation phase, shifting automatically 
to a different level of abstraction should no single answer stand out.  In practice and as 
shown in the work on the Odd One Out, the re-representation phase is managed in close 
concert with the representation phase as a nested loop.  In this way, the two phases of 
reasoning and re-representation occur as a unified execution phase.  Upon the conclusion 
of the iterative reasoning, reflection and reexamination, the most visually odd item may 
be indicated.
 The CoreGeo algorithm is a direct extension of the Extended Analogy By Recall 
(ABR*) algorithm and also incorporates the similarity distribution technique used above 
in the work on the Odd One Out problem domain as a means for calculating individual 
object similarity.
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Algorithm 9.1. The CoreGeo Algorithm.
The CoreGeo algorithm attempts to isolate the novel object as being the statistical 
outlier.  The threshold value E corresponds to a deviation from the mean equivalent to 
some desired confidence level. 
To determine from a group of geometrically related objects M 
which of the objects does not share the sought-for relationship.  The 
specifics of the relationship are not known at the outset of the 
problem.
P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let M := { O1, O2, ... On } represent a group of objects.  
Let A := { a1, a2,  ... al } represent an ordered range of abstraction, 
from most coarse (at a1) to finest (at al).  The cardinality of A, |A|, 
and the members of A themselves are determined according to the 
formula given in the chapter on Analogy and Ambiguity. 
Let G := { g1, g2, ... gm } represent  an ordered range of complexity 
groupings, from 2-combinations (at g1) to (n-1)-combinations (at 
gm). Thus |G| = |M|-2.
Let Ε be a real number which represents the number of standard 
deviations beyond which a value’s answer may be judged as 
“confident.”  E then is the threshold value T which groups objects 
into the TYPICAL or ODD sets according to their similarity value.  
 E X E C U T I O N  
For each complexity g ∈ G:
 For each abstraction a ∈ A:
• Form a set  of relationships R from the objects in M according 
to g and a
• Derive the set of similarity  values S := { S1, S2, S3, S4, ... Sn } 
from the set of relationships R, using the similarity distribution 
algorithm
• Set µ ← mean ( S )
• Set σµ ← stdev ( S )/√n
• Set D ← { D1, D2, D3, D4, ... Dn } where Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
• Set TYPICAL ← ∅
• Set ODD ← ∅
• Distribute the objects Oi ∈ M by this rule:
if Di > E , then ODD ← ODD ∪ { Oi }
else TYPICAL ← TYPICAL ∪ { Oi }
• If |ODD| = 1, return the object Oi ∈ ODD 
• otherwise there exists ambiguity, and further refinement must 
occur.
If no answer has been returned, then no answer may be given 
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An example
Let us illustrate the workings of the CoreGeo algorithm by working through one 
of the problems of the Dehaene set in detail.  The chosen problem is Dehaene #35, which 
seeks to determine an understanding of symmetry transformation about a mixed axis.  
The problem can be seen below in figure 9.1.
Figure 9.1. Dehaene #35, Transformation with mixed axial, symmetry.
Segmentation phase
First the algorithm must segment the problem into its constituent objects, which I 
shall label O1 through O6.  In this example, the problem is given as a 720 x 540 .PNG 
image in the RGB color space.  The objects are arrayed in a 3x2 grid within the problem 
image.  At this resolution, I had found that each object fits within a 210x210 pixel image. 
Note that the matrix arrangement of the objects is immaterial to the problem at hand: the 
one which does not belong would be determined as not belonging without regard to its 
specific position.
As with all of the examples presented in this dissertation, even though the objects 
appear to be regular geometric shapes, the algorithm and the representation do not 
interpret them in any manner other than as mutual fractals.  In addition, some noise and 
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image artifacts are inevitably present, even though they may not be evident in the 
illustration here.  Other than a straightforward conversion of the color image into a 
grayscale image (using the formula mentioned in the chapter on fractal representations), 
no other processing of the image to remove artifacts occurs: the pixels are addressed as 
received.
Representation Phase
Given these six objects, the strategy now groups objects as 2-combinations, pairs, 
such that each object is paired once with the other five objects, to form 10 distinct 2-
combinations.  The strategy then calculates the mutual fractal representation Rij for each 
pair of objects Oi and Oj as described above. 
The level of abstraction used initially is identical to the largest possible pixel 
dimension, in this case 210x210 pixels.  For this example, the algorithm shall determine 
the finer levels of abstraction by uniform subdivision of the images into block sizes of 
105x105, 52x52, 26x26, 13x13, and 6x6 pixels.
Reasoning Phase
To determine the object which does not possess the same geometric relationship 
as the others, the algorithm must determine the dissimilarity of each object.  The 
CoreGeo algorithm calculates the dissimilarity via the distributed similarity technique 
described above and in the Visual Oddity algorithm. 
At the coarsest level of abstraction, these are the distributed similarity values for 
the objects in the example problem.
Table 9.1.  Similarity distribution for the initial 210x210 level of abstraction.
0.2273 0.2416 0.2303 0.2484 0.2419 0.2381
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Concluding the example
Once the distribution of similarity is accomplished, the algorithm must examine 
the resulting values to see if any object has a substantially lower score than the others.  
This is wholly in keeping with the method used in the prior chapters for determining the 
Odd One Out.
As in the example with the Visual Oddity algorithm, the distinction between the 
lowest and the next-lowest score can be quite close (in this case, 0.2273 vs. 0.2303, a 
delta of only 0.003).  If I calculate the mean of the similarity values and standard 
deviation of each of these values from that mean, a different picture emerges.  In this 
example, the similarity mean is 0.2379 and the standard deviation is 0.0032.  Therefore, I 
get the following table of deviations and subsequent confidences:













As can be seen, both the first and third answers are values well below the standard 
deviation and therefore at a strong confidence level. The negative values here are to 
indicate the least similar outliers; the strong positive confidence in the fourth answer, in 
contrast, indicates a strong prototype of the group.  Thus, one is left with an ambiguous 
answer at this level of abstraction, and the algorithm must re-represent each of the 2-
combinations at a finer level and try again.
Refinement
By re-representing the 2-combinations at increasing levels of abstraction, it is 
possible to determine an unambiguous answer.  The following table illustrates the results 
of that successive refinement of abstraction.
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Table 9.3. Mean, Standard Deviation, and Confidence for various levels of abstraction
µ σµ
210x210 0.2379 0.003 -99.9% 75.0% -98.3% 99.99% 78.0% 3.6%
105x105 0.189 5.5x10-5 41.1% 96.3% -39.6% -27.3% 98.9% -99.9%
52x52 0.271 0.005 -95.2% -74.3% 99.9% -65.4% -93.9% 92.6%
26x26 0.337 0.002 -98.9% -99.7% 99.9% 42.6% 3.7% 82.6%
13x13 0.399 0.001 -99.9% -91.9% 99.9% 90.1% 69.6% -60.2%
6x6 0.494 0.001 -98.3% -99.8% 99.9% 80.0% 53.4% 2.8%
As can be seen in the table, there are three levels of abstraction for which a 
singular answer stands out as significantly odd, while for the other levels there exists 
ambiguity.  If the algorithm strictly followed the philosophy of proceeding from coarsest 
to finest abstraction until a value stands out, then the CoreGo algorithm would select 
answer 6 at the abstraction denoted by 105x105 partitioning.  This answer, unfortunately, 
is incorrect: the proper answer is answer 1.  Inspection of the results shows that for all 
levels of abstraction except for the 105x105 level, answer 1 is among the chosen values 
which exceed a 95% confidence.  Why would this not be true at the 105x105 level?
The advent of significance
A closer inspection unveils the mystery.  At the 105x105 level, the standard 
deviation from the mean for all values is remarkably low (in this case, 5.5x10-5).  That 
deviation is two orders of magnitude smaller than all other abstraction levels.  Thus, 
while the signal at that level of abstraction is unambiguously in favor of answer 6, the 
signal itself is too weak to merit consideration.  In contrast, the unambiguous signal for 
answer 1 at the 52x52 level of abstraction is three orders of magnitude stronger.
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The similarity calculations arise from the comparison of features present in the 
fractal representations of the relationships being examined.  As noted earlier, in the 
chapter on visual similarity, the number of features available gives rise to the presence or 
absence of ambiguity, either through a sparsity of features or an increase in the 
homogeneity of features.  In this example, I find evidence of both of these, yet the data 
itself has yielded now a clue for detecting homogeneity: the coefficient of variation (CV), 
a normalized measure of the dispersion of the values.  Let us revisit the results in light of 
the CV for each level, calculated using this formula: 
CV = σµ / µ
Table 9.4. CV and Confidence for various levels of abstraction
CV
210x210 0.0126 -99.9% 75.0% -98.3% 99.99% 78.0% 3.6%
105x105 0.0003 41.1% 96.3% -39.6% -27.3% 98.9% -99.9%
52x52 0.0185 -95.2% -74.3% 99.9% -65.4% -93.9% 92.6%
26x26 0.0059 -98.9% -99.7% 99.9% 42.6% 3.7% 82.6%
13x13 0.0025 -99.9% -91.9% 99.9% 90.1% 69.6% -60.2%
6x6 0.0020 -98.3% -99.8% 99.9% 80.0% 53.4% 2.8%
I now can offer an amendment to the CoreGeo algorithm, and by extension to the 
general models for addressing visual similarity and visual oddity.  The selection of a 
threshold confidence value itself is not enough: the signal must be unambiguous and 
strong before the algorithm declares a solution.  With this addition, I capture a powerful 
notion of analogy making and rule discovery, that the analogy must be significant enough 
to warrant notice.
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Results of CoreGeo on the Dehaene set
 The CoreGeo algorithm was run against the 45 problems provided to me by 
Dehaene via personal correspondence, and are the same problem set examined in Lovett 
et al. (2008).  The problems are grouped into various categories of mathematical or 
geometric reasoning.  
Preparation of the material
 The Dehaene problem set was given as individual slides contained within a 
PowerPoint document.  Each slide was exported into a single image in the .PNG format.  
Each problem image was 720 x 540 pixels, in the RGB color space.  Each problem 
consists of six subimages, each of which upon inspection was found to fit well within a 
210 x 210 boundary.  
Levels of abstraction considered and calculations performed
 The levels of abstraction used ranged from a coarse partition of 210x210 pixels, 
down to a fine partitioning of 6x6 pixels, giving 6 levels of abstraction, using the formula 
described in an earlier chapter for determining the maximum grid size and using a 
strategy of halving the pixel dimension at each successively finer level of abstraction.  As 
the CoreGeo algorithm is a derivative of the Visual Oddity algorithm, the algorithm is 
capable of examining all combinations of the six subimages; however, only 2-
combination relationships were examined in this experiment.  This restriction was made 
only to serve the interests of experimental time, and illustrate the use of the algorithm on 
the problem set.  It is important to note that the goal of the experiment was not to 
improve upon any prior computational model results: the goal was to illustrate that a 
parsimonious account could accomplish much on the test.
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 At each level of abstraction for each problem, the algorithm determined the 
similarity value as distributed amongst the six candidate images.  For these calculations, 
the algorithm used the Tversky formula and set alpha and beta to 1.0, thus conforming 
the model of Gregson and Sjöberg (Gregson, 1976; Sjöberg, 1971), as it is unclear which 
of the difference relationships to favor.  As proscribed by the CoreGeo algorithm, 
calculations continued until the confidence in an answer exceeded a given threshold, or 
until all levels of abstraction were calculated.  For this experiment, that threshold value 
was able to be varied.
 The CoreGeo algorithm was coded into the Java programming language, and run 
on a Macbook Pro computer.  The code and entire Dehaene set of problems are available 
on our lab’s research site, to facilitate replication of these results and future studies.
Performance
 The overall results are that the CoreGeo algorithm detected the correct answer at a 
95% or higher level of confidence on 35 of the 45 problems.  Of the 35 problems where 
the correct answer was detected, 13 were ambiguously so.
 The performance of the algorithm can be analyzed by varying the level of 
confidence required.  As the table below shows, the performance of CoreGeo increases as 
the level of confidence required is lowered, but the ambiguity of the answers 
correspondingly increases. 
 Table 9.5. Performance of the CoreGeo Algorithm at varying levels of confidence
confidence level
problem / category 99% 95% 90% 80% 70% 60%
Total noted correct 31 35 36 38 40 42
Correct but ambiguous 6 13 18 22 26 27
1 Training Color yes yes yes yes yes yes
2 Training Orientation yes yes yes yes yes yes
3 Topology Holes yes yes yes yes yes yes
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4 Topology Inside/Outside ambiguo









us6 Topology Connexity yes yes yes yes yes yes






















































us13 Geometry right angle triangle ambiguo
us14 Geometry right angle cross ambiguo
us
ambiguo
us15 Geometry right angle abut yes yes yes yes yes yes
16 Geometry distance ambiguo
us
ambiguo
us17 Geometry circles yes yes yes yes yes ambiguo
us18 Geometry center of circle yes yes yes yes yes yes





us20 Geometry Equilateral triangles yes yes yes yes ambiguo
us
ambiguo

























































us28 Geometry vertical axial symmetry yes yes yes yes ambiguo
us
ambiguo
us29 Geometry horizontal axial 
symmetry





us30 Geometry random axial symmetry yes yes yes yes yes yes
31 Transformation translation yes yes yes yes yes yes




















us34 Transformation rotation yes yes yes yes yes yes









us36 Transformation homothety yes yes yes yes yes yes



























us40 Geometry Parallels 2
41 Geometry Chirality 2 yes yes yes yes yes yes
42 Geometry Chirality 3 yes yes yes yes yes yes





us44 Geometry Chirality 4 yes yes yes yes yes yes
45 Series Geometric
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Discussion of the specific results
 As can be plainly seen in the table above, there are certain problems and 
categories for which the CoreGeo algorithm successfully identifies a correct answer 
unambiguously, and others for which the algorithm is consistently ambiguous or wrong.  
There are still other problems and categories for which the results are mixed across the 
spectrum of confidence levels examined.
Topological reasoning
 The CoreGeo algorithm performs well on the problems involving topological 
reasoning except for one type: inside vs outside.  Figure 9.2 illustrates the Dehaene 
problem #4.
Figure 9.2. Dehaene problem #4, topological inside/outside
 As in all the examples, the features over which the CoreGeo algorithm reasons are 
derived from the fractal representation.  Between the features themselves, there is no 
connection, and therefore no ability to directly associate the location of the dot in the 
figures above as either within or without the closed line.
Geometrical reasoning
 The CoreGeo algorithm performs somewhat well on problems involving 
geometric shapes and geometric reasoning, with two notable exceptions: reasoning about 
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trapezoids, and reasoning about parallelism.  Figure 9.3 illustrates two Dehaene problems 
which evoke a failing in my algorithm.
Figure 9.3. Dehaene problems #26 and #40
In the case of Dehaene problem #26, while the shape lacking non-parallel edges is 
apparent, at the fractal feature level, the comparisons would be with respect to finding 
similarity between the angles themselves.  Each of the other shapes contains at least one 
oblique angle and two acute angles, and so the failing for this problem would seem to 
indicate that the numerosity of the angle kinds is absent or not readily inferred from the 
fractal representation.  In Dehaene problem #40, as in Dehaene problem #4 above, the 
satisfactory answer would imply that comparisons be made between the whole line 
shapes, rather than their constituent parts (that is, the fractal representation of the images 
would note that line segments may be formed via the collage of other line segments).
Reasoning about Series
 The CoreGeo algorithm performs poorly on problems involving reasoning about 
series.  Figure 9.4 illustrates the two Dehaene problems which evoke a failing in the 
algorithm.
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Figure 9.4. Dehaene problems #43 and #45
The CoreGeo algorithm fails to note the oddity in arithmetic progression (Dehaene 
problem #43) and in geometric progression (Dehaene problem #45), and in fact I should 
be quite surprised if it were to do so. The detection of regular progression (whether 
arithmetic or geometric) would require a segmentation of the image into shapes, and then 
a comparison of the attitude of those shapes when taken in groups of two or more.  The 
fractal representation of a scene does not perform segmentation.
Comparison against prior efforts and human performance
 Lovett et al. (2008) report that their system correctly solves 39 of the 45 
problems.  They also note a strong correlation between their model’s performance and the 
performance of human test takers.  Their paper presents a summarization of their results, 
and that of American and Mundurukú test subjects.  Here is a comparison of those results 
with those of the CoreGeo algorithm set at a confidence level of 95%. Note that I 
interpret the human data as correct if the accuracy value (given in the chart in Lovett et 
al. 2008) is above 0.6 (about 1 standard deviation of confidence), ambiguous if between 
0.6 and 0.2 (approximately random), and incorrect if below 0.2.
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 Table 9.6. Comparing the CoreGeo Algorithm
problem / category Core Geo Lovett et al. American Mundurukú
Total noted correct 35 39 43 40
Correct but ambiguous 13 0 12 10
1 Training Color yes yes yes yes
2 Training Orientation yes yes yes yes
3 Topology Holes yes yes yes yes
4 Topology Inside/Outside yes yes yes
5 Topology Closure ambiguous yes yes yes
6 Topology Connexity yes yes yes yes
7 Topology Belongs To ambiguous yes yes yes
8 Geometry curved lines yes yes yes yes
9 Geometry Convexity ambiguous yes yes yes
10 Geometry straight lines yes yes yes yes
11 Geometry aligned ambiguous yes yes yes
12 Geometry quadrilateral ambiguous yes yes yes
13 Geometry right angle 
triangle
yes ambiguous yes
14 Geometry right angle cross yes yes yes
15 Geometry right angle abut yes yes yes yes
16 Geometry distance yes yes yes
17 Geometry circles yes yes yes yes
18 Geometry center of circle yes yes yes yes
19 Geometry midpoint yes ambiguous ambiguous
20 Geometry Equilateral 
triangles
yes yes yes yes
21 Geometry Proportion 1:3 ambiguous ambiguous yes
22 Geometry Diagonals ambiguous ambiguous
23 Geometry Square ambiguous yes yes yes
24 Geometry Rectangle ambiguous yes yes yes
25 Geometry Parallelogram ambiguous yes ambiguous yes
26 Geometry Trapezoid yes yes yes
27 Transformation vertical axial 
symmetry
yes yes ambiguous
28 Geometry vertical axial 
symmetry
yes yes ambiguous yes
29 Geometry horizontal axial 
symmetry
yes yes ambiguous ambiguous
30 Geometry random axial 
symmetry
yes yes yes yes
31 Transformation translation yes yes yes ambiguous
32 Transformation point 
symmetry
yes yes ambiguous
33 Transformation horizontal 
axial symmetry
ambiguous yes ambiguous ambiguous
34 Transformation rotation yes ambiguous
35 Transformation mixed axial 
symmetry
yes yes ambiguous ambiguous
36 Transformation homothety yes yes yes ambiguous
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37 Geometry Parallels yes yes yes yes
38 Geometry Chirality 1 ambiguous ambiguous
39 Geometry Proportions ambiguous
40 Geometry Parallels 2 yes yes yes
41 Geometry Chirality 2 yes yes yes yes
42 Geometry Chirality 3 yes yes yes yes
43 Series Arithmetic yes yes ambiguous
44 Geometry Chirality 4 yes ambiguous
45 Series Geometric yes yes ambiguous
 Again, I must point out that the intention of this experiment was not to improve 
upon the results of the Lovett study, but to show that fractal representations and the 
parsimonious reasoning techniques afforded by it are capable of a fair showing.  It is 
intriguing to note that on the six problems that the Lovett et al. model misses, the 
CoreGeo algorithm either answers correctly (on two of them) or ambiguously correct (on 
the remaining four).  On the 10 problems that the CoreGeo algorithm fails to note the 





 In this chapter, I present the use of the fractal representation and related 
algorithms as a basis for limited visual perception.  
 As mentioned earlier, this work on perception is presented only to show the 
broader utility of the fractal representation and the ABR* algorithm, and therefore 
contains preliminary results.  The last chapter of this dissertation, on future directions, 
expands on methods by which this particular section may be extended or enhanced.
Agents Perceiving Fractally
 While we may not be able to ascertain the workings of visual reasoning by direct 
interrogation, we may observe the interaction of humans and animals as they interact with 
each other and their environment.  We might construct artificial agents, endow them with 
our models of such reasoning, place them into virtual worlds, and observe the correlation 
of their acts with their reality companions.
 In nature, highly complex interactions between agents are common. 
Murmurations of starlings, schools of fish, and stampedes of wildebeest are at once 
stunning and remarkable in appearance. Even though these groups are made up of 
discrete individuals, the overall group splits and combines with extraordinary fluidity and 
grace.  The collection of agents, taken together, appear to be acting under some organized 
control system.  Yet, as Craig Reynolds, a pioneer in computer graphic flocking observes, 
“all evidence indicates that flock motion must be merely the aggregate result of the 
actions of individual animals, each acting solely on the basis of its own local perception 
of the world.” (Reynolds, 1987) He reinforces the distinction between his work on boids 
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and prior particle system research by remarking that to flock realistically, boids (and 
birds) must interact strongly with one another, and rely computationally upon both an 
internal state and a received external state. A simulation of flocking consists of having 
each agent adjust itself (modulated by internal and external state) and then rendering each 
agent in the simulated environment.
 Reynolds’ work in flocking has inspired a generation of computer graphics artists 
simulating natural flocking (Tu & Terzopoulos, 1994), including some of the most 
stunning examples ever presented on film (Allers & Minkoff, 1994; Jackson, 2003). The 
initial work has been extended to provide mimicry of other natural, commonplace 
steering mechanisms (Reynolds, 1999).  In each of these systems, however, Reynolds’ 
initial proscription for how agents interpret their environment has remained essentially 
intact.  I now briefly introduce this proscription, as a prelude to my departure from it.
Boids, and the Three Laws of Flocking
 Reynolds' boids are agents with an internal state which describes their current 
heading (which can be modeled by a velocity vector in two or three dimensions) and an 
awareness of those agents to whom they should attend (their flock mates). They also have 
a minimum set of intrinsic behaviors that drive them to coordinate their actions with 
those flock mates.
 As shown in figure 10.1, the minimum set of behaviors required to produce 
realistic facsimiles of flocks in nature are three: stay close together, don’t collide, and 
mimic the motion of others.
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Figure 10.1. Flocking Behaviors: Cohesion, Separation, and Alignment
Cohesion  
 Flocking animals appear to want to be close to others like themselves.  In 
simulations, this is achieved by calculating a centroid of the apparent position of flock 
mates, and adjusting a boid’s heading to aim in that direction.
Separation  
 Animals generally do not want to collide with one another.  The separation 
behavior balances the cohesion behavior by forcing a boid’s heading away from the 
apparent direction of each individual flock mate.
Alignment  
 Animals mimic one another. A way to provide this mimicry to agents in a flock is 
to have each agent attempt to match the movement of its flock mates. In practice, this is 
accomplished by having a boid adjust its heading to align with the aggregate direction of 
its flock mates.
Interaction
 These three behaviors interact with one another in specific ways.  The separation 
behavior affords static collision avoidance, in that the position of flock mates is perceived 
at every new moment, and thus may be considered static.  In contrast, the alignment 
behavior is dynamic, in that the heading (and not the position) of flock mates is 
considered.  As Reynolds points out, this is a simplified predictive version of collision 
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avoidance, complementary to the separation behavior, in that boids that mimic the motion 
of their flock mates are less likely to collide with them than would boids which moved 
freely (Reynolds, 1987).  The cohesion behavior drives a boid to become the center of its 
flock, with the urge to move to the center modulated by its distance from the centroid of 
its mates.  This movement to the center is localized, and allows a flock to split around 
obstacles (or other portions of the flock) with natural fluidity.
Perception 
 A flock in nature (a murmuration of starlings, for example) may be composed of 
many thousands of individuals. It would seem an improbable computational load to place 
upon each agent within the flock the attempt to ascertain aspects of each member of the 
flock prior to making modifications to its own behavior. Some restriction of which 
individuals to consider must occur. Reynolds characterizes this as considering each agent 
to have a local perception. In computer simulations of flocks, the local perception each 
agent has of the world typically is provided to the agent by a godlike view of the entire 
environment, and a superimposed restriction of individuals by culling those deemed too 
distant to consider. This distance is usually referred to as a range of influence.
The Froid World
 The oraclesque decision of whom to consider is only practical in computer 
simulations. In natural flocks, clearly no such ability is afforded, and each animal must 
make its decisions based upon some combination of what it is perceiving of or thinking 
about its world.  The choice of flock mate is crucial for the remaining behavior to 
succeed.
 For explorations of visual reasoning, affording agents with models of perception 
based on familiarity and novelty and observing those agents as flocks seems ideal. Prior 
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research has employed fractal representations to model and discover similarity and 
novelty in visual analogy tasks such as intelligence tests (references omitted).  In my 
system, I wish to endow my agents with a visual reasoning apparatus that embodies 
precisely these characteristics.  Thus, for my flocking simulation, I created agents 
possessed with the ability to receive their local environment by localized observation 
only, and to perceive this received world via manipulations of fractal representations.  I 
call my agents froids (“fractal boids”).
Froids versus Boids 
 The difference between my froids and typical Reynolds boids is two-fold: froids 
sense and then classify their environment, whereas boids are told explicitly about their 
surrounds.  Both boids and froids manifest the same behaviors, and thus participate in 
flocking with their mates, but only froids perceive and reason about their environment 
prior to enacting those behaviors.  Figure 10.2 illustrates the visual reasoning pipeline of 
a froid, from the reception of the world, through perceiving individuals and objects in the 
world, reasoning about those perceptions, and finally to enacting a decided upon course 
of action.
Figure 10.2. Visual reasoning pipeline
 The perceptive system of a froid must be computationally efficient, to permit 
sufficient time to select and enact a behavior based upon the arriving stimulus.  In 
animals, the perception system, while informed by the decision and control system, 
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appears to operate concurrently with those systems, providing a real-time appraisal of a 
continuously shifting world.  For the purposes of my experiment, and in the general case 
for systems based upon Reynolds’ boids, the simulation of the agents within the world 
proceeds in discrete steps. Thus, the available stimuli from the world changes at a known 
pace, and I need not provide for parallel processing with the visual reasoning pipeline, 
nor for the need to interrupt an action in process to accommodate new information. 
 I therefore made two simplifying architectural decisions. First, the perception 
stage occurs in a serial fashion with the behavior decision stage, since the world of the 
simulation will not have changed until all the agents have moved themselves. Second, the 
perception stage would act only upon newly arriving stimuli, and not be influenced by 
prior decisions.  This variety of architecture is deemed "reactive control" in robotics 
(Arkin, 1998) and "situated action" in cognitive science (Norman, 1993). I made these 
simplifications so that I might better compare the effect of perception on the subsequent 
behavior, without having my analysis take into account any perceptual hysteresis or other 
internal state.
 I now shall describe each stage of the visual reasoning pipeline in some detail.
Figure 10.3. Visual field to retina mapping
How a Froid Sees
 I imagine a froid as having a single “eye” with a broad field of view.  The froid’s 
eye consists of a simulated retina, an arrangement of sensors. A froid sees its environment 
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by receiving photometric stimulation upon this retina.  The light entering each of these 
sensors is combined to form a visual field, as shown in figure 10.3.  In my simulation, I 
use ray-casting to send a ray out through each of the sensors into the simulated world, 
and note whether that ray intersects anything.  I illustrate this in Figure 10.4.
Figure 10.4.  Seeing via ray casting
 The froid interprets the “light” falling upon the sensor is a function of the distance 
of the intersected object from the froid, where objects which are distant are fainter than 
close objects.  No characterization is made regarding what object has been intersected, 
only that an intersection has occurred at some distance.  Figure 10.5 shows an example of 
how objects within the froid’s immediate environment may be mapped by this visual 
system onto its retina.
Figure 10.5. Objects in the environment, retinal image
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Fractal Perception
 The photometric values arriving via the froid’s retina next are interpreted by the 
froid’s perception stage.  While there may be many possible objects one may wish to 
divine from this visual stimuli, I restrict the intentionality of the perception to only those 
tasks which will drive the flocking behavior.  Accordingly, the primary task of the 
perception system is to determine flock mates.  
 This, however, raises an immediate question: what does a flock mate look like to a 
froid? My froids are rendered into the simulated environment as chevrons whose 
orientation, color and physical size may vary.  The visual environment, as transduced 
onto the retinal image, will show only an arranged set of values, roughly corresponding to 
visual distance to whatever object happened to intersect the ray from the sensor.
Filial Imprinting
 I was inspired to approach this problem using techniques from neurological and 
biological research.  Certain baby animals acquire behaviors from their parents, via a 
process called filial imprinting.  Implicit in the imprinting is the ability to identify a 
parent.  There is evidence that certain species have innate or rapidly develop through 
acclimation visual prototypes which allow young members to accurately identify their 
parents (O’Reilly & Johnson, 1994).  
 There are many possible visual arrangements between a froid and a prototypical 
“other” in its environment.  I chose to restrict these prototypes to six: four which 
corresponded to points on the compass (north, south, east and west), and two which 
corresponded to specific situations which would seem useful for behavior selection (close 
and empty).  Figure 10.6 illustrates these filial imprints, along with their corresponding 
retinal impressions.  These imprints are given as innate knowledge to each froid.
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Figure 10.6. Filial Imprinting
Fractal Imprinting
 A froid encodes all its visual information, its retinal data, as  a fractal 
representation.  Accordingly, each imprinted prototype is encoded into a fractal 
representation, and placed, indexed by derived fractal features, into the froid’s memory 
system.  The technique for transforming the image into a fractal representation and the 
derivation of fractal features from that representation is the same as described earlier in 
this dissertation. 
 This imprinting, encoding, and memorization provides each froid with a static 
knowledge base. From this foundational base, a froid can receive new retinal images and 
seek within those arriving images what it believes to be familiar. 
Finding the familiar by visual analogy 
 The arriving retinal image is an otherwise undifferentiated collection of 
photometric information, with each value corresponding to a particular direction and 
distance. From this retinal image, flock mates that might be within the visual range of the 
froid may be identified.
 As shown in figure 10.7, the algorithm begins by segmenting the retinal image 
into varying sets (collections of adjacent sensors), and then encoding each of these 
segments into fractal representations. No attempt is made to interpret the retina image for 
edges or other boundary conditions: the segments are treated merely as they are found. 
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 Additionally, the segment size itself is arbitrarily chosen. For my experiment, I 
selected a segment size corresponding to 10 retinal sensors, with the entire retina being 
90 sensors in size, encompassing a field of view roughly 135°, oriented to the froid’s 
forward motion. Thus, each retinal image yielded nine segments for analysis.
Figure 10.7. Segmenting the retinal image
 The process of perceiving a segment and possibly selecting a familiar prototype is 
given in Algorithm 10.1. First, the segment is encoded into its fractal representation, 
exploiting its self-similarity. Next, the froid’s memory is interrogated for similarity with 
imprinted prototypes, using a scoring system for featural similarity as described by 
Tversky (1977). The most similar imprinted prototype is chosen as the interpretation of 
that segment of the froid’s retinal image.
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Algorithm 10.1. Selecting the familiar
 If a segment appears to correspond to an imprinted prototype (and not to empty 
space), then several inferences may be made. The first is that an individual flock mate 
exists in that direction of view, which corresponds to the segment’s retinal constituents. 
Secondly, it may be inferred that the flock mate lies at a distance which corresponds to a 
function of the faintness of the photometric readings of that portion of the froid’s retinal 
image. By systematically examining each segment of the retina, the froid’s flock mates 
thus may be inferred by visual analogy.
The Three Laws for Froids
 Once the flock mates have been discovered, the Reynolds rules for flocking may 
be invoked.  Since the perception system has inferred the existence of a flock mate at a 
particular distance and direction, the separation and cohesion rules may be enacted 
directly. However, the alignment rule’s application requires further inference.
 To align with a flock mate, the froid must infer the  heading from the visual 
classification of the mate.  This classification depends explicitly upon which of the filial 
To determine the prototype P’ which is most analogous to the retinal 
segment R from a set of fractal prototypes P ≔ { P1, P2, … Pn }:
F ← Fractal( R, R )
Set M ← 0 and P’ ← unknown
For each prototype Pi ∈ P:
· Calculate the similarity of F to Pi : S ← Sim( F, Pi )
· If S > M, then M ← S  and  P’ ← Pi
P’ is therefore that prototype Pi ∈ P which corresponds to the 
maximal similarity S, and is deemed the most analogous to retinal 
segment R.
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prototypes has been selected as most representative of the retinal segment.  Algorithm 
10.2 provides the following five rules of heading inference.
Algorithm 10.2. Inferring flock mate heading
 Figure 10.8 shows an example of these inference rules at work.  In this example, 
the retinal image is classified as most similar to the RIGHT filial prototype. The heading 
of this identified object is inferred to be at a 90° angle to its apparent direction.  Note that 
the partially viewed individual does not sufficiently cover enough retinal space to be 
identified.
Figure 10.8. Inferring heading from a retinal segment
 Once the heading is inferred, the alignment rule of Reynolds may be used to 
adjust the motion of the froid.
Froids and Boids
 To test my belief that a froid could behave as naturally as its boid counterparts, I 
created a traditional Reynolds- style boid system, written in Java, running on a 
To determine the heading H for an identified flock 
mate with classification C and apparent direction D: 
If C = LEFT, then H ← D - 90°
If C = RIGHT, then H ← D + 90°
If C = BEHIND, then H ← D
If C = FRONT, then H ← D + 180°
If C = CLOSE or C = EMPTY, then H ← unknown
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conventional computer system. I first placed into the environment several thousand 
standard boids, and observed that their aggregate motion was as expected: a realistic 
simulation of natural flocking behavior.
Figure 10.9. A froid flocks with boids, a closeup of the froid perceiving its environment 
 I then introduced one froid into the environment with the boids. Figure 10.9 
shows a view of this simulation, with traditional boids in green, and the froid in gold. I 
observed that the froid, whose identification of flock mates was based solely upon its 
fractal perception system, behaved in the same manner as those boids whose 
identification of flock mates was given in the traditional oracle manner. I subsequently 
added several more froids into the mix, and found that the overall flocking behavior 
remained consistent and realistic. Figure 10.9 also shows a closeup of the froid, in the 
company of several boids, with its perception system visualized, perceiving and 
classifying its flock mates.
 Unlike the boids, the froids appeared to suffer from uncertainty (manifested by a 
stuttering motion) when in the proximity of a large number of other boids. I surmised that 
this is due to the inability of the segmentation system using within the retina to 
accommodate or otherwise classify large amounts of overlapping or confounding visual 
data. Another possibility concerns the enaction itself. Let us suppose that two action 
vectors arising due to two received perceptual signals almost exactly cancel each other. In 
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this case, small fluctuations in the perceptual signal can cause a significant change in the 
action vector, which may result in stuttering.
Summary
 Through this experiment, I have shown that the fractal techniques previously 
developed for visual analogies can be used for perception. I constructed an artificial boid 
like world that is popular in graphics and games, and demonstrated that froids (fractal-
based boids) can use the fractal technique for mapping percepts into actions in real time 
and manifest flocking behavior. 
 While the use of fractal representations is central to my technique, the emphasis 
upon visual recall in my solution afforded by features derived from those representations 
is also important. There is evidence that certain species have innate or rapidly develop 
through acclimation visual prototypes which allow young members to accurately identify 
their parents (O’Reilly & Johnson, 1994). I hold that placing imprints into memory, 
indexed via fractal features, affords a new and robust method of discovering image 
similarity, and that images, encoded and represented in terms of themselves, may be 
indexed and retrieved without regard to shape, geometry, or symbol. I also hold that the 
representations of the perceptual stimuli, as in my fractal technique, need to be built at 




FRACTALS AND GESTALT PERCEPTION
 The relationship of my computational approach to visual analogy using fractal 
representations and the gestalt view of visual perception in cognitive psychology 
(Arnheim, 1954; Steinman et al., 2000; Wagemans et al. ,2012a, 2012b) requires 
examination. The gestalt view of visual perception recently has received attention in 
computational models of visual analogy (e.g., Schwering et al., 2007, but obliquely 
Dastani & Indurkhya, 1997, 2000; and Ojha & Indurkhya, 2009). As in gestalt methods in 
general, my fractal approach to visual analogy constructs different interpretations of the 
input dynamically and re-represents the problem as needed. 
 As mentioned earlier, this exploration of gestalt perception is presented only to 
show the broader utility of the fractal representation and the ABR* algorithm, and 
therefore contains promising but very preliminary results.  The last chapter of this 
dissertation, on future directions, expands on methods by which this particular section 
may be extended or enhanced.
Bistable Perception and the Necker Cube
 A visual percept is deemed bistable if there are two potential yet mutually 
exclusive interpretations of the percept between which the human visual system cannot 
unambiguously choose.  An additional characteristic of bistable perception is that 
alternation between the available interpretations appears to happen in an uncontrollable,  
spontaneous and stochastic manner (Kogo et al., 2011; Nagao et al., 2000). Perhaps the 
most famous example of a bistable visual percept is the Necker Cube, shown in Figure 
11.1 (Necker, 1832).  
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Figure 11.1. The original Necker Cube
As Necker notes concerning this illustration from crystallography, although the figure is 
drawn to indicate that the solid angle labelled A should be seen as closest and the solid 
angle X should be seen as furthest (and therefore, the face ABCD would be foremost), 
one’s perception of the figure will shift involuntarily to cause the opposite interpretation 
(Necker, 1832).
Investigations of Bistable Perception
 Psychological and cognitive neuroscientists have been fascinated by the advent 
and potential cause of bistable perception, though not all of their research has been 
concerned with the Necker Cube.  For example, one way to induce a bistable percept in 
humans is to present dissimilar visual images to each eye, in a process known as 
binocular rivalry (Meng & Tong, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2004; Tong et al., 2006).  When 
presented in such a manner, the images compete for perceptual dominance, with each 
image “available” in a perceptual sense for a few moments while the other image is 
perceptually suppressed.  Because the changes in perception occur without changes in the 
actual stimuli, studies have been conducted to establish the neural correlates of those 
perceptual responses.  Lumer et al. (1998) report that fMRI studies revealed cortical 
regions typically associated with spatial attention were active, but that activity in the 
frontopariental cortex were specifically associated with perceptual alternation, suggesting 
that visual awareness was biased toward abstract internal representations rather than 
merely the arriving percept’s spatial arrangement. 
199
 That there appears to be a neural correlation between bistable perception and the 
regions of the brain thought to involve abstraction representation is of keen interest to my 
research.  As ever, the question arises as to what the nature of that representation may be, 
and therefore what sorts of reasoning would it endorse.
 Work on the Necker Cube problem has occurred since Necker’s original paper 
(Necker, 1832) on the subject.  A fair number of efforts have examined the perceptual 
alternation problem. Einhauser et al. (2004) performed eye tracking studies and found 
that there is a close link between the perception of the Necker cube and eye position, 
wherein a subject’s eye position shifts after their perceptual shift, moving to a extreme 
position that then, in turn, caused a perceptual shift, suggesting that somehow eye 
position suppress the older percept. In examining the timing information available in 
EEG studies, Kornmeier and Bach (2004) found an early electrophysical correlate of the 
perceptual reversal in an Necker cube by comparing exogenous reversals of unambiguous 
stimuli to the endogenous reversal in Necker-like stimuli.  This suggested to Kronmeier 
and Bush that the emergence of a 3D interpretation of the stimuli and its reversal likely 
occur in purely visual areas, but that the act of perceiving the stimuli is modulated from a 
higher level in the visual system, perhaps a confirmation of the earlier results of Lumer et  
al. (1998).
 Noest et al. (2007) present a neural model of perceptual switching which exhibits 
the percept choosing and spontaneous switching without any high-level decision making 
or memory.  Their work specifically addresses the problem that the ambiguous visual 
stimuli is viewed continually, but the perception of that constant stimuli switched many 
times.  
 Of particular consequence to my work is that the investigations of Noest et al. 
(2007) were guided by their recognition of the process of ambiguity resolution as an 
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example of dynamically equivalent nonlinear processes that occur throughout nature 
which are mathematically well characterized (Cross & Hohenberg, 1993; Guckenheimer 
& Holmes, 1983). Sundareswara and Schrater (2008) likewise investigated ambiguity 
resolution as a potential explanation for perceptual bistability by exploring the effects of 
the background on the viewpoint selected.
Perceiving the Necker Cube, Fractally
 As a consequence of my research, I wished to see how the Extended Analogy By 
Recall (ABR*) algorithm would perform when considering the Necker Cube problem.  In 
particular, what I sought to discover was whether the algorithm would exhibit an inability 
to choose between alternative visual interpretations of the Necker Cube.
The input data
 I set up the experiment in the following manner.  First, I created a very exact 
rendition of the Necker Cube at a resolution of 200x200 pixels, and saved it in the .PNG 
format in the RGB color space.  This target cube is shown in Figure 11.2.
Figure 11.2. The target Necker Cube.
 I then created, from that original drawing, three sets of alternative visual 
interpretations of the cube, each set containing two interpretation choices: C1, an image 
with the forward face lowermost, and C2, an image with the forward face uppermost.  
 Each set maintained the same isometric projection as the target cube, but in each 
set, a visual cue was embedded to suggest which face was forward.  In Set 1, a technique 
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known as “haloed lines” was used (Appel et al. 1977). In Set 2, the edges which are to be 
interpreted as “behind” are rendered in a slightly different color.  In Set 3, the occluded 
edges are removed entirely, leaving an impression of a solid cube.  In each set, the 
individual images were 200x200 pixels, and saved into the .PNG format in the RGB 











Figure 11.3. Sets of alternative interpretations of the Necker Cube
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Creating the relationships
 Since the ABR* algorithm compares the similarity between fractal 
representations, I created for each set three fractal relationships.  The first relationship 
was between the target and itself (to establish a self-referential identity).  The second 
relationship was between the target and the set’s C1 image, and the third was between the 
target and the set’s C2 image.  Thus, for each set, these mutual fractals were created:
R = MutualFractal( target, target )
R1 = MutualFractal( target, C1 )
R2 = MutualFractal( target, C2 )
The problem, then, becomes this:  to which of the two relationships, R1 or R2, is the R 
relationship most similar? Another, and most concise, statement of the problem for each 
set would be: if R1 and R2 are known (previously experienced, kept in memory), of which 
is R most analogous?
Calculating Necker analogies
The algorithm for calculating Necker analogies for each set, the Fractal Necker 
algorithm, is a derivation of the ABR* algorithm, and is given below.  As in the ABR* 
algorithm there are three phases: preparatory, examination and re-representation.  Indeed, 
as in the other instances of the ABR* presented in this dissertation, the examination and 
re-representation phases are combined into a single execution phase for expedience.
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Algorithm 11.1. The Fractal Necker Algorithm, preparatory stage.
The Fractal Necker Algorithm: Preparatory Stage
 In the first stage of my Fractal Necker Algorithm, a Necker Cube problem is first 
segmented into its component images (the target image T, and the collection of 
interpretation images).  Next, the algorithm determines the relationship between the target 
and itself, expressed as a mutual fractal representation.  Then, a range of abstraction 
levels is determined. 
 As in other implementations in my research, the abstraction levels are determined 
to be a partitioning of the given images into gridded sections at a prescribed size and 
regularity. In contrast to earlier implementations of the ABR* algorithm, however, in this 
experiment I wished to note the circumstances under which the algorithm would prefer 
one or the other alternative interpretation of the target Necker Cube.  Therefore, for this 
experiment, I allowed the level of abstraction to begin at the coarsest possible level 
(200x200), but decrease in a regular fashion, in steps of 3 pixels.  Thus, the abstraction 
Given a target Necker cube and set of possible interpretations, 
determine an answer.
P R O B L E M  S E G M E N T A T I O N
By examination, the set of interpretations are individual images.
Let T be the target Necker cube image.
Let C := { C1, C2, ... } be the set of individual interpretations.
R E L A T I O N S H I P  D E S I G N A T I O N S
Let R be a relationship, determined as follows:
 R ← MutualFractal( T, T )
 A B S T R A C T I O N  L E V E L  P R E P A R A T I O N  
Let d be the largest pixel dimension for any image in the set M ∪ C.
Let δ be the abstraction decrement value where 1 ≤ δ ≤ d.
Let A := { a1, a2, ... } represent an ordered range of abstraction 
values where
 a1 ← d, and  ai ← ai-1  - δ ∀ i, 2 ≤ i and  ai  ≥  2  
The values within A constitute the grid values to be used when 
partitioning the problem’s images.
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level proceeded as follows:  200x200, 197x197, 194x194, and so forth, down to a 
minimum level of 5x5. 
Algorithm 11.2. The Fractal Necker Algorithm, execution stage.
The Fractal Necker Algorithm: Execution Stage
 The algorithm concludes by using a variant of the ABR* algorithm to determine 
the confidence in the answers at each level, stopping when ambiguity is sufficiently 
resolved.  Thus for each level of abstraction, the relationship R is re-represented into that 
partitioning.  Then, for each of the candidate images, a potentially analogous relationship 
is determined and a similarity value is calculated.  The balance of the Fractal Necker 
algorithm follows the ABR* algorithm, using the deviation from the mean of these 
Given M, C, R, A, and η as determined in the preparatory  stage, 
find the answer.
P R E P A R A T O R Y
Let Ε be a real number which represents the number of standard 
deviations beyond which a value’s answer may be judged as 
“confident”
Let S(X,Y) be the Tversky similarity metric for sets X and Y
 E X E C U T I O N  
For each abstraction a ∈ A:
• Re-represent each fractal representation r ∈ R according to 
abstraction a
• S ← ∅
• For each answer image c ∈ C :
R’ ← MutualFractal( T, c ) according to abstraction a
S ← S ∪ { S( R, R’) }
• Set n ← |S|
• Set µ ← mean ( S )
• Set σµ ← stdev ( S )/√n
• Set D ← { D1, D2,  ... Dn } where Di = (Si-µ)/σµ
• Generate the set Z := { Zi ... } such that Zi ∈ D and Zi > E
• If |Z| = 1, return the answer image Ci ∈ C which corresponds 
to Zi
• otherwise there exists ambiguity, and further refinement must 
occur.
If no answer has been returned, then no answer may be given 
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similarities, continues through a variety of levels of abstraction, looking for an 
unambiguous answer that meets a specified confidence value. 
 However, in this experiment, I did not allow the algorithm to halt if one or the 
other interpretation exceeded the confidence threshold.  To achieve this, I set the 
confidence level artificially high (100%), a result unobtainable.  This then caused the 
algorithm to proceed to calculate and report similarity values at all levels of abstraction.
Results of the experiments
 I ran the algorithm on each of the three sets given above.  The algorithm was 
coded in the Java programming language, and run on a Macbook Pro computer.  The total 
running time required was less than a day, the bulk of which was taken up by the 
construction of the various fractal representations. As with previous algorithms and 
experiments in this dissertation, the code and example images are available on our 
research lab’s website for ready replication and extension.
 As indicated above, the algorithm calculated similarity values for all of the 
available levels of abstraction, beginning with the coarsest (200x200) and proceeding in a 
regular fashion down to the very finest (5x5). At each level of abstraction, the similarity 
value for each of the possible interpretations is calculated, using the Tversky formula, and 
set alpha to 1.0 and beta equal to 0.0, conforming to values used in the coincidence model 
by Bush and Mosteller (1953). From those values, the algorithm calculated the mean and 
standard deviation, and then calculated the deviation and confidence for each answer.  
The calculations of confidence were not used to halt the running of the algorithm.
 Very intriguingly, the algorithm showed a clear instability in its ability to choose 
between either of the alternative interpretations for each set of the Necker problems 
tested.  In fact, in no case was there any preference for either interpretation which was 
determined unambiguously, even though the confidence values for the interpretation 
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exceeded that corresponding to a confidence of 95% for a sample set of two.  The 
following charts plot the deviation of the interpretation similarity values against the level 










































































































































































































































Figure 11.6. Deviation oscillations for Set 3.
 There are occasional oscillations in the deviation at some coarse levels of 
abstraction, particularly apparent in Sets 2 and 3.  Then, a regular pattern of oscillation 
appears to occur in each set after the abstraction level dips below 100x100.  I attribute 
some of this to the manner in which the fractal representation is calculated:  at a given 
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partitioning level, an empty, temporary image buffer is calculated which is an even 
multiple of the partitioning in both directions, and then the image is composited into the 
center of that temporary buffer.  The oscillations present in Sets 2 and 3 suggest this, but 
Set 1’s chart does not.  My interpretation in that case is that the haloed line effect used in 
Set 1 is not a remarkable feature within the image until the partitioning reaches a lower 
limit; thus, Set 1 deviations remain almost perfectly flat for much of the coarse 
abstractions.















































































































































































































































Figure 11.9. Similarity values for Set 3.
 In these charts, it can be seen that the similarity value itself gyrates sporadically at 
coarse abstraction levels, and then, somewhere between 100x100 and 80x80, settles into 
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a gradual rising pattern of oscillation about the mean, for each of the sets.  
 Unsurprisingly, the similarity value itself creeps upward to approach 1.0 as the 
abstraction level becomes ever finer.  This is due to the increase in the homogeneity of 
the features being considered, coupled with the shear number of features under 
consideration (more than 200,000 at 5x5).  
Implications
 To my knowledge, this is the first computational model of the Necker cube which 
directly examines the bi-stable interpretation.  Even when presented with sets of potential 
interpretations with varying visual cues, the model exhibits an inability to determine an 
unambiguous and significant interpretation of the Necker cube’s orientation.  This 
suggests that the analogical reasoning afforded by the fractal representation and 
illustrated via the ABR* algorithm (from which the Fractal Necker algorithm is derived) 
may offer some insight into the gestalt perceptual capabilities of humans.
 As noted at the outset of this chapter, these results are very preliminary, and 
additional research will be needed to prove whether or not the techniques above are 




 All of the prior chapters in this dissertation concern themselves with either a 
motivation of some particular point of fractal representations or describe the results of 
experiments.  In this chapter, I shall summarize the defense of my thesis, and discuss the 
contributions and implications of the research.
The Summary
 My dissertation has presented a very specific model of reasoning, one rooted in 
the utility of fractal representations, as a means of addressing in a computationally 
feasible manner certain problems of visual similarity and visual oddity.  I hold that my 
research is sufficient to permit me now to assert that the hypotheses I made at the outset 
of this dissertation are substantiated claims, and that the sum of these claims substantiates 
my thesis.  I present now those claims, and that summation.
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Claim 1: the Fractal Representation is a Knowledge Representation
 I claim that the fractal representation is a knowledge representation.
Development and Motivation
 In Chapter 2, Fractals and Representation, I gave the background and motivation 
for the need to represent the received visual world in a novel way, one that captured, as a 
core aspect, the inherent repetition and similarity at scale present in visual scenes.  I 
described in detail the manner in which images may be encoded in a fractal manner.  I 
illustrated how this fractal encoding was dependent upon not just the source and target 
images, but also upon the partitioning chosen, and how in this manner these are important 
initial conditions to which the encoding is sensitive.  This led to four significant insights.
Insight 1: the Relationship between Source and Target
 I described the insight that the relationship between the source and target images 
of the encoding could be considered as encoded as well in this fractal manner, even 
though in accordance with the Collage theorem the use of such a fractal encoding would 
necessitate convergence into the target image, regardless of source image.  The specific 
insight was that the source image, in its role as an initial condition, significantly 
determined the encoded relationship.  Furthermore, given the nature of the search at the 
heart of the encoding algorithm, which seeks similarity at different scales, I put forth that 
this encoding of similarity was a direct way to capture the visual analogical relationship 
between the  two images.
Insight 2: the Partitioning as Abstraction “Knob”
 As shown in chapter 2 and mentioned above, the partitioning of the images into 
subimages which are then used in the pattern-matching search at the heart of the fractal 
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encoding algorithm can itself be considered as a significant initial condition.  I showed 
that this partitioning decision determines the size of the encoding, the amount of time 
required to perform the overall encoding, and the fidelity with which the encoding 
captures the colorimetric information in the images.  In this manner, the partitioning itself 
determines the level of abstraction of the information.  
 As it is a formal initial condition, however, the partitioning is seen as a useful 
“knob” with which to vary the information about the relationship between the source and 
target images.  The advent of this “knob” precisely affords the ability to re-represent that 
relationship at a different level of abstraction should the need arise.  Thus, the insight was 
that re-representation was so afforded, that subsequent re-representations could retain the 
same nature as the initial representation, and that the mechanism required for the re-
representation was identical to the initial representation. 
Insight 3: Features of Fractals
 The fractal encoding algorithm, as described in Chapter 2, generates an encoding 
of the relationship between a source and a target image at a given level of abstraction. As 
the overall aim of my research addressed reasoning, the ability to judge a comparison 
between relationships of images became paramount.  I noted that the set of 
transformations generated by the fractal encoding algorithm was unordered, providing a 
connotation of mutual independence between the transformations.  Thus, I examined each 
transformation and developed a methodology of expressing each as a code consisting of a 
limited number of variables.  Each of these variables, in turn, could be treated as labelled 
information (the color shift, the kind of similitude transformation used, and so forth).  
 In essence, each code I viewed as a Minsky-esque knowledge frame for that 
portion of the visual scene from which the transformation was derived, and the set of 
transformations in the fractal encoding then regarded as a frame-system. Furthermore, 
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each code, having labelled variables, could be used, in whole or in subsets, as a means to 
index the encoding into memory.  This interpretation in turn enabled the strategy for 
analogy making which I defend in the next section.
Insight 4: Mutuality
 As my research progressed, the problem of addressing not just pairs of images, 
but groups of images, arose frequently.  As an algorithm, the fractal encoding algorithm 
provided a means for generating a representation of the relationship between two images 
at some abstraction.  However, I noticed that the fractal representation by itself had both a 
directionality (in the sense that a target image was considered in light of a source image) 
and an unordered set quality (in that the individual transformations that form the 
representation will cause convergence into the target no matter the order in which they 
are applied).  
 What was necessary, I realized, was that the representation must include not just 
the relationship from the source to the target, but also the relationship from the target to 
the source.  The set-theoretic nature of the representation allowed me to describe 
therefore the mutual relationship between the images as the union of the two fractal 
representations, swapping the initial conditions of the images used in the encoding while 
maintaining the partitioning. Armed with this mutual representation, I extended it, in the 
manner as described in Chapter 2, to allow representations of three or more images, 
without losing any aspect of the encoded relationships.
From Fractal Encoding to Knowledge Representation
 In Chapter 3, I argue that the fractal representation meets the criteria of a 
knowledge representation in several regards.  I recap those arguments here briefly. 
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 Fractal representations satisfy Markman’s notion of a represented and 
representing world expressly through the particular initial conditions of the source and 
target images and the level of abstraction (as embodied by the partitioning), as via the 
commitment of inclusion/omission of that information into the representing world as 
given by the generated set of transformations.  Markman’s notion of representing rules 
find purchase in the fractal representation via the isomorphic mapping achieved by the 
partitioning scheme.  The fractal representation is non-symbolic ala Markman in that it 
rests upon the non-arbitrary inherent structure determined by the representing rules, but I 
note that the manner in which the features extracted from the transformations of the 
representation may be regarded as symbolic.  The expressivity and power Markman 
requires of a knowledge representation for the fractal representation rests in the 
extensibility of the mutuality I described above, the ability of the representation to 
represent any two (or more) arbitrarily chosen real-world images, and in the direct 
association of the representation to the mathematical notion of iterated function systems.
 The fractal representation satisfies the roles required of a knowledge 
representation as given by Davis et al. (1990) as well. A fractal representation is a clear 
surrogate for two or more images, with a strong correspondence established by the 
manner in which the representation is achieved via the partitioning.  As I argue in Chapter 
3, this grounding correspondence is isomorphic and, in conjunction with the 
independence of the transformations under that partitioning, thereby makes an explicit, 
complete, and concise ontological commitment. As I show repeatedly through the 
dissertation, the fractal representation affords and sanctions a number of inferences, or 
perhaps better said, a number of ways in which the information contained within the 
representation may be combined and construed.  Additionally, the various chapters of the 
dissertation illustrate precisely how the representation may be used for pragmatically 
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efficient computation.  Lastly, I argue in Chapter 3 that the fractal representation via its 
affordance of re-representation and featural similarity discovery offers a computational 
approximation of a medium of expression.
 For all of the above reasons, I maintain that claim one is satisfied: the fractal 
representation is a knowledge representation.
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Claim 2: the Identification of the Computational Strategy
 I claim that using the fractal representation, a robust computational strategy may 
be determined which automatically adjusts the representation to an appropriate level of 
abstraction.  
The Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) Algorithm
Regardless of which definition of analogy one chooses to adopt, all definitions 
require that some situation be regarded in comparison with another.  That is to say, then, 
that two significant aspects of analogy making are that there is a comparison evaluated 
via some criteria and that that comparison involves one thing and another.  Any strategy 
which would purport to address analogy making, it seems to me, then by necessity and at 
minimum would speak to both aspects: the manner of comparison to be conducted, and 
the manner by which the analog is chosen.  
In the course of my research, and as I describe in detail in Chapter 4, I discovered, 
developed and implemented an original and novel algorithm, which I call the Extended 
Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm.  The ABR* algorithm addressed both aspects of 
analogy making I described above:  it is based on the premise that analogy begins by 
being reminded of something (cf. Holyoak & Hummel, 2001), and therefore provides a 
mechanism for retrieving an analog, and it integrates the return of a measure of similarity 
along with that retrieved analog.  The measure of similarity which the ABR* algorithm 
returns is based upon the commonality or rarity of the features found in the retrieved 
analog and the target, from which an original set of features are derived.  The particular 
method of featural similarity which is used by the ABR* algorithm is based upon the 
theories and work of Amos Tversky (1977).
Ambiguity, Confidence, and Abstraction-Shifting
It is possible, even likely, that given some target, one or more analogs might be 
retrieved from memory using features derived from that target.  In this case, the similarity 
metric which is returned along with the analogs may be used to distinguish which one of 
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those analog should have priority (that is, which among them retrieved choices would be 
deemed to share the greatest featural similarity with the target).  Unfortunately, the 
similarity measures for the analogs might be quite close in value, and although one might 
be numerically higher than the others, it is possible that it is not statistically significantly 
higher.  Thus, one can readily see that there can arise a sense of ambiguity in two ways: a 
multiplicity of analogs, or a lack of a statistically significant singular analog.  Thus, the 
algorithm would be able to offer only an ambiguous answer in response to some question, 
or lack the confidence with which to hold forth some particular answer.  
In my work, I showed how the ABR* algorithm provides a way in which any 
ambiguity or uncertainty with which an answer to a visual analogy problem may be 
characterized can be attributed to those features naturally arising from fractal 
representations, as described above and in Chapter 2.  I illustrated, in detail in Chapter 4, 
and in subsequent chapters and experiments, how the algorithm could use the advent of 
ambiguity as a means for triggering re-representation, using the fractal representation’s 
inherent level-of-abstraction as a “knob.”  In this manner, I demonstrated how such a re-
representation could be employed as a means of automatically adjusting the level of 
abstraction, successively moving through them, until a confident, unambiguous answer 
could be chosen.  Subsequent chapters in the dissertation bear witness to the application 
of this automatic adjustment stratagem.   
Thus, in Chapter 4, using as a visual similarity task as a basis, I presented a 
complete description of the ABR* algorithm, its motivation, and an argument that the 
reasoning embodied therein may be construed as a computational model of visual 
abstraction.  Throughout the technical chapters of this dissertation, I illustrate regularly 
how the ABR* algorithm or algorithms directly derived from it are put into the service of 
solving visual analogy tasks.  In this manner, I show that the strategy itself is robust 
across the several domains. Finally, as I developed the ABR* algorithm as a consequence 
of being inspired by aspects of human visual reasoning, and in particular, the human 
ability to shift the manner with which we regard some scene in order to facilitate 
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understanding, I maintain that the algorithm on the whole is a computational strategy, yet 
cognitively-inspired.
For the reasons I have mentioned above, I maintain that claim two is satisfied: 
using the fractal representation, I have identified a robust computational strategy – the 
Extended Analogy By Recall (ABR*) algorithm – which automatically adjusts the 
representation to an appropriate level of abstraction.
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Claim 3: the Utility of the Strategy for Visual Similarity Problems
 I claim that using the fractal representation, a robust computational model can be 
derived for certain classes of problems of visual similarity, such as the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices tests.  
The work on Raven’s Progressive Matrices
 In Chapter 5, I show the derivation of a new algorithm, Fractal Raven, based upon 
the ABR* algorithm.  I use the Fractal Raven algorithm as a means to address all 
available problems from the entirety of those found in the Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
suite.  As my experiments show, the Fractal Raven algorithm detects the correct answer in 
50 of the 60 problems of the Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM) test, 42 of the 48 
problems on the Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM) test, 30 of the 36 problems on 
the Colored Progressive Matrices (CPM) test, and 50 of the 60 problems on the Standard 
Progressive Matrices Plus (SPM Plus) test.  Insofar as I know, only one other 
computational model, that of my research colleague Maithilee Kunda, has been used 
against all available Raven’s tests.
 The results of Fractal Raven also illustrate an important aspect of my research, 
namely that although the answers were noted correctly, they were not always so noted 
uniquely or unambiguously.  Indeed, the abstraction-adjustment strategy at the heart of 
the ABR* algorithm and present in Fractal Raven illustrated quite strongly that ambiguity  
and confidence are significant considerations and worthy of reporting for any 
computational model, yet for all prior models, none of them bring this into the discussion. 
Therefore, the Fractal Raven algorithm is the first computational model to address 
Raven’s tests with confidence. Finally, although it was not the intention of my research to 
develop an algorithm which would demonstrate superior ability on the Raven’s tests, as 
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shown in Chapter 5 the results of Fractal Raven compare quite favorably to all other 
attempts.
The work on Miller Analogies
 A characteristic of a Raven’s visual similarity problem is that two or more 
analogical relationships must be preserved when selecting an answer.  In other words, the 
problem is constrained in at least two ways.  To illustrate the robustness of the overall 
strategy of ABR*, I additionally chose to experiment with the Miller Analogies test, and 
in particular, to draw upon examples first used by Evans in one of the first AI efforts on 
analogy making (Evans, 1964).
 As I illustrated in Chapter 6, a Miller Analogies Test (MAT) problem consists of a 
single relationship, and the potential answer must maintain that analogous relationship.  I 
derived an algorithm, Fractal Miller, based on the ABR* algorithm and as a direct 
descendant of the Fractal Raven algorithm, and conducted an experiment on all 20 
problems used by Evans.  The Fractal Miller algorithm detected the correct answer in 13 
of the 20 problems, a score just slightly worse (13 vs. 15) than a contemporary 
computational model, as noted in Chapter 6.
Summation for Claim 3
 For the reasons just mentioned, and as developed more fully in Chapters 5 and 6, I 
maintain that claim three is satisfied: I have successfully derived a robust computational 
model and employed it successfully against the entirety of the problems contained in the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices suite as well as those used classically by Evans in a test of 
visual Miller’s Analogies.
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Claim 4: the Utility of the Strategy for Visual Oddity Problems
 I claim that using the fractal representation, a robust computational model can be 
derived for certain classes of problems of visual novelty, such as those found in the Odd 
One Out set.  Herein, I support that claim.
On Visual Oddity
 In Chapter 7, I discuss at length a problem of visual oddity, and particularly note 
the difficulty present in such problems: that the relationship between other objects in a 
scene are not known, nor are the number of those relationships known, and that all that is 
known is that some object or aspect of the scene is deemed odd.  Immediately, this 
interposed a new aspect, that an object’s relationship to all other objects in the scene, and 
not just some subset of pre-existing relationships, must be represented and considered.  I 
developed, as a derivative of the ABR* algorithm, the Visual Oddity algorithm, and 
showed how oddity could be derived.  Furthermore, I developed a means for distributing 
similarity measures to participating objects in relationships, to support the determination 
of oddity.  Lastly, I showed that the unusual affordance of re-representation to differing 
levels of abstraction, using the fractal representation and confidence as described above, 
were useful and maintained in the Visual Oddity algorithm.
On the Odd One Out
 In order to test the veracity of the Visual Oddity algorithm, I needed a set of 
problems, and found it in the work of Adam Hampshire and colleagues, in the form of 
almost 3,000 problems in their Odd One Out set, arranged in 20 levels of difficulty.  Each 
problem in the Odd One Out set consisted of 9 images, arranged in a matrix fashion, and 
in each problem, there was exactly one image which did not belong with the rest – the so-
called Odd One Out. No additional information was given.
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 In Chapter 8, I used the Visual Oddity algorithm to tackle the 2,976 problems of 
the Odd One Out.  The Visual Oddity algorithm correctly identified the Odd One Out in 
an unambiguous fashion in 1,647 of the problems.  The algorithm’s performance was 
better on problems which were perceived as easier by human test takers than it was on 
problems perceived as more challenging by human test takers.  Moreover, the results 
from this experiment also illustrated a significant aspect of the ABR* algorithm and the 
fractal representation:  at coarse levels of abstraction, there are very few features over 
which to reason (tens to hundreds), whereas at very fine levels of abstraction, there are 
many, many more (hundreds of thousands).  The scarcity of data at the coarse levels of 
abstraction led to mistakes, and at homogeneity of data at fine levels led to mistakes, as 
illustrated in Chapter 8.  This new information, coupled with continued performance of 
the general abstraction shifting strategy, led to a refined version of ABR*, one in which 
the amount of data and the nature of that data also may be used as contributing factors in 
selecting an appropriate level of abstraction.
On Core Geometry
 In another experiment, as explained in Chapter 9, I used a derivation of the Visual 
Oddity algorithm to address the problems used by Stanislaw Dehaene and colleagues to 
test whether humans have a naive understanding of certain geometric and mathematical 
concepts. The Dehaene test consisted of 45 visual oddity tasks, each containing six image 
of abstract geometric shapes.  Five of the subimages in a Dehaene problem were related 
by some geometric or mathematical principle, such as alignment, chirality, or symmetry, 
but a sixth image was not. Thus, a Dehaene problem required the test taker to select the 
one that did not belong – a geometric rendition of an Odd One Out problem.
 I derived a new algorithm, called CoreGeo, from the Visual Oddity algorithm, and 
applied it against the 45 Dehaene problems.  As I report in Chapter 9, the CoreGeo 
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algorithm detects a correct answer at a confidence of 95% or higher in 35 of those 
problems.  In my analysis of the results, I discovered that the selection of a confidence 
threshold itself was not sufficient, and that the signal of an answer must be both 
unambiguous, confident, and strong.  This is to say that the discovered oddity must be 
significant enough to warrant notice.  I show in the chapter that a straightforward 
calculation of the coefficient of variation, a normalized measure of the dispersion of 
similarity values, is one way to determine such significance.
Summation for Claim 4
 For the reasons summarized in this section, and developed fully in Chapters 7 
through 9, I maintain that claim 4 is satisfied: using the fractal representation, a robust 
computational model has been derived for certain classes of problems of visual novelty, 
such as those found in the Odd One Out set.
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Summation of the Defense
 My research has shown, and this dissertation described in detail, the manner with 
which each of these claims have been satisfied:
• the fractal representation is a knowledge representation;
• using the fractal representation, a robust computational strategy may be 
determined which automatically adjusts the representation to an appropriate level 
of abstraction;
• using the fractal representation, a robust computational model can be derived for 
certain classes of problems of visual similarity, such as the Raven’s Progressive 
Matrices tests; and
• using the fractal representation, a robust computational model can be derived for 
certain classes of problems of visual novelty, such as those found in the Odd One 
Out set.
 
 The overall computational strategy which I developed, embodied in the Extended 
Analogy by Recall algorithm and fueled by reasoning over fractal representations, is 
novel in several senses:  it is operating over fractal representations, which are themselves 
a new and novel contribution; it provides not only a retrieval of one or more source 
analogs from memory but a measure of the similarity associated with each; and it 
provides a parsimonious manner in which to shift or re-represent the elements over which 
it operates, based entirely upon the confidence and significance of the answer being 
return.  The strategy is feasible, as I have demonstrated the ability to conduct various 
experimental runs using an instantiation of the algorithm written in the Java programming 
language running on conventionally available computer hardware.  Lastly, the strategy is 
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useful, for I have demonstrated precisely how it addresses problems in a variety of 
domains.  
 I therefore maintain strongly and confidently that my thesis statement is defended: 
reasoning using fractal representations is a novel, feasible and useful computational 
technique for solving certain problems of visual similarity and novelty.
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The Contributions
 My dissertation and the body of research it describes makes two primary, novel, 
and significant contributions to science.  Those are the Extended Analogy by Recall 
(ABR*) algorithm and the fractal representation.  Additionally, as I have noted in the 
preceding chapters, my research has other contributions which are of note.  I shall now 
put each forward.
The Extended Analogy by Recall (ABR*) Algorithm
The first contribution is the Extended Analogy by Recall (ABR*) algorithm, a 
parsimonious, cognitively-inspired computational strategy for visual reasoning which 
automatically adjusts its representations to an appropriate level of abstraction. The 
several chapters of this dissertation show unmistakably that the strategy contained within 
the ABR* algorithm is suitable to meet the demands of a variety of visual analogy 
problems.  
The Fractal Representation
The second contribution is the fractal representation itself, a new and novel 
knowledge representation that will open the door for analogy researchers, cognitive 
scientists, and computer scientists to explore the role self-similarity and perceptual 
complexity play in analogy making.
The Secondary Contributions
In addition to these primary contribution, several algorithms, which address 
reasoning specifically in visual similarity and visual oddity tasks, as well as algorithms 
which afford or mimic aspects of visual perception, are contributions in their own right.
The Advent of Ambiguity Resolution
In the course of developing the ABR* algorithm, and as a direct consequence of 
the fractal representation’s affordance of re-representation via altering the initial 
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condition of partitioning, I contributed a manner with which to shift the level of 
abstraction.  By placing this shifting into service when and if the algorithm deems that an 
answer cannot be arrived at in an unambiguous and strong manner, this methodology of 
abstraction shifting becomes automated.  Insofar as I am aware, no one has ever 
constructed or demonstrated such a parsimonious mechanism.
The Fractal Raven Algorithm
As I point out in Chapter 5, a significant amount of research has been devoted to 
the cognitive and computation study of the Raven’s suite of visual similarity problems.  
My work on Raven’s, and the Fractal Raven algorithm itself, contributes to and extends 
that research.
The Visual Oddity Algorithm
Visual oddity tasks, in the same manner as the visual similarity tasks such as the 
Raven’s test, also command their fair share of research, both cognitively and 
computationally.  My research in this area offers researchers a powerful new set of tools, 
the fractal representation and the regard of ambiguity resolution, as a means for delving 
into phenomena arising from their exploration.
The CoreGeo Algorithm
In Chapter 9, I remarked upon the work of Dehaene and others on whether 
humans possess innate mathematical or geometric reasoning or recognition skills.  The 
CoreGeo algorithm, with its lineage to both fractal representations and the ABR* 
algorithm, provide both a way to consider and revisit observed effects in those 
experiments, as well as a means for categorizing and developing new problems which 
might elicit and discriminate finer effects.
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The FractalNecker Algorithm
Although it is preliminary, to my knowledge, my research and the Fractal Necker 
algorithm provide the first computational model of the Necker cube which directly 
examines the bi-stable interpretation as a byproduct of confidence.  
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The Implications
 I believe strongly that my research carries with it a number of indications and 
implications for artificial intelligence, cognitive science and vision.  I believe this to be so 
because in no small part my efforts have been inspired by the various aspects of human 
visual reasoning and by my work and the work of others to transmute certain of those 
aspects into computational models. 
 Although I reserve the final chapter of this dissertation as the place for speculation 
about certain topics which may overlap these, I must share now, in this penultimate 
chapter, those indications that are specific consequences of the contributions.  I also ask 
for a measure of forbearance, for any moderate attempt at suggesting implications calls 
for some degree of speculation, as may be noted here.
Implications for Perception
 My research has begun with the receipt of some visual scene.  As shown above 
and throughout this dissertation, what I sought to do was to provide as a surrogate for that 
arriving scene a fractal representation of it.  From there, depending upon the task at 
hand–decide what is similar, decide what is novel, decide how to act–my research looked 
expressly to the representation, and to what it afforded and sanctioned.  This is the way in 
which the algorithms I developed came about.
 But what of the arriving visual input itself?  As I mentioned, it is the observation 
of Mandelbrot (1982), and of Barnsley and Hurd (1992), that the world itself exhibits 
repetition and similarity at various scales.  The deliberate choice of building a fractal 
representation from a fractal encoding of the arriving world scene at once grounds the 
representation in the world and yet abstracts all else of the world away, so that what 
remains is merely a recipe for how one might reconstruct the scene, iteratively.  It is the 
arriving world, inbound with repetition and similarity at scale, which affords and 
229
sanctions the kinds of reasoning I discuss.  The fractal representation packages this, 
concisely. This, then, would beg at once several implications for further exploration.
 Firstly, let us suppose that we might construct scenes which do not exhibit these 
characteristics.  Is it possible to do so? What would they be?  Would we be able to say 
that they are analogous to nothing in our experience?  
 A particular implication worthy of future study would be that there may exist a 
continuum of visual images, not classifiable along the traditional means of color, spatial 
structure, etc., but along a fractal-like dimension.  When reasoning from a fractal 
representation, my research focused only upon features derived from the various 
transformations at the core of the representation, and only upon each of them 
independently.  Thus, as a first approximation, what might be gleaned from considering 
tandems or subsets of the transformations?  Would the consideration of those subsets 
yield a measure of the overall scene complexity akin that entropy measure found by Ruiz 
(2009)? 
 Another characterization of the scene might well stem from an analysis of the 
visual noise present.  While determining how “noisy” a scene is may be achieved by any 
number of computer vision methods, perhaps a characterization may be provided within 
the fractal representation itself.  In doing so, a potential new measure may emerge: the 
likelihood that measures of similarity or oddity calculated from the representation will be 
sufficiently discriminable. 
 Yet another implication has to do expressly with the grounding of the 
representation in the scene itself.  Let us suppose that although the scene is encoded in 
total, some aspects of the representation are omitted, accidentally or intentionally.  Could 
this also form another technique for establishing the veracity of reasoning from the 
representation; that is, could the degree to which the representation is judged to be 
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isomorphic with the received visual scene play a crucial role in subsequent calculations 
of certainty and significance? In precisely the same manner that it affords re-
representation into finer or coarser abstraction, the fractal representation offers a direct 
means to judge that isomorphism in conjunction with the partitioning which is its initial 
condition.  I imply that this is a worthy area of future study.
  Two aspects of human neurophysiology also present opportunities.  The orienting 
reflex, as a mechanism for studying that a subject has noted an anomaly, would seem an 
evident choice, and perhaps with careful attention to visual design, scenes with less or 
more self-similarity could be used in replication of those studies, with the intention of 
implicating the acts of encoding or the regard of complexity.  Similarly, a study of human 
vision search, in the spirit of Treisman and Gelade (1980) but using scenes with known 
fractal complexity, as determined by a computational model of the scene from the fractal 
representation, might illuminate a distinction in the kinds of processing at play in vision 
at a glance versus vision with scrutiny.  I should hope that there could be discovered a 
new event-related potential ala P3a (cf. Picton, 1992; Näätänen & Gaillard, 1983) which 
may be seen as variable in correlation with the fractal complexity of the regarded scene.
 Finally, with regard to perception, the fractal representation and the work I have 
performed can be specifically characterized as viewer-centric regards of the arriving 
world.  I have not pursued the extension of my techniques into the object-centric view.  
However, in the last chapter of this dissertation, I do discuss at some length the 
frameworks of David Marr, and offer some speculation about the utility of fractal 
representations in the service of object discovery.
Implications for Cognition
 Beyond perception, once the fractal representation is arrived at, it must be put to 
use in service of some goal or task.  In my research, those tasks varied from decision 
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making concerning visual similarity or visual oddity to classifying simulated retinal 
regions in agents piloting a simulated world.  What other tasks may be worth attention?  
How might the tasks require the representation itself to be arrived at in a different 
manner?
 As I showed through the development of the ABR* algorithm, the analogy 
making begins with the selection of some source analog, and in particular retrieved from 
a prior perceptional history of potential analogs kept in a memory system in a fashion 
organized by the features derived from the fractal representation of those prior percepts.  
The fractal representation itself I have shown is sensitive to its triplet of initial conditions, 
the source image, the target image, and the chosen partitioning.  It is possible to relax any 
of these initial conditions, and each yields interesting nuances.
 Suppose that the partitioning itself is kept constant, and let us presuppose that it is 
impossible to regard the arriving visual scene at a different level of abstraction.  This 
would correspond to receiving a scene at a glance.  What if the need arose to regard the 
scene at a different level of abstraction?  One method would be to infer coarser or finer 
abstractions for aspects of the representation.  In the last chapter of this dissertation, in 
the section on fractal reasoning, I offer a very specific suggestion as to how this may be 
accomplished, and how fractal composition may be seen as inference.
 Suppose that the target image itself is kept constant, but let us relax the constraint 
of choice of the source image.  If this is so, then any available image may be used to take 
the place of the source, including that of the target image.   If we should choose to take 
the target as the source, then the fractal representation would provide an interpretation of 
the visual scene in terms of itself.  This then would yield a potential strongly significant 
signal as to the visual complexity, but this would only be knowable (by another process 
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assessing the representation) if the representation carried information concerning its 
precise source and target. 
 In another stance, let us suppose that the source image is not provided, and that 
for some reason there is not a desire to encode the target in terms of itself.  I suggest that 
another option exists, and that is to use as a source image other prior percepts from the 
perceptual history of the agent, reconstituted as necessary.  Indeed, as I have shown via 
the derivation of the mutual fractal representation, any number of such percepts could be 
used as source images, and the lot could be combined to form a prior perceptually 
grounded fractal representation of the just arrived visual scene.
 Such an interpretation holds substantial implications, on several fronts: the 
arriving visual scene could be said to be grounded in a consistent perceptual stream; the 
arriving visual scene could be viewed as determined by what was just prior “in mind”–a 
priming point of view; or the source image could be constructed from perceptual 
fragments either as the target image arrived, or brought to bear in a kind of mental 
imagery task.  It is even possible to consider that an admixture of the two could be used: 
the arriving visual scene could be encoded first in terms of itself, and then, through the 
elicitation of source analogs from perceptual history, could be reinterpreted via re-
representation into a fractal representation (or mutual fractal representation as outlined 
above). Any of these are worthy of future experimentation.
 At present, there is no information carried into the fractal representation which 
indicates which if any of the aforementioned constraints are present or relaxed: the 
representation simply is what it is.  This meta-knowledge concerning the construction of 
the fractal representation may be quite useful, as I outlined above, and could be at the 
discretion of some over-arching cognitive-like process. 
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 The ABR* algorithm presumes that there is a desire on the part of the enacting 
agency to provide a confident answer to the task at hand.  This drive may or may not 
actually exist in cognition, or it might be manifested at a differing priority than the 
primacy with which my research has regarded it.  That the ABR* algorithm, using fractal 
representations, can generate not just a set of answers but a companion set of confidences 
(or rationales) for those answers should be useful to subsequent processing.  The degree 
to which confidence may be a drive, and the manner in which it might be relaxed or 
augmented by other processes is worth exploration.
 Some criticisms of published accounts of aspects of my research focus upon the 
fractal representation and ABR* algorithm’s inability to account for why one answer is 
the answer to a problem.  My response to those criticisms is straightforward:  the why is 
always the same – the answer is shown to stand out via featural similarity in a statistically 
relevant manner.  More intriguing is that this research points to a theory of how to decide 
not why something stands out, but that something stands out. This is deliberate, and 
driven by the design goal of noticing similarity and novelty. But, this does not mute nor 
does it diminish the request: a continued exploration of the fractal representation, the 
ABR* algorithm and its descendent techniques should focus on connecting the that to the 
why, from a knowledge-based point of view, and not merely a statistical one.
 My research has specific implications for theories of analogy as well.  Current 
theories of analogy approach regard the process of analogy-making as if it were a 
singular process of mind.  In the current thinking, the process of analogy-making is based 
upon three core ideas: that analogy depends upon the capture of not just features but the 
relationships between objects or concepts (Holyoak & Thagard, 1996); that propositional 
representations (and not imagistic representations) are crucial for the concise expression 
of those transformations and relationships;  and that the fit of an analogy depends upon 
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the alignment between the structure of representations, not necessarily the content of 
knowledge represented (Gentner, 1983). In contrast, our research group has a long history 
of building an alternative account of analogy (Goel, 1997; Griffith et al., 2000; Davies et 
al. 2005).  In our group’s view, analogy is composed of multiple processes, some of 
which are based on just features (e.g. Kunda et al., 2013) and others capturing 
relationships (e.g. Yaner & Goel, 2007, 2008), some more focused on propositional 
representations (e.g. Davies & Goel, 2001) and others on imagistic representations (e.g. 
Kunda et al., 2010), and some intent on exploiting the organization of knowledge into 
abstraction hierarchies (e.g. Goel & Bhatta, 2004; Davies et al., 2009) while others 
examine the content of knowledge at specific abstraction levels (e.g. McGreggor et al. 
2012).  My research clearly illustrates a connectivity to this history, and shows that the 
fractal representation as an imagistic representation and the ABR* algorithm as a featural 
analogical process offer one example of a content-based theory of analogy.
Implications for Artificial Intelligence
 I have developed a novel visual representation, the fractal representation, and 
shown the power of a computational model based upon reasoning afforded by it through 
successive derivations of the ABR* algorithm.  I believe, however, that more specific 
development can be done in the arena of artificial intelligence via these tools.
 In my opinion, the field of AI suffers through representational swings, and it is the 
reliance on kinds of representations (lately symbolic versus neuronal/nodal) that hold 
large sway upon it.  My hope is that with the advent of the fractal representation, as a 
novel form which sits not quite cleanly in either the “good-old-fashioned AI” or machine-
learning camp, that additional techniques and representations may be derived.  Thus, my 
hope is that just via existence, the fractal representation and the work represented here be 
a catalyst.
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 I mentioned briefly above that the fractal representation may be viewed as a frame 
system, and that each of the attendant portions of the representation viewed as frames, 
expressly in the sense that Minsky first proposed them (Minsky, 1975).  I want to 
underscore the significance of this mapping, now, from the point of view of artificial 
intelligence. 
 Too infrequently are the representations that some AI system uses actually 
grounded in the world.  The outcome of such loose grounding is often that the system 
itself can be seen as brittle, focused upon a particular domain or world, and unable to 
transcend that domain to general utility.  
 I propose the fractal representation has an additional opportunity for AI, as one 
such example of a wholly grounded representation.  Given that it is demonstrably 
grounded, however, would this be a sufficient condition to admit a computational model 
that does not suffer from brittleness? 
 It is for this reason that I suggest exploration in AI concerning not just the fractal 
representation, but of the ABR* algorithm as well. Insofar as it is now conceived, the 
ABR* algorithm depends not quite entirely upon the fractal representation per se, but 
upon the ability of a representation to afford re-representation in service of the task (and 
in the express case of ABR*, to reduce ambiguity).  What other kinds of representations 
await discovery, that afford parsimonious re-representation and substantive grounding?  
Could representational families exist, in which re-representation swaps between kinds of 
representations, and yet stay within the familial set?  Could the notions of grounding or 
re-representation be added to already familiar knowledge representations, and then those 
new derivations be pressed into the task of analogy making?
 Finally, the fractal representation offers a tantalizing hint concerning the nature 
and advent of a knowledge production rule.  The fractal representation takes a source 
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image, a target image, and a partitioning as initial conditions.  It is but a small stretch of 
viewpoint to consider it as taking some initial state (the source image), some final state 
(the target image), and a system of constraints (the partitioning), and in this manner 
describing or representing the transformation of the initial state into the final state.  What 
does the fractal representation, with its reliance on feature space searching at the heart of 
its encoding process, say with respect to its utility as a production rule?  What does the 
composition of mutual fractals involving several images suggest about the composition 
and chaining of rules?  Does the ability to reason analogically about fractal 
representations offer a means for identifying similarity between rules?
 This, perhaps above all the rest of the implications, might prove the most worthy 




 All of the prior chapters in this dissertation concern themselves with either a 
defense of some point of my thesis or describe the results of experiments.  This chapter is 
a departure, in that I intend to bring up ideas that occurred to me during the course of my 
research, some well-formed, others less so, and to speculate briefly on what the future 
may hold for fractal reasoning. I’ll segment my remarks into two primary areas: those 
concerning the fractal representation, and those concerning fractal reasoning.  Finally, I’ll 
close with some general commentary.
Forward the Fractal Representation
 The fractal representation was described in substantial detail in Chapter 3.  Yet, as 
I worked on its development, there were several aspects of representations and fractal 
representations which came to mind.  Some of those ideas, notably the ability to vary the 
grid size to facilitate re-representation at different levels of abstraction, found their way 
into the main body of my research.  Others, though, remain to be explored.  Here are 
some of those ideas.
The Image, Revisited
 The images that I’ve used throughout my research and presented within this 
dissertation are two-dimensional arrays of pixel values, generally in the RGB color space. 
It is from these images that fractal representations are calculated, by forming some 
partition based on a desired level of abstraction, and then proceeding with reasoning. it is 
true that there are any number of photometric manipulations permissible on the image, 
some of them perhaps advantageous (conversion to grayscale, for example).  Generally, 
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regardless of the photometric manipulation, we put pixels in, and get pixels out.  But, 
treating images as arrays of pixels is not the only manner in which a fractal representation 
may be constructed.  The principle requirement of constructing the fractal representation 
is that the source and target images being represented are searchable.
 One such image representation which meets the requirement of searchability and 
therefore would be suitable as input into the fractal representation is the Discrete Cosine 
Transformation (DCT) (Ahmed et al., 1974; Chen et al., 1977).  A discrete cosine 
transformation is a finite set of data points (in this case, pixels) in terms of a series of 
cosine functions of varying frequencies.  DCTs are used in the JPG and other images 
formats, due to their lossy compression characteristics.   A strong recommendation in 
favor of using DCTs when comparing images is that the transformation into the 
frequency domain for blocks within an image capture compactly a sense of the texture 
within that block.
 To prepare a source and a target image for fractal representation at a given level of 
abstraction (call it N for discussion purposes) using DCTs, one would first calculate 
DCT(target,N). This means that the entire target image would be re-represented as a set 
of DCT blocks, each derived from a NxN block taken in a regular fashion from the target 
image.  Similarly, but distinctly, one would also calculate a set of DCT blocks of size 
NxN from the source image, but instead of forming a regular partition, one would 
calculate the set of ALL possible DCT blocks of size NxN.   Then, given these two 
representations, DCT(target,N) and ALLDCT(source,N), a set of fractal codes may be 
calculated for each block in DCT(target,N), found by searching for the best matching 
DCT block in ALLDCT(source,N). 
 Interestingly, since the DCT blocks would contain frequency information, and not 
photometric information, the number of possible features per fractal code increases from 
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a single photometric value (the shift for all pixels within the block) to a frequency shift 
vector (potentially as long as NxN, but generally much shorter, involving only the lowest 
frequency or two).  The DCT block is arranged such that the first value represents the 
average overall photometric value of the block, and successive values represent higher 
frequencies.  Searching for blocks becomes much faster, since the average value is 
compared first (comparing the average of a target block to the average of a source block).  
 Exploring the use of DCT-based fractal representations would be an interesting 
future angle of research.
The Eight Transformations, Revisited
 One of the areas where the fractal representation could be extended is in its use of 
the eight similitude transformations.  In the discussion of the fractal representation, I 
made the case that those eight were sufficient, given that the smallest unit of an image 
which could encode symmetry, etc., was a 2x2 set of pixels. As seen throughout this 
dissertation, the level of abstraction is almost always something greater than this smallest, 
finest level (the pedantic finest level would be 1x1, or a single pixel, which I shall discuss 
shortly). 
 One can suppose that it is possible to allow for any arbitrary rotation to be used, 
and along with it reflections across arbitrary axes.  The consequences to the 
representation would be felt in two ways.
 Firstly, the fractal code itself would have to be extended to include a 
representation of the angle of rotation of either the image or the axis of reflection or both.  
One could imagine such a representation could be of the form: rθ or aθ, to represent a 
rotation of θ degrees or a reflection about an axis at θ degrees, respectively.  Doing so 
would offer the opportunity to create new features from these representations as well, 
perhaps affording a finer degree of analogical comparison.
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 Secondly, and most impactfully, the runtime complexity of creating the fractal 
representation would increase substantially.  Instead of searching for 8 possible 
transformations, the algorithm would now have to evaluate 2N additional matches per 
block in the partitioning scheme, where N = |{θ1, θ2, .... }| the magnitude of all potential 
angles of rotation or reflection.  
 I believe that affording this flexibility to the fractal representation in no way 
would diminish it, and would provide potentially improved reasoning on the Dehaene set 
of geometry problems.  It also would be likely to provide improved performance on 
several of the Ravens test suite problems.
Variations of the Fractal Code
 I’ve just mentioned allowing a number of new transformations into the fractal 
code, but I can suggest a few other ideas as well.
Coordinate system inferences
 The coordinate system used for images throughout this dissertation has been the 
Cartesian coordinate system, with the origin located at the upper leftmost extent of an 
image.  However, there exists other ways in which to address pixels within the scene, or 
to interpret their location afterward.
 One such system is the polar coordinate system (Korn & Korn, 2000).  In it, the 
traditional (x,y) coordinate is transformed into a radius and angle pair (r,θ) indicating 
distance and direction from the origin.  However, if one merely used the upper leftmost 
extent as the origin, this would yield values of θ between 0.0 and ½π.  If one instead 
locate the origin at the center of the image (e.g. at (½w,½h), presuming an image that is 
wxh pixels in extent), then the value of θ would range from 0.0 to 2π. While this may be 
of interest, it does carry with it an additional constraint, one that is absent in the fractal 
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code as presented, and that is that the image’s extent is known.  This may not always be 
the case, nor may it always be desirable.  Thus, if one is restricted to only constructing an 
inference based upon the information already present in a fractal code, then the quadrant 
restriction for θ must remain, and the distance value can be readily calculated as the 
square root of the squares of the (x,y) coordinate.  Even so, this would add distance and 
direction as features over which to calculate similarities.
Colorimetric inferences
 The pixel shift value encoded in a fractal code, like its spatial coordinate brethren, 
can also be interpreted in a number of ways.  If the average value of the whole image is 
known, then the shift value would be recast in terms of relative value to that average.  
Thus, if an image were predominantly light colored, a darker pixel shift value might have 
more value which matching for similarity as a relative measure.  But let me be clear, this 
would still presume that the overall average luminosity of an image be known at the 
fractal code level, perhaps an undesirable requirement. 
 Another interpretation of the shift value, independent of the average image value, 
would be to change the scale of the value from a linear scale to a logarithmic scale (Hunt 
& Pointer, 2011).  Thus, small changes would match small changes more crisply.  
 A third possible way to conduct the interpretation would be to discretize the 
values into some limited set of values, and therefore clump the matching potential for 
features which composite the shift value (Hall, 1989).  
 It is also possible to have these additional varying scales merely be rendered as 




 At the finest level of abstraction, a portion of an image is reduced to a single, 
orientation-free, photometric value, a pixel.  Curiously, the fractal representation readily 
may represent a single pixel, as a colorimetric shift, an identity transformation, and some 
offset. Thus, the fractal representation can represent any arriving image at any desired 
level of abstraction. 
 A potential future experiment would be to allow the visual similarity algorithm to 
proceed down to this finest level, and note the coefficient of variation in the answers.
Probabilistic Coding
 The search for a code yields a number of possible candidates, some of which are 
identically suited. My current implementation uses a heuristic of seeking the closest 
matching blocks which are spatially near the same location in the source and target 
images.  However, these other, unchosen matches are known to the algorithm, yet 
discarded.
 A variation of the fractal code, then, would be to introduce a notion of 
probabilistic coding.  That is, the fractal code could make note of how many blocks were 
close (within some controllable δ) matches, and have that be a new feature aspect.  This 
would offer a chance to reason over which blocks were most or least frequent in the 
source, a nice thought if the source image contains a high degree of self-similarity.
The Fractal Modality
 All of this dissertation research concerns itself with visual images.  But the visual 
sense is not the only one over which one could reason in a fractal-like manner.  Any sense 
modality which receives or transduces frequencies could have its input represented in a 
fractal form.  Audial fractal reasoning is an area to explore!
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On Fractal Reasoning
 Analogical reasoning, in general, has been the province of reasoning over 
propositional or strongly symbolic representations.  There have been exceptions, among 
them my research, and that of my colleague Maithilee Kunda.  Much of my research has 
been inspired by my earliest exposures to AI, in working with Janet Kolodner on the 
preamble to case-based reasoning (Kolodner, 1982; Kolodner et al., 1982). Here, I want 
to bring attention to specifically what additional kinds of reasoning fractal (or fractal-
like) representations afford, and expand on other intuitions arising from the advent of the 
ABR* algorithm.
Inference as Composition
 As I described earlier, Davis et al. (1993) note that knowledge representations 
play five distinct, critical roles.  Those roles are as a surrogate, as a set of ontological 
commitments, as a fragmentary theory of reasoning, as a medium for pragmatically 
efficient computation, and as a medium of human expression.   For the moment, let me 
presume that I’ve succeeded in my defense of the fractal representation as a knowledge 
representation, and focus on its ontological commitments and its impact on reasoning.
Fractals, Ontologically
 The fractal representation clearly makes a set of commitments that both define the 
extent of the representation’s capture of the world and define the way that extent is 
expressed or embodied within the representation ontologically.  As Davis et al. (1993) 
and Sowa (2000) note, the representational power lies in the correspondence of the 
representation to something in the world and in the constraints that that correspondence 
imposes.  As I’ve shown, the fractal code contains some features which are spatial and 
some which are photometric. The act of creating a fractal representation depends upon a 
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partitioning of the image into these fractal codes which is itself spatial.  The 
correspondence between the codes and portions of the image are firmly established, but 
so to are the constraints: the representation is only about spatial and photometric 
information.  There is no commitment to the construction of more commonplace 
geometric features (lines, enclosed areas, figure/ground, etc.) intrinsic in the fractal 
representation.
Inferences
 Even though the theory of reasoning arising from a representation may be 
implicit, it can be discerned by considering three aspects: what the representation defines 
as inferencing, the set of inferences it allows, and the subset of those inferences which it 
recommends.  I’ll discuss what I mean by fractal inferencing momentarily, but let us first 
examine the nature of the allowed and the recommended inferences.
 Allowed inferences are those inferences which can be made from available 
information.  As a representation might arise in any number of ways, so too might the 
allowed inferences vary.  As Davis, et al., point out, this flexibility is acknowledged so as 
to admit the legitimacy of the various approaches.  Having this flexibility at its core 
provides a framework for re-representation.  Indeed, much of my research hinged upon 
the fractal representation’s facility for re-representation.
 Clearly, the set of allowable inferences may become untenably large. A smaller, 
constrained subset of these inferences is necessary.  Whether by specifying the constraints 
with which to select recommended inferences, or by providing them somewhat explicitly, 
some process or reasoning or insight must be at work to frame them.  They also observe 
that much of the reasoning which informs recommended inferences has been provided by 
observation of human behavior.  While there are many possible inferences which can be 
drawn from the fractal encoding, my preliminary thoughts on fractal inferencing, and 
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subsequent discovery of the recommended inferences, stems from another role of 
knowledge representations: that they are a medium of efficient computation.  
Motivating Composition
 I noted earlier that the initial partitioning has a defining effect upon the fractal 
representation, in that each area partitioned results in a single fractal code.  Over the 
course of my research, I have experimented with varying the partitioning by using block 
sizes of many sizes, even to the extent wherein the entire image was considered as a 
single block.  These experiments lead me to an obvious finding: the time required to 
represent an image fractally increases as the partitioning varies.  Intriguingly, however, 
the encoding process that underlies creating fractal representations did not increase 
uniformly with a decrease in partition size.  In fact, I observed that the very largest or 
very smallest partitions took roughly the same amount of computation time, but that 
partitioning at sizes between these extremes took dramatically more computational 
resources.
 The search for matching blocks within the source and target images while creating 
fractal representations is the cause almost all of the computation time.  But, when faced 
with these experimental results, I began to speculate on how to leverage the notion of 
faster runtimes at the extreme of levels of abstraction. In particular, I had an “Aha!” 
moment: I wondered whether computational performance might improve if I composed 
coarser partitioning from the faster finer partitioning.  This lead me to conjecture that 
composition might be a form of fractal inference, and to develop a composition algorithm 
for fractal representations, which I now present.
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The Fractal Composition Algorithm
 The Fractal Composition Algorithm is a way to ensure that all possible 
compositions have been made from a given encoding.  It begins with the existing 
partitioning as expressed in the fractal representation, and stops when no further 
compositions can be made.  
Algorithm 13.1. Fractal Composition Algorithm
Proposing Composition
 A subset of the fractal codes in the fractal representation T is selected, based 
solely upon a single feature: its block size.  It is important to note that the selection of this 
subset based upon this one feature is non-arbitrary: I choose this feature expressly 
because I am seeking to optimize the calculation of a coarser partitioning based on block 
size.  Were it desirable, other partitionings of the fractal codes could be determined by 
Given the set T = {T1, T2, T3, ..., Tn} is a fractal representation.
Let B represent the level of abstraction at which T is encoded.
Do:
• Let n ← |T|
• Construct T’ ⊆ T such that Ti ∈ T’ iff the block size of Ti is B.
• For each fractal code Ti ∈ T’: 
- Propose a composition K, based on Ti.
- Search for 3 appropriate codes in T’ which both satisfy the rules of 
composition and correspond to needed elements of K.
- If the appropriate codes cannot be found, proposed composition K 
is invalid.
- If the appropriate codes are found, the proposed composition K is 
valid.
- If K is valid, form a new fractal code K’ from K, and add it  to the 
set T:  T ← T ∪ { K’ }
• Set B ← 2*B.
Repeat until n = |T|
247
extracting this subset using any of the feature (or combination of features) within a fractal 
code.
 Given the selection of such fractal codes, I can now address what kinds of 
compositions might be made.  In the present case, I know that one of these fractal codes 
will be one of four participating codes in a larger composition, as illustrated in Figure X.
Figure 13.1.  Image Composition
 The affine transformation feature of the composed code I shall require, as a 
constraint in the present implementation, to be identical to the affine transformation 
associated with the given code.   As the composition can be considered to be a 4-tuple of 
codes, this feature determines which position within that 4-tuple will be occupied by the 
given code.  Table 13.1 illustrates the required tuple location, based upon the affine 
transformation.
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Table 13.1. Initial location within the composed tuple.
Transformation Name Position Tuple
  Identity 1 < C, *, *, * >
  
Rotate 90° 3 < *, *, C, * >
  
Rotate 180° 4 < *, *, *, C >
  
Rotate 270° 2 < *, C, *, * >
  
Flip Horizontal 2 < *, *, C, * >
  
Flip Vertical 3 < *, *, C, * >
  
Reflect XY 1 < C, *, *, * >
  
Reflect -XY 4 < *, *, *, C >
 Since each fractal code has a single affine transformation associated with it, and 
because I am constraining the composed code to have the same affine transformation, 
there will be exactly one proposed composition per selected fractal code.  I note, 
however, that a code may participate in more than one composition.
 The act of composition becomes searching for three other codes which can be 
combined to fill out the missing places in the 4-tuple and thus form the composition.  
While they are selected from the same subset of fractal codes as the original code, they 
are further constrained by four rules, which I have labeled the rules of fractal 
composition.
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Rules of Fractal Composition
 I believe that these four rules are minimally necessary to ensure candidacy for 
combination.  While the order of application of these rules is generally arbitrary, 
computational efficiency may be gained by pruning the subset of codes through a 
particular ordering (size, transform, photometric) prior to calculation of coverage.  The 
rules subdivide into two groups: the consistency rules, and the coverage rule.
Consistency Rules: the Photometric, Size, and Transform Rules
 A fractal code contains both spatial and photometric features.  The photometric 
rule holds that the photometric features of the codes being combined must be the same.  
Thus, the pixel operation and the amount of color shift must be the same across all 
candidate codes.  The size rule requires that the dimensions of the code being composed 
be exactly twice that of the constituent code.  The algorithm directly enforces this rule 
during the selection by block size of the subset of codes to consider.  Lastly, the transform 
rule constrains the candidate codes to possess the same affine transformation as that of 
the original code.
The Coverage Rule
 The codes being combined must be spatially adjacent to one another and 
completely cover the area under consideration.  However, they must not overlap.  I use 
region connection calculus (reference) to specify how each of the regions must be 
externally connected (in that they share borders but do not overlap).  Furthermore, these 
regions must exhibit this connectivity in the destination image space.  Thus, for a 
proposed combination 4-tuple <C1,C2,C3,C4> and their corresponding regions 
{R1,R2,R3,R4}, the following four RCC relationships must hold:
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 R1 EC R2 ⋀ R3 EC R4 ⋀ R1 EC R3 ⋀ R2 EC R4
where, given point-set closed regions A and B,
 A EC B ≔ A ∩ B ≠ ∅ ⋀ interior(A) ∩ interior(B) = ∅
 interior(A) ≔ the set of interior points of A
Confirming Composition
 Once candidate blocks are found which conform to the rules of composition, then 
the task is to confirm the composition.  This can be done quite readily by examining the 
proposed composition under the coverage rule, but instead of using the destination image 
space, I use the source image space.  If all four of the RCC relationships hold in source 
image space, then the proposed composition is valid.
 A new fractal code may be generated from the proposed composition by taking 
the source and offset spatial values from the first value of the 4-tuple, and using the twice 
the block size, the affine transformation, and the color shift which were constant across 
all constituents.
Is Composition Truly Inference?
 The result of the composition algorithm is the creation of additional fractal codes, 
which are added to the entire representation.  Can it be said that these additional codes 
are the result of inference?
 Preliminarily, I’d argue that yes, composition in this manner is inference.  New 
knowledge is being created in a manner wholly sanctioned by the representation.  
Additionally, that new knowledge is then kept within the same representational 
framework as the old knowledge.  From a fractal reasoning point of view, this means that 
there would now be available, for any given initial level of abstraction, a set of inferred 
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fractal codes, each of which would contribute their own fractal features over which 
analogy by recall could occur.
Visual Case-based Reasoning
 Case-based reasoning concerns itself with performing analogical reasoning over 
cases stored in memory (Kolodner, 1993; Riesbeck & Schank, 1989).  My ABR 
algorithm was entirely informed by this field.   Yet, in the ABR algorithm, and not so 
with case-based reasoning, I make use of how something is stored in memory, rather than 
what something is stored in memory.  The use of features as indices into memory aligns 
with case-based reasoning, but differs in that no quality assessment is made with respect 
to the index itself.  Every index is treated equally.
 One could make an extension to my algorithms and models by relaxing this 
equality among indices.  After all, each index for me is a feature vector of some degree.  
It is easy to see how a weighting system could be implemented (e.g. the more features 
have that particular index, the stronger that index becomes when calculating similarities). 
Likewise, it is easy to see how to extend the comparison of indices, by relaxing the binary 
nature of the current comparison of the feature (to wit, in the present implementation, my 
algorithms view feature matching as all-or-nothing).  Proximal feature matching, on a 0.0 
to 1.0 scale, could yield a more finely tuned match, where the feature preference 
parameters could be determined a priori by the problem under consideration.
 In such a light, the Analogy By Recall algorithm and its descendants can be 
considered as a form of visual case-based reasoning. 
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The long shadow of Marr
 David Marr was a highly influential researcher in vision (Marr, 1982; Frisby & 
Stone, 2010). Famously, he proposed two frameworks for evaluating computational 
systems and for how the human visual system may work.  
 The first of these, his computational framework as outlined in Frisby & Stone 
(2010), informs and inspires my work as much as any other.  In this framework, he 
proposes that computational systems be analysis at three distinct levels:
* the computational level, to identify the constraints for solving some problem: what is 
the nature of the problem to be solved, what i the goal of the computation, why is it 
appropriate, and what is the logic of the strategy by which it can be carried out?
* the representational and algorithmic level, in which the constraints are put to work in an 
algorithm: how can the computational theory be implemented, what representations are 
to be used, and what is the algorithm which transforms the input into the output?
* the hardware implementation, as the realization of the algorithm and the representation: 
what is the physical nature of the processing?
 With this analytical approach, Marr did not mean to imply that the way the brain 
interprets visual information would be best seen as some series of steps, but rather that 
this affords a way to characterize the advent and realization of constraints when 
performing that interpretation.  Marr also did not equate this framework with computer 
vision per se, and rather used it to lump problems into two “types.”  A “type one” 
problem would be one in which some computational account would be attainable in 
principle, and therefore subject to his three-level analysis.  A “type two” problem would 
offer only evidence as to the interplay of various components, and not to the specifics of 
those components (and therefore not subject to the three-level analysis).  It is safe to 
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presume at this writing that how it is that the brain “sees” a visual scene is a task which 
we can ascribe to neither of Marr’s problem types.
 Marr’s other framework forms a potential account of how the human visual 
system may see a scene.  In Marr and Hildreth (1980), they describe how to form, first, a 
raw primal sketch of edges found within a presented visual scene, postulating that the 
first few stages of a brain’s visual processing system affords the neuronal apparatus 
necessary to detect edge fragments.  Then, from these fragmentary raw edges, a full 
primal sketch may be determined, using principles of gestalt perception and reasoning 
(such as grouping, continuity, closure, and the principle of least commitment).  From this 
slightly higher level representation, additional reasoning occurs to form planar closed 
shapes, and so on.
 I offer a different thought:  what if the material upon which Marr’s first stage of 
visual processing were not fragmentary edges, but fractal codes?  My supposition here is 
that just as Marr leverages gestalt continuity to assist in joining edge fragments into full 
primal edges, reasoning from fractal features, based upon an agent’s prior perceptual 
history, could give rise to similar gestalt-like capabilities.  Perhaps even such a system 
could operate in tandem with a Marr process, influencing and informing the inferences 
made at each of Marr’s stages.
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Final Remarks
 Fractal representations are analogical in that they have a structural 
correspondence with the images they represent. Like other knowledge representations, 
fractal representation support inference and composition. In this dissertation, I’ve used 
fractal representations to develop a powerful new model of analogical reasoning and 
applied it to problem domains of visual similarity and visual oddity.  Along the way, I 
also illustrated its utility in providing a nascent perceptual capability for agents in a 
virtual world, and even demonstrated its ability to mimic bistable perception.  The sum of 
my research suggests a degree of generality to fractal representations for addressing 
visual analogy problems.
 Analogies are based on similarity and repetition. Fractals capture self-similarity 
and repetition within images at multiple scales. Thus, the fractal representation brings the 
powerful idea of self-similarity to analogy-making. Furthermore, since fractals work at 
multiple scales, they give to rise to an iterative problem solving strategy as I have 
demonstrated. Processing may begin at a certain level of abstraction for computational 
efficiency or other expediencies, but should the problem solving not result in a clear 
answer, the strategy may be shifted to other levels of abstraction.  
 All of this is a direct consequence of choosing to represent images fractally.
255
REFERENCES
Ahmed, Nasir, Natarajan, T, & Rao, Kamisetty R. (1974). Discrete cosine transform. 
Computers, IEEE Transactions on, 100(1), 90-93. 
Allers, R., & Minkoff, R. (Writers). (1994). The Lion King: Walt Disney Pictures.
Appel, Arthur, Rohlf, F James, & Stein, Arthur J. (1979). The haloed line effect for 
hidden line elimination (Vol. 13): ACM.
Arkin, Ronald C. (1998). Behavior-based robotics [electronic resource]: MIT press.
Arnheim, Rudolf. (1954). Art and visual perception: A psychology of the creative eye: 
Univ of California Press.
Ashby, F Gregory, & Ennis, Daniel M. (2007). Similarity measures. Scholarpedia, 2(12), 
4116. 
Atmanspacher, H, Bach, M, Filk, T, Kornmeier, J, & Romer, H. (2008). Cognitive time 
scales in a Necker-Zeno model for bistable perception. Open Cybernetics & 
Systemics Journal, 2, 234-251. 
Baliarda, Carles Puente, Romeu, Jordi, & Cardama, Angel. (2000). The Koch monopole: 
A small fractal antenna. Antennas and Propagation, IEEE Transactions on, 48(11), 
1773-1781. 
Barnsley, Michael, & Hurd, Lyman. (1992). Fractal Image Compression. Boston, MA: 
A.K. Peters.
Barnsley, Michael F, & Demko, Stephen. (1985). Iterated function systems and the global 
construction of fractals. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. A. 
Mathematical and Physical Sciences, 399(1817), 243-275. 
Barnsley, Michael F, & Sloan, Alan D. (1990). United States Patent No. 4,941,193.
256
Barsalou, Lawrence W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Behavioral and brain 
sciences, 22(04), 577-660. 
Barsalou, Lawrence W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol., 59, 617-645. 
Berger, Andrea, Henik, Avishai, & Rafal, Robert. (2005). Competition between 
endogenous and exogenous orienting of visual attention. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 134(2), 207. 
Biederman, Irving. (1987). Recognition-by-components: A theory of human image 
understanding. Psychological review, 94(2), 115-147. 
Bisiach, Edoardo, Ricci, Raffaella, Lai, Elena, De Tanti, Antonio, & Inzaghi, Maria 
Grazia. (1999). Unilateral neglect and disambiguation of the Necker cube. Brain, 
122(1), 131-140. 
Bobrow, Daniel G, & Winograd, Terry. (1977). An overview of KRL, a knowledge 
representation language. Cognitive science, 1(1), 3-46. 
Bohan, A, & O’Donoghue, D. (2000). LUDI: A model for geometric analogies using 
attribute matching. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 11th Artificial 
Intelligence and Cognitive Science Conference (AICS-2000), Galway, Ireland.
Bringsjord, Selmer, & Schimanski, Bettina. (2003). What is artificial intelligence? 
Psychometric AI as an answer. Paper presented at the International Joint 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Brooks, Rodney A. (1991). Intelligence without representation. Artificial intelligence, 
47(1), 139-159. 
Bush, Robert R, & Mosteller, Frederick. (1953). A stochastic model with applications to 
learning. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 559-585. 
Carpenter, Patricia A, Just, Marcel Adam, & Shell, Peter. (1990). What one intelligence 
test measures: A theoretical account of the processing in the Raven Progressive 
Matrices Test. Psychological review, 97, 404-431. 
257
Cassimatis, Nicholas L, Bello, Paul, & Langley, Pat. (2008). Ability, Breadth, and 
Parsimony in Computational Models of Higher-Order Cognition. Cognitive 
science, 32(8), 1304-1322. 
Cave, Kyle R, & Bichot, Narcisse P. (1999). Visuospatial attention: Beyond a spotlight 
model. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6(2), 204-223. 
Chen, Wen-Hsiung, Smith, CH, & Fralick, Sam. (1977). A fast computational algorithm 
for the discrete cosine transform. Communications, IEEE Transactions on, 25(9), 
1004-1009. 
Cirillo, Simone, & Ström, Victor. (2010). An Anthropomorphic Solver for Raven's 
Progressive Matrices. 
Cross, Mark C, & Hohenberg, Pierre C. (1993). Pattern formation outside of equilibrium. 
Reviews of Modern Physics, 65(3), 851. 
Dastani, Mehdi, & Indurkhya, Bipin. (1997). An algebraic approach to similarity and 
categorization. Paper presented at the Interdisciplinary Workshop On Similarity 
and Categorization.
Dastani, Mehdi, & Indurkhya, Bipin. (2000). Discovering Pattern Structures: Interaction 
between Analogical Reasoning and Perception. 
Davies, Jim, & Goel, Ashok K. (2001). Visual analogy in problem solving. In Proc. of the 
17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-01), 
372-382.
Davies, Jim, Goel, Ashok K, & Nersessian, Nancy J. (2009). A computational model of 
visual analogies in design. Cognitive Systems Research, 10(3), 204-215. 
Davies, Jim, Goel, Ashok K, & Yaner, Patrick W. (2008). Proteus: Visuospatial analogy in 
problem-solving. Knowledge-Based Systems, 21(7), 636-654. 
Davies, Jim, Nersessian, Nancy J, & Goel, Ashok K. (2005). Visual models in analogical 
problem solving. Foundations of Science, 10(1), 133-152. 
258
Davis, Randall, Shrobe, Howard, & Szolovits, Peter. (1993). What is a knowledge 
representation? AI magazine, 14(1), 17. 
Dehaene, Stanislas, & Cohen, Laurent. (1994). Dissociable mechanisms of subitizing and 
counting: neuropsychological evidence from simultanagnosic patients. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 20(5), 958. 
Dehaene, Stanislas, & Cohen, Laurent. (1996). Towards an anatomical and functional 
model of number processing. Mathematical cognition, 1, 83-120. 
Dehaene, Stanislas, Izard, Véronique, Pica, Pierre, & Spelke, Elizabeth. (2006). Core 
knowledge of geometry in an Amazonian indigene group. Science, 311(5759), 
381-384. 
Demko, Stephen, Hodges, Laurie, & Naylor, Bruce. (1985). Construction of fractal 
objects with iterated function systems. Paper presented at the ACM SIGGRAPH 
Computer Graphics.
Diascro, Matthew N, & Brody, Nathan. (1994). Odd-man-out and intelligence. 
Intelligence, 19(1), 79-92. 
Dosher, Barbara Anne, Sperling, George, & Wurst, Stephen A. (1986). Tradeoffs between 
stereopsis and proximity luminance covariance as determinants of perceived 3D 
structure. Vision research, 26(6), 973-990. 
Eckmann, J-P, & Ruelle, David. (1985). Ergodic theory of chaos and strange attractors. 
Reviews of Modern Physics, 57(3), 617. 
Einhäuser, Wolfgang, Martin, Kevan AC, & König, Peter. (2004). Are switches in 
perception of the Necker cube related to eye position? European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 20(10), 2811-2818. 
Eriksen, Charles W, & St. James, James D. (1986). Visual attention within and around the 
field of focal attention: A zoom lens model. Perception & Psychophysics, 40(4), 
225-240. 
259
Evans, Thomas G. (1964). A heuristic program to solve geometric-analogy problems. 
Paper presented at the Proceedings of the April 21-23, 1964, spring joint computer 
conference.
Falkenhainer, Brian, Forbus, Kenneth D, & Gentner, Dedre. (1986). The structure-
mapping engine: Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign.
Ferguson, Ronald W. (1994). MAGI: Analogy-based encoding using regularity and 
symmetry. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the sixteenth annual conference 
of the Cognitive Science Society.
Forbus, Kenneth D, Ferguson, Ronald W, & Usher, Jeffery M. (2001). Towards a 
computational model of sketching. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 6th 
international conference on Intelligent user interfaces.
Forbus, Kenneth D, Usher, Jeffrey M, Lovett, Andrew, Lockwood, Kate, & Wetzel, Jon. 
(2008). CogSketch: Open-domain Sketch Understanding for Cognitive Science 
Research and for Education. Paper presented at the SBM.
Franco, Laura, & Sperry, RW. (1977). Hemisphere lateralization for cognitive processing 
of geometry. Neuropsychologia, 15(1), 107-114. 
French, Robert M. (2002). The computational modeling of analogy-making. Trends in 
cognitive Sciences, 6(5), 200-205. 
Frisby, John P, & Stone, James V. (2010). Seeing: The computational approach to 
biological vision: The MIT Press.
Gentner, Dedre. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. 
Cognitive science, 7(2), 155-170. 
Gentner, Dedre. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical learning. Similarity and 
analogical reasoning, 199, 241. 
Gentner, Dedre, Holyoak, Keith James, & Kokinov, Boicho N. (2001). The analogical 
mind: Perspectives from cognitive science: The MIT Press.
260
Gentner, Dedre, & Loewenstein, Jeffrey. (2002). Relational language and relational 
thought. Language, literacy, and cognitive development: The development and 
consequences of symbolic communication, 87-120. 
Goel, Ashok K. (1997). Design, analogy, and creativity. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 
Special Issue on Qualitative Reasoning, 12(3), 62-70.
Goel, Ashok K., & Bhatta, Sambasiva R. (2004). Use of design patterns in analogy-based 
design. Advanced Engineering Informatics, 18(2), 85-94.
Goldschmidt, Gabriela. (2001). Visual analogy: A strategy for design reasoning and 
learning. Design knowing and learning: Cognition in design education, 199-220. 
Goldstein, E Bruce. (2013). Sensation and perception: Cengage Learning.
Grassberger, Peter, & Procaccia, Itamar. (1983). Characterization of strange attractors. 
Physical review letters, 50(5), 346-349. 
Green, David Marvin, & Swets, John A. (1966). Signal detection theory and 
psychophysics (Vol. 1): Wiley New York.
Gregson, RAM. (1976). A comparative evaluation of seven similarity models. British 
Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, 29(2), 139-156. 
Griffith, Todd. W., Nersessian, Nancy J., & Goel, Ashok. (2000). Function-follows-Form: 
Generative Modeling in Scientific Reasoning. In 22nd Annual Conference of the 
Cognitive Science Society, 196-201.
Guarino, N. (1995). Formal ontology, conceptual analysis and knowledge representation. 
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 43(5), 625-640.
Guckenheimer, John, & Holmes, Philip. (1983). Nonlinear oscillations, dynamical 
systems, and bifurcations of vector fields. 
Hall, Roy. (1989). Illumination and color in computer generated imagery (Vol. 7): 
Springer-Verlag New York.
261
Halsey, Thomas C, Jensen, Mogens H, Kadanoff, Leo P, Procaccia, Itamar, & Shraiman, 
Boris I. (1986). Fractal measures and their singularities: the characterization of 
strange sets. Physical Review A, 33(2), 1141. 
Hart, John C. (1996). Fractal image compression and recurrent iterated function systems. 
Computer Graphics and Applications, IEEE, 16(4), 25-33. 
Haugland, John C. (1981). Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial 
Intelligence: MIT Press.
Henderson, John M. (2003). Human gaze control during real-world scene perception. 
Trends in cognitive Sciences, 7(11), 498-504. 
Hertzmann, Aaron, Jacobs, Charles E, Oliver, Nuria, Curless, Brian, & Salesin, David H. 
(2001). Image analogies. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 28th annual 
conference on Computer graphics and interactive techniques.
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (2001). Analogy as the core of cognition. The analogical mind: 
Perspectives from cognitive science, 499-538. 
Hofstadter, Douglas R. (2008). Fluid concepts and creative analogies: Computer models 
of the fundamental mechanisms of thought (F. A. R. Group Ed.). New York: Basic 
Books.
Holyoak, Keith J, & Hummel, John E. (2001). Toward an understanding of analogy 
within a biological symbol system. The analogical mind: Perspectives from 
cognitive science, 161-195. 
Holyoak, Keith J, & Thagard, Paul. (1996). Mental leaps: Analogy in creative thought: 
MIT press.
Holyoak, Keith J, & Thagard, Paul. (1997). The analogical mind. American Psychologist, 
52(1), 35. 
Hunt, Earl. (1974). Quote the Raven? Nevermore. In L. W. Gregg (Ed.), Knowledge and 
Cognition (pp. 129-158). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
262
Hunt, R Reed. (1995). The subtlety of distinctiveness: What von Restorff really did. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2(1), 105-112. 
Hunt, Robert William Gainer, & Pointer, Michael R. (2011). Measuring colour: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Indurkhya, Bipin. (1989). Modes of analogy Analogical and Inductive Inference (pp. 
217-230): Springer.
Indurkhya, Bipin. (1998). On creation of features and change of representation. 認知科学
= Cognitive studies: bulletin of the Japanese Cognitive Science Society, 5(2), 
43-56. 
Inui, Toshio, Tanaka, Shigeki, Okada, Tomohisa, Nishizawa, Sadahiko, Katayama, 
Masahiro, & Konishi, Junji. (2000). Neural substrates for depth perception of the 
Necker cube; a functional magnetic resonance imaging study in human subjects. 
Neuroscience letters, 282(3), 145-148. 
Jackson, Peter (Writer). (2003). Lord of the Rings: Return of the King: New Line 
Cinema.
Johnson-Laird, Philip Nicholas. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of 
language, inference, and consciousness (Vol. 6): Harvard University Press.
Junge, Kenneth. (1977). Generalization of the Eisler-Ekman similarity function. 
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 45(2), 616-618. 
Kim, Kyungnam, Chalidabhongse, Thanarat H, Harwood, David, & Davis, Larry. (2005). 
Real-time foreground–background segmentation using codebook model. Real-
time imaging, 11(3), 172-185. 
Kishiyama, Mark M, & Yonelinas, Andrew P. (2003). Novelty effects on recollection and 
familiarity in recognition memory. Memory & cognition, 31(7), 1045-1051. 
263
Klink, PC, van Wezel, RJA, & van Ee, R. (2012). United we sense, divided we fail: 
context-driven perception of ambiguous visual stimuli. Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367(1591), 932-941. 
Kogo, Naoki, Galli, Alessandra, & Wagemans, Johan. (2011). Switching dynamics of 
border ownership: A stochastic model for bi-stable perception. Vision research, 
51(18), 2085-2098. 
Kokinov, Boicho, & Petrov, Alexander. (2001). Integrating memory and reasoning in 
analogy-making: The AMBR model. The Analogical Mind. Perspectives from 
Cognitive Science, Cambridge Mass. 
Kolodner, Janet. (1993). Case-based reasoning. San Mateo, CA: Morgan Kaufmann.
Kolodner, J., Simpson, B., Sharpe, D., & McGreggor, K. (1982). Intelligent Fact 
Retrieval. ACM SIGART Bulletin, 79, 55-56. 
Kolodner, Janet L. (1982). The Role of Experience in Development of Expertise. Paper 
presented at the AAAI.
Korn, Granino Arthur, & Korn, Theresa Marie. (2000). Mathematical handbook for 
scientists and engineers: definitions, theorems, and formulas for reference and 
review: Courier Dover Publications.
Kornmeier, Jürgen, & Bach, Michael. (2004). Early neural activity in Necker-cube 
reversal: Evidence for low-level processing of a gestalt phenomenon. 
Psychophysiology, 41(1), 1-8. 
Kornmeier, Jürgen, & Bach, Michael. (2005). The Necker cube—An ambiguous figure 
disambiguated in early visual processing. Vision research, 45(8), 955-960. 
Krapivsky, PL, & Ben-Naim, E. (1994). Multiscaling in stochastic fractals. Physics 
Letters A, 196(3), 168-172. 
Kuehne, Sven, Forbus, Kenneth, Gentner, Dedre, & Quinn, Bryan. (2000). SEQL: 
Category learning as progressive abstraction using structure mapping. Paper 
264
presented at the Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive 
Science Society.
Kuncel, Nathan R, Hezlett, Sarah A, & Ones, Deniz S. (2004). Academic performance, 
career potential, creativity, and job performance: can one construct predict them 
all? Journal of personality and social psychology, 86(1), 148. 
Kunda, Maithilee, McGreggor, Keith, & Goel, Ashok. (2010). Taking a look (literally!) at 
the Raven's intelligence test: Two visual solution strategies. Paper presented at the 
Proc. 32nd Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Portland.
Kunda, Maithilee, McGreggor, Keith, & Goel, Ashok. (2011). Two Visual Strategies for 
Solving the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Intelligence Test. Paper presented at the 
Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence.
Kunda, Maithilee, McGreggor, Keith, & Goel, Ashok. (2012). Reasoning on the Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices Test with Iconic Visual Representations. Paper 
presented at the 34th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Sapporo, 
Japan.
Kunda, Maithilee, McGreggor, Keith, & Goel, Ashok K. (2013). A computational model 
for solving problems from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices intelligence test 
using iconic visual representations. Cognitive Systems Research, 22-23, 47-66. 
Laird, John E, Newell, Allen, & Rosenbloom, Paul S. (1987). Soar: An architecture for 
general intelligence. Artificial intelligence, 33(1), 1-64. 
Lakoff, George, & Núñez, Rafael E. (2000). Where mathematics comes from: How the 
embodied mind brings mathematics into being: Basic books.
Lindenmayer, Aristid. (1968). Mathematical models for cellular interactions in 
development I. Filaments with one-sided inputs. Journal of theoretical biology, 
18(3), 280-299. 
Lohman, David F. (2004). Aptitude for college: The importance of reasoning tests for 
minority admissions. Rethinking the SAT: The future of standardized testing in 
university admissions, 41-55. 
265
Lovett, Andrew, Forbus, Kenneth, & Usher, Jeffrey. (2007). Analogy with qualitative 
spatial representations can simulate solving Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Society, Nashville, Tennessee.
Lovett, Andrew, Forbus, Kenneth, & Usher, Jeffrey. (2010). A structure-mapping model 
of Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 32nd 
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Portland, Oregon.
Lovett, Andrew, Lockwood, Kate, & Forbus, Kenneth. (2008). Modeling cross-cultural 
performance on the visual oddity task Spatial Cognition VI. Learning, Reasoning, 
and Talking about Space (pp. 378-393): Springer.
Lovett, Andrew, Tomai, Emmett, Forbus, Kenneth, & Usher, Jeffrey. (2009). Solving 
Geometric Analogy Problems Through Two-Stage Analogical Mapping. 
Cognitive science, 33(7), 1192-1231. 
Lumer, Erik D, Friston, Karl J, & Rees, Geraint. (1998). Neural correlates of perceptual 
rivalry in the human brain. Science, 280(5371), 1930-1934. 
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. (1975). Stochastic models for the Earth's relief, the shape and the 
fractal dimension of the coastlines, and the number-area rule for islands. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 72(10), 3825-3828. 
Mandelbrot, Benoit B. (1982). The fractal geometry of nature. San Francisco: W.H. 
Freeman.
Mandler, George, & Shebo, Billie J. (1982). Subitizing: an analysis of its component 
processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 111(1), 1. 
Markman, Arthur B. (1999). Knowledge representation: Routledge.
Markman, Arthur B, & Gentner, Dedre. (1993). Splitting the differences: A structural 
alignment view of similarity. Journal of Memory and Language, 32(4), 517-535. 
Markou, Markos, & Singh, Sameer. (2003). Novelty detection: a review—part 1: 
statistical approaches. Signal processing, 83(12), 2481-2497. 
266
Markou, Markos, & Singh, Sameer. (2003). Novelty detection: a review—part 2:: neural 
network based approaches. Signal processing, 83(12), 2499-2521. 
Marr, D. (1982). Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation 
and Processing of Visual Information. San Francisco, CA: WH Freeman and Co.
Marr, David, & Hildreth, Ellen. (1980). Theory of edge detection. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences, 207(1167), 187-217. 
Mazel, David S, & Hayes, Monson H. (1992). Using iterated function systems to model 
discrete sequences. Signal Processing, IEEE Transactions on, 40(7), 1724-1734. 
McGreggor, Keith, & Goel, Ashok. (2011). Finding the odd one out: a fractal analogical 
approach. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on 
Creativity and cognition.
McGreggor, Keith, & Goel, Ashok. (2012). Fractal analogies for general intelligence 
Artificial General Intelligence (pp. 177-188): Springer.
McGreggor, Keith, Kunda, Maithilee, & Goel, Ashok. (2011). Fractal Analogies: 
Preliminary Results from the Raven’s Test of Intelligence. Paper presented at the 
Proc. International Conference on Computational Creativity, Mexico City, 
Mexico, April.
McGreggor, Keith, Yerga, Christopher M, & Van Brink, David. (1999). USA Patent No. 
5,963,201. U. S. P. a. T. Office.
Meagher, Don. (2006). Understanding Analogies. 
Meng, Ming, & Tong, Frank. (2004). Can attention selectively bias bistable perception? 
Differences between binocular rivalry and ambiguous figures. Journal of vision, 
4(7). 
Minsky, Marvin. (1974). A framework for representing knowledge. 
267
Minsky, Marvin. (1995). A framework for representing knowledge. Paper presented at the 
Computation & intelligence.
Mitchell, Jude F, Stoner, Gene R, & Reynolds, John H. (2004). Object-based attention 
determines dominance in binocular rivalry. Nature, 429(6990), 410-413. 
Näätänen, R, & Gaillard, AWK. (1983). 5 The Orienting Reflex and the N2 Deflection of 
the Event-Related Potential (ERP). Advances in psychology, 10, 119-141. 
Nagao, Natsuki, Nishimura, Haruhiko, & Matsui, Nobuyuki. (2000). A neural chaos 
model of multistable perception. Neural Processing Letters, 12(3), 267-276. 
Necker, LA. (1832). On an apparent change of position in a drawing or engraved figure 
of a crystal. The London & Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of 
Science, 1(Third Series, November), 329–337. 
Nersessian, Nancy. (2008). Creating scientific concepts: The MIT Press.
Neto, Hugo Viera, & Nehmzow, Ulrich. (2007). Visual novelty detection with automatic 
scale selection. Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 55(9), 693-701. 
Newell, Allen. (1994). Unified theories of cognition (Vol. 187): Harvard University Press.
Newell, Allen, Shaw, John Calman, & Simon, Herbert A. (1958). Elements of a theory of 
human problem solving. Psychological review, 65(3), 151. 
Noest, AJ, Van Ee, R, Nijs, MM, & Van Wezel, RJA. (2007). Percept-choice sequences 
driven by interrupted ambiguous stimuli: A low-level neural model. Journal of 
vision, 7(8). 
Norman, Donald A. (1993). Cognition in the head and in the world: An introduction to 
the special issue on situated action. Cognitive science, 17(1), 1-6. 
O'Hara, Scott, & Indurkhya, Bipin. (1995). Adaptation and redescription in the context of 
geometric proportional analogies. Paper presented at the AAAI-95 Fall 
Symposium on Adaptation of Knowledge for Reuse.
268
O'reilly, Randall C, & Johnson, Mark H. (1994). Object recognition and sensitive periods: 
A computational analysis of visual imprinting. Neural Computation, 6(3), 
357-389. 
Oblinger, Kenneth D Forbus Dan. (1990). Making SME greedy and pragmatic. Paper 
presented at the Program of the Twelfth Annual Conference of the Cognitive 
Science Society: 25-28 July 1990, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Ojha, Amitash, & Indurkhya, Bipin. (2009). Perceptual vs. conceptual similarities and 
creation of new features in visual metaphor: New Frontiers in Analogy Research, 
Sofia: New Bulgarian University Press.
Owen, Adrian M, Hampshire, Adam, Grahn, Jessica A, Stenton, Robert, Dajani, Said, 
Burns, Alistair S, . . . Ballard, Clive G. (2010). Putting brain training to the test. 
Nature, 465(7299), 775-778. 
Parish, Yoav IH, & Müller, Pascal. (2001). Procedural modeling of cities. Paper presented 
at the Proceedings of the 28th annual conference on Computer graphics and 
interactive techniques.
Pearson. (2011). The Miller Analogies Test Study Guide   
Picton, Terence W. (1992). The P300 wave of the human event-related potential. Journal 
of clinical neurophysiology, 9(4), 456-479. 
Pomplun, Marc, Ritter, Helge, & Velichkovsky, Boris. (1996). Disambiguating complex 
visual information: Towards communication of personal views of a scene. 
PERCEPTION-LONDON-, 25, 931-948. 
Posner, Michael I, Snyder, Charles R, & Davidson, Brian J. (1980). Attention and the 
detection of signals. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109(2), 160. 
Prade, Henri, & Richard, Gilles. (2011). Analogy-making for solving IQ tests: A logical 
view Case-Based Reasoning Research and Development (pp. 241-257): Springer.
269
Prade, Henri, & Richard, Gilles. (2013). Analogical Proportions and Multiple-Valued 
Logics Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty (pp. 
497-509): Springer.
Prusinkiewcz, Przemyslaw, & Sandness, Glen. (1988). Koch curves as attractors and 
repellers. Computer Graphics and Applications, IEEE, 8(6), 26-40. 
Prusinkiewicz, Przemyslaw, & Hammel, Mark S. (1992). Escape-time visualization 
method for language-restricted iterated function systems Fractal Geometry and 
Computer Graphics (pp. 24-44): Springer.
Prusinkiewicz, Przemyslaw, Lindenmayer, Aristid, Hanan, James S, Fracchia, F David, 
Fowler, Deborah R, de Boer, Martin JM, & Mercer, Lynn. (1990). The algorithmic 
beauty of plants (Vol. 2): Springer-Verlag New York.
Ragni, Marco, Stahl, Philip, & Fangmeier, Thomas. (2011). Cognitive Complexity in 
Matrix Reasoning Tasks. 
Rasmussen, Daniel, & Eliasmith, Chris. (2011). A neural model of rule generation in 
inductive reasoning. Topics in Cognitive Science, 3(1), 140-153. 
Raven, J, Raven, J.C., & Court, J.H. (2003). Manual for Raven’s progressive matrices 
and vocabulary scales. San Antonio, TX: Harcourt Assessment.
Ray, Siddheswar, & Turi, Rose H. (1999). Determination of number of clusters in k-
means clustering and application in colour image segmentation. Paper presented 
at the Proceedings of the 4th international conference on advances in pattern 
recognition and digital techniques.
Reeke, George N, & Edelman, Gerald M. (1988). Real brains and artificial intelligence. 
Daedalus, 117(1), 143-173. 
Reynolds, Craig W. (1987). Flocks, herds and schools: A distributed behavioral model. 
Paper presented at the ACM SIGGRAPH Computer Graphics.
Reynolds, Craig W. (1999). Steering behaviors for autonomous characters. Paper 
presented at the Game Developers Conference, San Jose, CA.
270
Riesbeck, Christopher K., & Schank, Roger C. (1989). Inside case-based reasoning. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Ruiz, Philippe E. (2009). Measuring fluid intelligence on a ratio scale: Evidence from 
nonverbal classification problems and information entropy. Behavior research 
methods, 41(2), 439-445. 
Ruiz, Philippe E. (2011). Building and solving odd-one-out classification problems: A 
systematic approach. Intelligence, 39(5), 342-350. 
Russell, Stuart Jonathan, Norvig, Peter, Davis, Ernest, Russell, Stuart Jonathan, & 
Russell, Stuart Jonathan. (2010). Artificial intelligence: a modern approach (Vol. 
2): Prentice hall Englewood Cliffs.
Santini, Simone, & Jain, Ramesh. (1999). Similarity measures. Pattern analysis and 
machine intelligence, IEEE transactions on, 21(9), 871-883. 
Schaller, Robert R. (1997). Moore's law: past, present and future. Spectrum, IEEE, 34(6), 
52-59. 
Schneider, Jens, & Westermann, Rüdiger. (2001). Towards Real-Time Visual Simulation 
of Water Surfaces. Paper presented at the VMV.
Schwering, Angela, Gust, Helmar, Kühnberger, Kai-Uwe, & Krumnack, Ulf. (2009). 
Solving geometric proportional analogies with the analogy model HDTP. Paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci 2009), 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Schwering, Angela, Krumnack, Ulf, Kühnberger, Kai-Uwe, & Gust, Helmar. (2007). 
Using gestalt principles to compute analogies of geometric figures. Paper 
presented at the 19th Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society (CogSci07).
Schwering, Angela, Kühnberger, Kai-Uwe, Krumnack, Ulf, & Gust, Helmar. (2009). 
Spatial cognition of geometric figures in the context of proportional analogies 
Spatial Information Theory (pp. 18-35): Springer.
271
Sezgin, Mehmet. (2004). Survey over image thresholding techniques and quantitative 
performance evaluation. Journal of Electronic imaging, 13(1), 146-168. 
Sinclair, N, & Schiralli, M. (2003). A constructive response toWhere mathematics comes 
from'. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 52(1), 79-91. 
Sjoberg, Lennart. (1975). Models of similarity and intensity. Psychological Bulletin, 
82(2), 191. 
Sjoberg, Lennart. (1977). Similarity and multidimensional ratio estimation with 
simultaneous qualitative and quantitative variation. Scandinavian Journal of 
Psychology, 18(1), 307-316. 
Sjöberg, Lennart. (1971). Three models for the analysis of subjective ratios. Scandinavian 
Journal of Psychology, 12(1), 217-240. 
Sjöberg, Lennart, & Thorslund, Christer. (1979). A classificatory theory of similarity. 
Psychological Research, 40(3), 223-247. 
Sloman, Aaron. (1989). On designing a visual system (Towards a Gibsonian 
computational model of vision). Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial 
Intelligence, 1(4), 289-337. 
Sloman, Aaron. (2011). What is vision for, and how does it work? 
Smith, Alvy Ray. (1984). Plants, fractals, and formal languages. Paper presented at the 
ACM SIGGRAPH Computer Graphics.
Sokolov, Evgeniy N. (1963). Higher nervous functions: The orienting reflex. Annual 
review of physiology, 25(1), 545-580. 
Sowa, John F. (2000). Knowledge representation: logical, philosophical, and 
computational foundations (Vol. 13): MIT Press.
Spearman, Charles. (1904). " General Intelligence," Objectively Determined and 
Measured. The American Journal of Psychology, 15(2), 201-292. 
272
Stark, Jaroslav. (1991). Iterated function systems as neural networks. Neural Networks, 
4(5), 679-690. 
Steinman, Robert M, Pizlo, Zygmunt, & Pizlo, Filip J. (2000). Phi is not beta, and why 
Wertheimer’s discovery launched the Gestalt revolution. Vision research, 40(17), 
2257-2264. 
Sternberg, Robert J. (1977). Intelligence, information processing, and analogical 
reasoning: The componential analysis of human abilities: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Sternberg, Robert J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence: CUP 
Archive.
Stone, James V, & Harper, Nicol. (1999). Temporal constraints on visual learning: a 
computational model. PERCEPTION-LONDON-, 28, 1089-1104. 
Sundareswara, Rashmi, & Schrater, Paul R. (2008). Perceptual multistability predicted by 
search model for Bayesian decisions. Journal of vision, 8(5). 
Taylor, Richard, Brewster, David, & Phillips, Richard. (1832). The London and 
Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science: Richard Taylor, Red 
Lion Court, Fleet Street, Printer to the University of London. Sold by Longman, 
Rees, Orme, Brown, Green, and Longman; Cadell Baldwin and Cradock; 
Sherwood, Gilbert, and Piper; Simpkin and Marshall; and S. Highley, London:--
by Adam Black, Edinburgh; Smith and Son, Glasgow; Hodges and M'Arthur, 
Dublin; and GG Bennis, Paris.
Tomai, E, Forbus, K, & Usher, J. (2004). Qualitative spatial reasoning for geometric 
analogies. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 18th International Qualitative 
Reasoning Workshop.
Tomai, Emmett, Lovett, Andrew, Forbus, Kenneth D, & Usher, Jeffrey. (2005). A 
structure mapping model for solving geometric analogy problems. 
Tong, Frank, Meng, Ming, & Blake, Randolph. (2006). Neural bases of binocular rivalry. 
Trends in cognitive Sciences, 10(11), 502-511. 
273
Treisman, Anne M, & Gelade, Garry. (1980). A feature-integration theory of attention. 
Cognitive psychology, 12(1), 97-136. 
Trick, Lana M, & Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1993). What enumeration studies can show us 
about spatial attention: evidence for limited capacity preattentive processing. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19(2), 
331. 
Trick, Lana M, & Pylyshyn, Zenon W. (1994). Why are small and large numbers 
enumerated differently? A limited-capacity preattentive stage in vision. 
Psychological review, 101(1), 80. 
Tu, Xiaoyuan, & Terzopoulos, Demetri. (1994). Artificial fishes: Physics, locomotion, 
perception, behavior. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 21st annual 
conference on Computer graphics and interactive techniques (SIGGRAPH '94).
Tversky, Amos. (1977). Features of similarity. Psychological review, 84(4), 327-352. 
Tversky, Barbara. (1993). Cognitive maps, cognitive collages, and spatial mental models 
Spatial Information Theory A Theoretical Basis for GIS (pp. 14-24): Springer.
Ullman, Shimon. (1995). Sequence seeking and counter streams: a computational model 
for bidirectional information flow in the visual cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 5(1), 
1-11. 
Varma, Sashank. (2011). Criteria for the Design and Evaluation of Cognitive 
Architectures. Cognitive science, 35(7), 1329-1351. 
Viola, Paul, & Jones, Michael. (2001). Rapid object detection using a boosted cascade of 
simple features. Paper presented at the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 
2001. CVPR 2001. Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Computer Society Conference 
on.
Von Restorff, Hedwig. (1933). Über die wirkung von bereichsbildungen im spurenfeld. 
Psychologische Forschung, 18(1), 299-342. 
274
Wagemans, Johan, Elder, James H, Kubovy, Michael, Palmer, Stephen E, Peterson, Mary 
A, Singh, Manish, & von der Heydt, Rüdiger. (2012). A century of Gestalt 
psychology in visual perception: I. Perceptual grouping and figure–ground 
organization. 
Wagemans, Johan, Feldman, Jacob, Gepshtein, Sergei, Kimchi, Ruth, Pomerantz, James 
R, van der Helm, Peter A, & van Leeuwen, Cees. (2012). A century of Gestalt 
psychology in visual perception: II. Conceptual and theoretical foundations. 
Wallace, William P. (1965). Review of the historical, empirical, and theoretical status of 
the von Restorff phenomenon. Psychological Bulletin, 63(6), 410. 
Whitely, Susan E, & Schneider, Lisa M. (1981). Information structure for geometric 
analogies: A test theory approach. Applied Psychological Measurement, 5(3), 
383-397. 
Winograd, Terry. (1973). A procedural model of language understanding. Computer 
models of thought and language, 152, 186. 
Yaner, P. W., & Goel, A. K. (2006). Visual analogies at multiple levels of abstraction. In 
Proc. of 29th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society.
Yaner, P. W., & Goel, A. K. (2008). Analogical recognition of shape and structure in 
design drawings. International Journal of AI in Engineering Design, Analysis and 
Manufacturing, Special Issue on Multimodal Design, 22(2), 117-128.
Zhu, Song Chun, & Yuille, Alan. (1996). Region competition: Unifying snakes, region 
growing, and Bayes/MDL for multiband image segmentation. Pattern analysis and 
machine intelligence, IEEE transactions on, 18(9), 884-900. 
275
